Luke_Wilbur

Pam I do not take sides on this boards. I do monitor people that do not follow the Posted Guidelines. I have noticed that the ip you have posted with 213.251.135.49 is the same as Tammy Bresloff.

Human, I just got back from winter vacation. I tried to contact the person that was writing as a guest, but I did not receive an email response. It is our policy not to editing guest messages without knowing who wrote them. At this point of the thread the guest began writing about Central American Intelligence rather that the stated topic, 'Iraq Prewar Intelligence.' I can make a change to this topic if you send an email to luke@dcpages.com stating you are the person who posted as guest Human. I will have to edit this statement and my edit will be shown on the board. But I cannot delete other remarks without the permission of the other posters.

Patrick Ramsey saved our butts against the Giants, but right now Mark Brunell is our man. Three special shout-outs! One to Marcus Washington, who has been named the NFC Defensive Player of the Month for December! A second shout-out to Mike Sellars, named NFC Player of the Week for Special Teams (that's the fourth week in a row, one of the Redskins has been named an NFC Player of the Week!) And finally, a very special shout-out to Assistant Head Coach/Defense Gregg Williams! On behalf of all the Redskins fans, thanks for the vote of confidence in the team and in the city! Hail to the Redskins!

Here is what they wrote me. They did not even take inconsideration that they ruined a trip. I even offerred to pay them the difference. That is pretty pathetic. I will never use Priceline again.

I have contacted Priceline by email once again. They are This what I have received from Priceline so far.

I planned to take the DCpages staff out to Las Vegas to watch the Superbowl. I decided to use Priceline Vacation packages. The problem is that one of my staff would be Traveling from San Francisco to Las Vegas. I was wondering how I could do the vacation package to include two different departure routes so I went into the web site and then spent time creating an itinerary. When I realized I could not do it myself I called Priceline reservations. I explained how I was going to Las Vegas to watch the Superbowl and having a mini convention with our community staff members. I further explained that I would like our company to pay for the air fare and trip. I then told the gentleman the airfare time and date I wanted. He told me to pay for the one fair, because the prices change all the time. So I booked a 11:30 pm flight out of Las Vegas to Washington. He then told me to use SFO instead of Oakland to Las Vegas. I got the price called my staff member to confirm the date and I then booked my second flight. Here is my problem.... When I got my email I found out that my flight was no longer a Red Eye back to Washington. Priceline instead picked a flight that starts before kickoff of the Superbowl. This one email has ruined our whole trip. I followed the Priceline instructions and spoke with Jesse 7090. He told me that the Priceline representative should have told me to review the contract before I booked my flight. He is right. DO NOT TRUST WHAT A PRICELINE RESERVATION AGENT STATES. Jesse 7090 told me there was nothing he could do, but I can try to contact Lisa Gillianham. I asked Jesse 7090 for her email he stated that she has none. He then told me to look in invester relations. Lisa Gillingham Senior Vice President, Customer Service and Operations Lisa Gillingham was promoted to Senior Vice President, Customer Service & Operations, for priceline.com in March 2001. She joined priceline.com in April 2000 as Vice President, Customer Service. Prior to joining priceline.com, Ms. Gillingham was e-Commerce Director, Interactive Group at AT&T. Before that, she served in a number of finance, product management, advertising, marketing and program management positions for AT&T in both business-to-business and business-to-consumer categories.

Thanks for taking the time to clarify this issue Martin.

The Redskins have signed Gregg Williams, assistant head coach-defense, to a new three-year contract, the team has announced.

I was in Philly for the game. It was scary in many ways. I would love to know the price of two tickets for the Redskins vs. Tampa Bay. Hail to the Skins.

WTOP wants to know the date of Mayor Williams and Councilman Fenty's confrontation.

Look I am about at the edge here with all of you. I have asked numerous times to focus on issues and not slandering someone.

Jason Rees IP is 64.27.5.168 MissGloverPark IP 72.36.253.66 and 4.249.120.65 CUMES IP 138.88.109.84

What are you talking about? Where and when did they make that statement.

Mr. Rees, You promised to me over the phone that you would not stoop down to this low banter. I thought you were a man of your word. Stick to the issues.

That is a horrible thing to say. DCpages does not associate itself with anyone that wishes harm on another.

