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by Immanuel Kant
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good.
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations.
....reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature... has adapted the means... to produce a will...good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary.
it is a duty to maintain one's life; and.. everyone has.., a direct inclination to do so.
...if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it- not from inclination or fear, but from duty- then his maxim has a moral worth.
It is in this manner... we are to understand those passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination- nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not pathological- a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensity of sense- in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
...an action done from duty derives its moral worth... from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.
To secure one's own happiness is a duty...for discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty.
...an action done from duty derives its moral worth..from the maxim by which it is determined...merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.
Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law... which can be an object of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law,
I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.
...respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through influence, but is self-wrought by a rational concept... specifically distinct from all feelings...which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognize immediately as a law for me, I recognize with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense.
Respect is... neither as an object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analogous to both. The object of respect is the law only, which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize as necessary... As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) ...All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.
But what sort of law can... determine the will... in order that this will may be called good... there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle... and must so serve it.. to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked.
...an estimation of the worth far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything.
...men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it... we do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, ..wise and virtuous...we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over the theoretical in the common understanding of men. In the latter, if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and from the perceptions of the senses, it falls into mere inconceivabilities and self-contradictions, at least into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical sphere it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show itself to advantage.
Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced...even wisdom- which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge- yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations...which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command.
many things are done in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have at all times been philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at all in human actions, and have ascribed everything to a more or less refined self-love. Not that they have on that account questioned the soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature, which, though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations
In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of duty. Sometimes it happens... nothing beside the moral principle of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this infer with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the actual determining cause of the will. We like them to flatter ourselves by falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind the secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see.
notions of duty must be drawn only from experience... the strict command of duty which would often require self-denial. Without being an enemy of virtue...the judgement is partly made wiser by experience and partly, also, more acute in observation. This being so, nothing can secure us from falling away altogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul a well-grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that although there should never have been actions which really sprang from such pure sources
Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me (whom you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God only (whom ye do not see)?" But whence have we the conception of God as the supreme good? Simply from the idea of moral perfection, which reason frames a priori and connects inseparably with the notion of a free will.
moral principles are not based on properties of human nature, but must subsist a priori of themselves, while from such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man.
all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a priori in the commonest reason just ...that which is in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical... contingent, knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle...since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being...knowing well that unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world.
Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. the will is nothing but practical reason. the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.
The conception of an objective principle...is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative.
The dependence of the desires on sensations is called inclination... always indicates a want. The dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is called an interest. This therefore, is found only in the case of a dependent will which does not always of itself conform to reason; in the Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the human will can also take an interest in a thing without therefore acting from interest.
no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in general for a holy will... because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law. Therefore imperatives are only formula to express the relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, e.g., the human will.
Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.
all imperatives are formula determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good.. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical.
Thus the imperative declares what action possible... be good and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good...yet its maxims might be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason
Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual. In the first case it is a problematical, in the second an assertorial practical principle. The categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i.e., without any other end, is valid as an apodeictic (practical) principle.
..Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called prudence, * ...the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical...
*The word prudence is taken in two senses: in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world, in the other that of private prudence. The former is a man's ability to influence others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting benefit. This latter is properly that to which the value even of the former is reduced, and when a man is prudent in the former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say of him that he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent.
Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately...This imperative is categorical...its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition...This imperative may be called that of morality.
... three sorts of principles in the dissimilarity of the obligation of the will... they are either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands (laws) of morality. For it is law only that involves the conception of an unconditional and objective necessity, which is consequently universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination... the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any condition.., may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first kind of imperatives technical (belonging to art), the second pragmatic * (to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to morals).
the notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether empirical, i.e., they must be borrowed from experience, the most clear-sighted and at the same time most powerful being... is unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient. the problem to determine certainly and universally what action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble... happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting solely on empirical grounds...This imperative of prudence would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means to happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is distinguished from the imperative of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is merely possible, in the former it is given;
...the question how the imperative of morality is possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one, demanding a solution, as this is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the hypothetical imperatives... it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the will...the so-called moral imperative, which appears to be categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a pragmatic precept, drawing our attention to our own interests and merely teaching us to take these into consideration.
a categorical imperative... possibility should be requisite only for its explanation...the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law.
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.