Here is a White House Press Briefing by Scott McClellan on the issue dated December 21 - U.S. District Court Judge Dee Benson also sits on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the 11-judge panel that secretively approves wiretaps and searches in the most sensitive terrorism and espionage cases. Here is good definition developed by Lee Tien, Electronic Frontier Foundation "In looking at FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) warrants, my main job is to decide whether the statute has been complied with and, if there is a probable cause, determine it's based on certain facts," Benson told The Salt Lake Tribune on Thursday. 1. What is FISA? FISA is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which establishes a legal regime for "foreign intelligence" surveillance separate from ordinary law enforcement surveillance. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-62). 2. What is the purpose of FISA? FISA is aimed at regulating the collection of "foreign intelligence" information in furtherance of U.S. counterintelligence, whether or not any laws were or will be broken. See 50 U.S.C. § 401(a)(3) (defining "counterintelligence" as information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities). Department of Defense (DOD) guidelines state that the purpose of counterintelligence collection is to detect espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and related hostile intelligence activities to "deter, to neutralize, or to exploit them." In short, counterintelligence and criminal prosecution are different. 3. How does FISA fit with regulation of electronic surveillance? Given the "tendency of those who execute the criminal laws . . . to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures," the Supreme Court has viewed commumications interception as an especially grave intrusion on rights of privacy and speech. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50 (1967) (quotation and citation omitted). "By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope," and its "indiscriminate use . . . in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions." Id. at 56 (quotation and citation omitted). "Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than those posed by the use of eavesdropping devices." Id. at 63. Thus, the Court outlined seven constitutional requirements: (1) a showing of probable cause that a particular offense has been or is about to be committed; (2) the applicant must describe with particularity the conversations to be intercepted; (3) the surveillance must be for a specific, limited period of time in order to minimize the invasion of privacy (the N.Y. law authorized two months of surveillance at a time); (4) there must be continuing probable cause showings for the surveillance to continue beyond the original termination date; (5) the surveillance must end once the conversation sought is seized; (6) notice must be given unless there is an adequate showing of exigency; and (7) a return on the warrant is required so that the court may oversee and limit the use of the intercepted conversations. More information can be found at: http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_mi...s/fisa_faq.html

The ip bfrankdc is posting at is 67.80.120.22. Can't you all do something more constructive than slam each other. I challenge you all to take the time and write about issues that are important to DC.

The real question is whether Congress believes what President Bush is preaching. 'Do whatever it takes.'

Can you put a link from you web site to DCMessageBoards.com?

Here is some interesting information that was sent to me about Isreal's Intelligence assessment of Iraq before the war was taken mostly from United States and British information sources. Note that I have put in bold Isreal's thoughts of intelligence failure and the possiblility that the WMD now exist in Syria. Dr. Yuval Steinitz Chairman Eli Yishai Ehud Yatom David Levy Ilan Leibovitch Haim Ramon The IDF Intelligence Branch (hereinafter: Military Intelligence) and the Institution for Intelligence and Special Functions (hereinafter: Mossad) assessed just prior to the war, with a high probability approaching a certainty, that Iraq had —residual capability“ in the sphere of chemical weapons and biological weapons as well as scores of ground-to-ground missiles capable of reaching Israel that could be armed with chemical and biological warheads. In the sphere of intentions Israeli intelligence assessed just prior to the war, with a generally low probability, that Saddam Hussein would attack the State of Israel with the non-conventional weapons in his possession; using either ground-to-ground missiles, fighter planes or unmanned aircraft that had been readied for this purpose. In view of the intelligence assessments of capabilities and intentions, and in accordance with assessments of the situation, the Government of Israel decided to adopt a string of passive and active defensive measures, which included: • A directive to the public to prepare sealed rooms against the penetration of chemical or biological agents. • Full distribution of personal protective kits and a directive to the public to open them and keep them readily available. • Preparation of vaccination doses against biological weapons and the inoculation of an initial group of some 17,000 security and medical staff (first responders) against the smallpox virus. • Mobilization of thousands of reserve soldiers from the Home Front and preparations for non-conventional weapon injuries in Israel. • Mobilization of reserve soldiers from the anti-aircraft units and the deployment of Arrow and Patriot missile batteries through the country, on stand-by to intercept enemy missiles and aircraft. • Putting the planes of the Air Force on high alert, with air patrols to defend Israel‘s airspace and provide an assault response as necessary. After the end of the war, when it became clear that the intelligence assessments regarding Iraqi capabilities were apparently inconsistent with the reality that came to light on the ground, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, Dr. Yuval Steinitz, decided to set up a sub-committee to investigate the functioning of Israeli intelligence vis-à-vis Iraq in the period that preceded the war and to examine the decision making processes of the political echelon and the extent to which they were reasonable. It was also decided to expand the canvas and include in the work of the sub-committee an examination of general aspects of the functioning of the intelligence services of Israel, and the state of the intelligence services in view of the new challenges that have taken shape in recent decades, mainlywith respect to non-conventional weapons and ground-to-ground missiles in the countries of the second and third tier and in general. The Committee found that the place of Iraq in the order of priorities of the intelligence EEI since the first Gulf War in 1991 and until the date on which the UN inspection team (UNSCOM) left Iraq in 1998 was reasonable. This was in light of the gamut of security risks and threats facing Israel, and allowing for the restrictions on resources. The reasonableness of the intelligence attitude to Iraq, in this period, also relied on the post factum results of the war but, to no lesser an extent, on the following three facts: a. the existence of a regime of punctilious inspection by the UN in Iraq; b. the open eye of other western intelligence services on Iraq; c. the serious restrictions which the coalition countries imposed, with UN support, on Iraq's freedom of action. At the same time, the Committee considers that the speed of reaction of Israeli intelligence to the changing circumstances following the departure of the UN inspectors from Iraq in 1998 was faulty. Despite the formal change in the position of non-conventional weapons and ground-to-ground missiles in Iraq in the order of priorities and in the EEI, neither Military Intelligence and the Mossad, nor the political echelon over them, internalized the meaning of the change and did not make operational preparations at the requisite pace to give a fitting intelligence-collection response to developments. As a sharp expression of this, it can be noted that the Iraqi matter did not receive the appropriate amount of attention in the two years prior to the war on the agenda of the Committee of the Heads of the Intelligence Services. The Committee determines that the cessation of inspections did not lead to a renewed and in-depth discussion regarding the state of intelligence on Iraq, nor to a new, more operative, Israeli assessment that would permit proper cover of nonconventional weapon and ground-to-ground missile matters throughout Iraq. As part of the cooperation between Israel's intelligence services and fellow intelligence agencies and organizations, Military Intelligence and the Mossad exchanged information and intelligence evaluations with respect to Iraq with various services, particularly the intelligence services of the USA, with which cooperation became much closer prior to the war. I highlighted interesting intelligence points in bold. The Committee is of the opinion that the uniform international intelligence evaluation in relation to Iraq took root to a certain extent through a sort of vicious circle and by way of repeated reciprocal feedback, which often caused more damage than benefit. It was not impossible for assessments conveyed by the Israeli intelligence organization or any other intelligence organization to a fellow organization to do the rounds and play a central role in the formulation of the assessments of the foreign organization and, in the end, come back to the originating organization as an assessment of another intelligence service, to be immediately seized upon as reinforcement and encouragement from another reliable source for the original Israeli assessment. In this way, an inbuilt failure can take place, recalling somewhat Ephraim Kishon's story "The Chocolate Box". This is likely to lead to exaggerated self-confidence and lack of doubts in intelligence communities throughout the western world in general, relying on intuitions that developed in parallel, and to a large extent jointly, in various intelligence services. During the deliberations of the Committee, the conjecture was raised that intelligence services naturally tend to share with each other evaluations made by those heading them, while placing less emphasis on doubts and contrary arguments that have been rejected. It thus happens that the gamut of cooperation can generate a process of strengthening widely held evaluations and conceptions, while ignoring and pushing into a corner the skeptics and their misgivings. This cooperation is vitally important for a small country such as Israel; and it is even more essential in the case of Iraq, where other western intelligence services, particularly the American and the British, had advantages which are difficult to overstate, deriving from their physical presence on the borders of Iraq, their ability to work out of their bases in neighboring Arab countries such as Kuwait, and their ability to fly on a regular basis over the territory of Iraq in the service of the UN, virtually undisturbed. At the end of the chapter on the findings in the intelligence sphere with regard to the operation in Iraq, it is essential to recall that the enigma of the existence or non-existence of non-conventional weapons and ground-to-ground missiles in Iraq has not yet been resolved. The likelihood of the destruction or concealment of these means of warfare in the vast expanses of Iraq, as well as the possibility that they were moved to Syria on the eve of the war, still exists. The discovery of Iraqi military warplanes which had been buried in the sand and which popped up like 'sand birds' after the war, might testify as to how strange and unpredictable the regime of Saddam Hussein was, and how good it is that it no longer exists. At the same time, even if one assumes, for the sake of the discussion, that Iraq was in possession of such weapons in the months prior to the war, it is certain that, contrary to the picture which was drawn, the non-conventional weapons and ground-to-ground missiles were not deployed in the units and were not readied for use at the time of the war. If Iraq had prepared ahead of time a sophisticated mechanism for concealing and/or moving weapons of this sort, then the very existence of this mechanism and the preparations for concealment rather than for activation was not discovered by the intelligence services.

Interesting, I can understand your thought process, but this document came from a United States Senator's Office. http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supportin...tter.102605.pdf This information about Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was released on November 6, 2005. Here is more information about the admistration's Iraq policy. http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supportin....CBW.110605.pdf http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supportin...aeda.110605.pdf You right on one count. The media is slamming the Bush Administration hard. Some of it is not fair. But, if the President just disclosed his October 31, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief on Iraq Intelligence to Congress this would be a dead issue.

Attached is a declassified letter from DIA about Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi Ibnal_Shaykhal_LibiDIA.pdf

Is this the story of a death penalty case tried on television? How is different than the 1987 movie "The Running Man?"

Today, Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) Wrote That "There Is A Broad Consensus On What Must Be Done" To Win In Iraq: "There is a broad consensus on what must be done to preserve our interests. Recently, 79 Democratic and Republican senators told President Bush we need a detailed, public plan for Iraq, with specific goals and a timetable for achieving each one." (Sen. Biden, Op-Ed, "Time For An Iraq Timetable," The Washington Post, 11/26/05) The Fact Is That The Senate Amendment Reiterates The President's Strategy In Iraq. The Senate Amendment Says Iraqi Security Forces Should Take The Lead In Securing Their Country. "Calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq; United States military forces should not stay in Iraq any longer than required and the people of Iraq should be so advised." (S.Amdt. 2518 To S. 1042, CQ Vote #323: Adopted 79-19: R 41-13; D 37-6; I 1-0, 11/15/05) Sen. Biden Says "Iraqi Forces" Must Be Trained To "Act On Their Own Or Take The Lead With U.S. Help": "The president must set a schedule for getting Iraqi forces trained to the point that they can act on their own or take the lead with U.S. help. We should take up other countries on their offers to do more training, especially of officers. We should focus on getting the security ministries up to speed. Even well-trained troops need to be equipped, sustained and directed. (Sen. Biden, Op-Ed, "Time For An Iraq Timetable," The Washington Post, 11/26/05) The President Has Said Iraqi Security Forces Are Taking More And More Responsibility For Their Own Security. President Bush Discussed The Strategy To Train Iraqi Forces To "Stand Up" So America Can "Stand Down." PRESIDENT BUSH: "As we pursue the terrorists, we have a strategy to go forward. Our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so they can defend their people and take the fight to the enemy. And we're making steady progress. With every passing month, more and more Iraqi forces are standing up, and the Iraqi military is gaining new capabilities and new confidence. At the time of our Fallujah operations just a year ago, there were only a few Iraqi army battalions in combat. Today, there are nearly 90 Iraqi army battalions fighting the terrorists alongside our forces. American and Iraqi troops are conducting major assaults to clear out enemy fighters in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. Iraqi police and security forces are helping clear the terrorists from their strongholds, hold on to the areas we've cleared, and prevent the enemy from returning. Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. And when our commanders on the ground tell me that the Iraqi forces can defend their freedom, our troops will come home with the honor they have earned." (President Bush, Remarks On The War On Terror, Anchorage, AK, 11/14/05) Lieutenant General David Petraeus: "Well, Here's The Bottom Line Up-Front For You. The Iraqi Security Forces Are In The Fight; They Are Fighting For Their Country. They Are, As This Notes, Increasingly Leading That Fight." (Lt. General David Petraeus, Remarks On "Iraq's Evolving Forces," Washington, D.C., 11/7/05) After Returning From Iraq, CNN Military Analyst Retired Major General Don Shepperd Said Iraqi Forces Are Taking Charge. SHEPPERD: "The Iraqi forces are ready to protect the polling places. They're ready. They're starting to get ready in various areas. For instance, 20 percent of the territory of Baghdad has already been turned over to Iraqi forces. You're starting to see that spread slowly as they come up to speed. When they come up to speed, they are matched with U.S. forces, and then they are given their own territory. All of that appears to me to be working. It's slow, tough work, and we'll be there for a while helping them." (CNN's "Live From," 10/11/05) Iraqi Army Is More And More In The Fight: "As of September, 120 Iraqi Police and Army battalions are in the fight. In addition to a fully independent battalion: 80 battalions are able to fight alongside Coalition troops. 36 battalions generally able to conduct independent operations. SNAPSHOT: Two brigades of the Iraqi 6th Division have their own battle space in Baghdad, including Haifa Street, once a haven for insurgents. As of September, one division, 5 brigades, and 36 battalions currently have the lead in their areas in Iraq. This summer, only one division and 11 battalions had the lead." (Department of Defense, Iraq Progress Update, 11/15/05 http://joewilson.house.gov/UploadedFiles/1...q%20Update.ppt) Sen. Biden Says "We Must Forge...Political Compromise Between Iraqi Factions": "Over the next six months, we must forge a sustainable political compromise between Iraqi factions, strengthen the Iraqi government and bolster reconstruction efforts, and accelerate the training of Iraqi forces. First, we need to build political consensus, starting with the constitution. Sunnis must accept that they no longer rule Iraq. But unless Shiites and Kurds give them a stake in the new deal, they will continue to resist. We must help produce a constitution that will unite Iraq, not divide it." (Sen. Biden, Op-Ed, "Time For An Iraq Timetable," The Washington Post, 11/26/05) The Senate Amendment Says Iraqis Should Achieve A "Broad-Based And Sustainable Political Settlement." "The Administration should tell the leaders of all groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq, within the schedule they set for themselves." (S.Amdt. 2518 To S. 1042, CQ Vote #323: Adopted 79-19: R 41-13; D 37-6; I 1-0, 11/15/05) The President Has Discussed The Incredible Progress Iraqis Are Making Toward Democracy Through A Broad-Based Political Process The President Discussed The Strategy To Build A Lasting Democracy In Iraq. PRESIDENT BUSH: "And the second part of our strategy is a political strategy. Iraqis are making inspiring progress toward building a democracy. A month ago, millions of Iraqis turned out to vote for a constitution that guarantees fundamental freedoms and lays the foundation for a lasting democracy. In a few weeks, Iraqis will vote again, to choose a fully constitutional government to lead them for the next four years. This country is making amazing progress from the days of being under the thumb of a brutal tyrant. In two-and-a-half years, they've gone from tyranny, to an election for a transitional government, to the ratification of a constitution, to the election of a free government. It's amazing progress when you think about it. The Iraqi people are proving their determination to build a future founded on democracy and peace. And the United States of America will help them succeed." (President Bush, Remarks On The War On Terror, Anchorage, AK, 11/14/05) Secretary Of State Condoleezza Rice Outlined America's Strategy For "A Political Transition To A Permanent, Constitutional Democracy." SEC. RICE: "In 2005, we emphasized transition: a security transition to greater reliance on Iraqi forces and a political transition to a permanent, constitutional democracy. The just-concluded referendum was a landmark in that process. And now we are preparing for 2006. First we must help Iraqis as they hold another vital election in December. Well over nine million Iraqis voted on Sunday. Whether Iraqis voted yes or no, they were voting for an Iraqi nation, and for Iraqi democracy. And all their voices, pro and con, will be heard again in December. If the referendum passes, those who voted no this time will realize that their chosen representatives can then participate in the review of the constitution that was agreed upon last week. This process will ultimately lead to Iraqis selecting a lasting government, for a four year term." (Sec. Rice, Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 10/19/05) Sen. Biden Says Iraq Is "Barely Functional": "Second, we must build Iraq's governing capacity and overhaul the reconstruction program. Iraq's ministries are barely functional. Sewage in the streets, unsafe drinking water and a lack of electricity are all too common. With 40 percent unemployment in Iraq, insurgents do not lack for fresh recruits." Sen. Biden Ignores Real Progress In Iraq: "Infrastructure improvements up to September 2005: 3,404 Public Schools, 304 Water and Sewage Projects, 257 Fire and Police Stations, 149 Health Facilities, Total of 4,114 reconstruction projects completed with 921 ongoing." (Department of Defense, Iraq Progress Update, 11/15/05 http://joewilson.house.gov/UploadedFiles/1...q%20Update.ppt)

On September 30, 2004, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) released the Duelfer Report, its final report on Iraq's WMD programs. Evidence. The problem of discerning WMD in Iraq is highlighted by the prewar misapprehensions of weapons, which were not there. Distant technical analysts mistakenly identified evidence and drew incorrect conclusions. There is also the potential of the obverse problem. Observers may have evidence before them and not recognize it because of unfamiliarity with the subject. Often ISG found no evidence of one thing or another. It may be that a more accurate formulation might be we recognized no evidence. This is a fundamental conundrum in assessing alien circumstances. 2000—The End is in Sight. By 2000, the erosion of sanctions accelerated. The semi-annual debates over the renewal of sanctions in the Security Council became the forum for Iraqi proponents to argue the case for relaxing sanctions further. Out of concern that this pillar of containment policy was about to collapse, the United States (under a new administration) proposed “Smart Sanctions” in early 2001. This was an attempt to bolster support for sanctions within the Security Council by narrowing the targeted items subject to scrutiny. There was a reversal of a presumption of denial to a presumption of approval of items to be acquired under the Oil-For-Food program. Syria had recently signed an oil export protocol that provided for reopening of the Iraq-Syria pipeline. Initially, the United States tried to curtail this program, but failed. Baghdad could read this turn of events only as growing momentum of its strategy to undermine sanctions with the goal of an ultimate collapse. The new administration in Washington gave no evidence of changing the approach toward Iraq. The sanctions debate in the Security Council in June 2001 was indicative with the Russians demanding further relaxation and a concrete signal from the Council that sanctions would be lifted if Iraq satisfied the elements of UNSCR 1284. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and the new Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, were making progress internationally. France, Russia, and Syria (then a member of the Security Council) were all quite vocally supporting Iraq in sanctions debates in the Security Council. Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem. The only notable items stopped in this flow were some aluminum tubes, which became the center of debate over the existence of a nuclear enrichment effort in Iraq. Major items had no trouble getting across the border, including 380 liquid-fuel rocket engines. Indeed, Iraq was designing missile systems with the assumption that sanctioned material would be readily available. 11 September 2001 The progress Baghdad had made toward escaping sanctions changed following 11 September 2001. Saddam did not immediately understand this. Reflecting Saddam’s ill-formed understanding of the United States, Baghdad fully grasped neither the effect of the attacks on the United States nor their implications for Iraq’s position in the United Nations. The seriousness of the change in the international atmosphere and Iraq’s diplomatic position became clear to Saddam only after President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech. He saw a seriousness he had not earlier recognized. Still, he tried to bargain with the Security Council rather than outright accept new inspections. The dithering cost him. Washington was building a huge and expensive military force around Iraq. Efforts to secure access and support for potential military action were pursued. In the Security Council a new, tougher resolution was passed (UNSCR 1441). Momentum was building that would be increasingly hard to deflect. Belatedly, following the speech by President Bush at the UN General Assembly in September 2002, Saddam finally agreed to unconditional acceptance of the UNMOVIC weapons inspectors. The work of UNMOVIC inspectors on the ground was pursued energetically and in a charged political environment. Iraq was surrounded by a large and expensive, military force. Sustaining such a force for any length of time would be impossible. It was not a stable situation, and Saddam realized his position far too late. Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events May 2000 Syria-Iraq Trade/Oil sale protocol established; Syrian pipeline opens June 2000 Saddam speech: Iraq cannot give up its weapons if neighbors do not June 2000 Saddam orders the design of long range missile June 2000 French contracts under OFF total $1.78B--second only to Russia 10-Jun-00 President Hafez al-Assad of Syria dies: opens diplomatic opportunities for Iraq July 2000 Iraq negotiates deals with Russia worth $20B 2000 Al Tahadi Company signs magnet production line contract with Romanian company 2000 Regime procurement with Belarus, FRY, India, Jordan, North Korea, PRC, South Korea, Syria, Russia and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion 23-Aug-00 Engineering drawings for 2 and 5 clustered SA-2 engine missiles created Sept 2000 10% contract value kickbacks on OFF imports officially begin; may have been occurring since 1998 Mid-Late 2000 Iraq initiates contacts with a Chinese firm NORINCO, and first of several contacts over the next two years 01-Nov-00 Baghdad International Fair: 46 countries participate, a ten-year record 07-Nov-00 Saudis open border for OFF exports Dec 2000 Leadership starts $.20-$.35 per barrel OFF oil surcharge; by 2002 drops to $.15 per barrel March 2001 IAEC President asks Saddam to gather former IAEC scientists and researchers at Tuwaitha - Saddam says no April 2001 Major Iranian missile attack on Mujaheddin el-Khalq (MEK) facilities in Iraq Early 2001 L-29 RPV crash on final attempted unmanned flight 20-May-01 Iraqi embassy in Nairobi reports rejecting an opportunity to buy uranium June 2001 Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) begins to get cash/gold from OFF kickbacks via courier June 2001 Huwaysh approves the Al Samud II program 300 POL 2001 MIC Director orders reconstruction of items destroyed by UNSCOM 2001 Saddam asks Huwaysh if he had developed BW and is told no 2001 Intensified Iraqi intel focus on Iranian nuclear program 2001 Al Tahadi Company signs magnet production line contract with Belarusian company 2001 Regime procurement with Belarus, Bulgaria, France, FRY, India, Jordan, North Korea, PRC, South Korea, Syria, Russia and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion 2001 NMD deputy requests scientists to turn in any documents they may have at home OTHER/NUC 2001 IAEC establishes Technical Research Branch under Physics Department to support rail gun research mid 2001 Aluminum tubes destined for Iraq captured in Jordan 24-Aug-01 First successful launch of Al Samud II 01-Sep-01 MIC founds a 3rd front company: Al Mufakhir Export Co 11-Sep-01 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 12-Sep-01 Iraq misinterprets US reaction to events of 9/11; adopts ill-conceived diplomatic position 312 OTHER/NUC Late 2001 IAEC Modernization Project begins and initiates purchase of CNC machines 313 POL Oct-Nov 2001 Enduring Freedom defeats the Taliban in Afghanistan 314 DS Dec 2001 Iraq begins serial production of the Al Samud II 315 POL Late 2001 Around this time, Iraqi scientists tell Regime leaders they cannot produce WMD 316 OTHER/NUC January 2002 Saddam issues order for IAEC and MIC to implement cooperative projects in physics, machining, electronics 317 PROC January 2002 Saddam directs the MIC to assist the IAEC with foreign procurement 318 PROC 26-28 January 2002 Tariq ‘Aziz visits Moscow and Beijing to bolster international support for lifting UNSC sanctions 319 POL 29-Jan-02 Bush refers to ‘Axis of Evil’ in State of the Union address 320 NUC 12-Feb-02 Saddam declares “We will not return to it” with reference to nuclear weapons 321 POL 13-Feb-02 Iraq says inspectors will not be allowed to return 322 PROC March 2002 MIC front company ARMOS authorized to trade outside of Russia 323 POL 21-Mar-02 Russia blocks UNSC attempt to tighten-up OFF, reduce violations 324 POL March/April 2002 Iraq & UN hold new inspection talks in NY 325 DS 01-Jun-02 Jinin cruise missile project initiated (1000km range; 500kg payload) 326 DS 2002 Ibn Firnas recommends MIC cancel L-29 RPV program 327 POL July 2002 Iraq & UN hold more inspection talks in Vienna 328 OTHER/NUC Mid 2002 MIC Rotating Machinery Department (RMD) formed; machine tools ordered, including a balancing machine 329 OTHER/NUC 05-Jul-02 Copper vapor laser demonstrated to Huwaysh; put into storage 330 PROC 2002 Regime procurement with Belarus, France, FRY, India, Jordan, PRC, Russia, Syria and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion 331 POL/PROC 2002 Iraq and Russia negotiate $40B oil development deal to be undertaken once sanctions are lifted 332 OTHER/NUC 2002 MIC sponsors 3200 research projects in Iraqi universities (up from 40 in 1997) 333 OTHER/NUC 2002 MIC builds explosive test facility capable of researching shaped charges 334 POL Mid 2002 Iraq begins production of 81mm aluminum tubes for rockets 335 DS Sept 2002 CAD designs for a launcher accommodating missiles up to 1m in diameter; 9m in length 336 POL Sept 2002 Higher Committee, once controlled by Tariq ‘Aziz, is reconstituted to deal with inspections, headed by Taha Ramadan 337 CW Sep 02 Over 900,000 nerve agent antidote autoinjectors had been purchased 338 POL 12-Sep-02 Bush calls Iraq ‘Grave and gathering danger’ in UN General Assembly (UNGA) speech 339 POL 16-Sep-02 Iraq agrees to readmit inspectors 340 POL 18-Sep-02 Publication of UK Iraq WMD dossier 341 POL Nov 2002 MIC scientists meet and are told that Iraq has no WMD, and they must not hide anything from inspectors 342 DS Nov 2002 Jinin and other covert delivery system programs suspended due to return of inspectors 343 POL 08-Nov-02 UNSCR 1441 finds Iraq in material breach, calls for disarmament and FFCD 344 POL 08-Nov-02 Russia refuses to veto UNSCR 1441 345 POL 27-Nov-02 UNMOVIC inspections begin 346 POL Dec 2002 Saddam tells his Generals he does not have WMD 347 POL Dec 2002 Saddam tells military leaders/senior leaders to “cooperate completely” with inspectors 348 POL/DS Dec 2002 UNMOVIC freezes the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h flight tests upon further analysis of system’s range capbility 349 OTHER/NUC Dec 2002 Details of IAEC dual-use CNC machine purchases provided to UN/IAEA 350 POL End of 2002 Iraq successfully flight tests 81mm rockets with indigenously produced aluminum tubes 351 POL Late 2002 Iraq again attempts foreign purchase of 81mm tubes 352 POL Dec 2002 NMD publishes the Currently Accurate Full, and Complete Declaration 353 CW Jan 2003 Two teams from IAEC and Al Majid Company develop multipurpose controllers for process plant 354 PROC Jan 2003 MIC annual budget at $500M 355 POL Jan-2003 UNMOVIC finds 12 empty 122mm CW rocket warheads 356 POL Jan 2003 Iraqi MoD conference on Iranian WMD 357 POL 20-Jan-03 Husam Amin tells military leaders to cooperate with inspectors, repeating Saddam’s earlier directives 358 POL 20-Jan-03 The MIC directs all Directors General of state companies to relinquish any WMD to the NMD 359 POL 25-Jan-03 The NMD director meets with Republican Guard (RG) leaders and advises they sign documents stating no WMD in RG units 360 CW Feb 2003 Inspection of Al Nu’man factory reveals cluster bomb that management claimed from Al Muthanna 361 POL Feb 2003 According to senior Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saddam has decided to use CW against US troops in the event of war 362 CW Feb-2003 Iraq recommends excavating R-400 bomb fragments at Al ‘Aziziyah 363 NUC February 2003 DG of NMD still trying to satisfy IAEA concern over missing explosive lens mold drawings 364 POL 05-Feb-03 US SecState Powell presents evidence of Iraqi WMD programs to UNSC 365 POL 14-Feb-03 Saddam issues directive banning private companies and individuals from importing WMD materials or producing WMD 366 POL 28-Feb-03 Russia threatens veto of UNSCR authorizing war on Iraq 367 CW March 2003 New construction scheduled for MIM plant to provide indigenous multi-purpose production facility, halted due to OIF 368 PROC Mar 2003 MIC has $186M in contracts with Syria (SES Company) 369 DS 1-17 Mar 2003 UNMOVIC bans Samud II and supervises destruction of missiles 370 PROC Early 2003 Regime procurement with Belarus, Bulgaria, France, India, Jordan, PRC, Russia, Syria, and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion 371 PROC 01-Mar-03 MIC has accumulated $300M+ in reserves 372 PROC Early March Saddam forms a funds distribution committee consisting of Minister of Finance, President of the Diwan, Presidential Secretary, and Qusay Husayn 373 POL 06-Mar-03 UNMOVIC publishes report - Unresolved Disarmament Issues (Clusters) 374 POL 10-Mar-03 France threatens veto of UN resolution authorizing war; later opposes OIF 375 POL 18-Mar-03 UNMOVIC and IAEA depart Iraq 376 POL 19-Mar-03 Initiation of hostilities 377 POL Late March 2003 Saddam implies to military leaders that he has secret weapon http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_20...ransmittal.html