If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an exception... in favor of our inclination. Consequently... we should find a contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions.


..the categorical imperative, we must contain the principle of all duty We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove... that there is a practical law which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.


Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish.


The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.


If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions...all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end with all, never as means only.


This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself...must... spring from pure reason... now by the second principle the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.


It was seen that man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, though at the same time they are universal, and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will... designed by nature to give universal laws. For when one has conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law required some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint, since it did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will was according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain manner... For men never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any case the imperative must be conditional and could not by any means be capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this the principle of autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other which I accordingly reckon as heteronomy.


The conception of the will of every rational being as one which must consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view- this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely that of a kingdom of ends.


By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole


For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all others ...in every case at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union of rational being by common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means. It is certainly only an ideal.


A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when...he is also...subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not subject to the will of any other.
A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of will.
Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being and of emanating from his will... maxims universal laws. If now the maxims of rational beings are not by their own nature coincident with this objective principle, then the necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation... Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does to every member of it and to all in the same degree.
The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., duty, does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as legislating universally, to every other will and also to every action towards oneself...from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives.


Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself, ... a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity.
What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good disposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the giving of universal laws, by which it qualifies him to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was already destined by his own nature as being an end in himself...legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards all laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth; and the word respect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it. Autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature.


...the conception of a will unconditionally good... if made a universal law, could never contradict itself...and such an imperative is categorical... the categorical imperative can also be expressed thus: Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature.
Rational nature...sets before itself an end...conceived...that which we must never act against and..must never be regarded merely as means...good will...cannot without contradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: "So act in regard to every rational being..,may always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself," is accordingly essentially identical with this other: "Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves its own universal validity for every rational being... the fundamental principle of all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i.e., the rational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as the supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as an end likewise.
...whatever laws any rational being may be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws, since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself; also it follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all mere physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point of view which regards himself and, likewise, every other rational being as law-giving beings (on which account they are called persons). In this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is possible as a kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation proper to all persons as members. Therefore every rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is: "So act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the universal law (of all rational beings)." A kingdom of ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature, the former however only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the latter only by the laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from without. Nevertheless, although the system of nature is looked upon as a machine, yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends, it is given on this account the name of a kingdom of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends would be actually realized by means of maxims conforming to the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, if they were universally followed. But although a rational being, even if he punctually follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all others being therefore true to the same, nor expect that the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as a fitting member, so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he himself contributes, that is to say, that it shall favor his expectation of happiness, still that law: "Act according to the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends legislating in it universally," remains in its full force, inasmuch as it commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox lies; that the mere dignity of man as a rational creature...respect for a mere idea, should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is precisely in this independence of the maxim on all such springs of action that its sublimity consists; and it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his wants. And although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends to be united under one sovereign, so that the latter kingdom thereby ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality...The essence of things is not altered by their external relations, and that which, abstracting from these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being. Morality.. is...the autonomy of potential universal legislation by its maxims. An action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does not agree therewith is forbidden. A will whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, then, cannot be applied to a holy being. The objective necessity of actions from obligation is called duty.
...the conception of duty implies subjection to ...moral law...he is likewise a legislator, and ...has sublimity... neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is the proper object of respect; and the dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative, though with the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation.
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy then is: "Always so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law." ... it is a synthetical proposition ...which ...must be capable of being cognized wholly a priori.



If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but it is given by the object through its relation to the will. This relation, whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason, only admits of hypothetical imperatives: "I ought to do something because I wish for something else." ... the moral, and therefore categorical, imperative says: "I ought to do so and so, even though I should not wish for anything else." ..."I ought not to lie, although it should not bring me the least discredit." ...therefore must so far abstract from all objects that they shall have no influence on the will, in order that practical reason (will) may not be restricted to administering an interest not belonging to it, but may simply show its own commanding authority as the supreme legislation. Thus, e.g., I ought to endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as if its realization involved any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and the same volition.


All principles ...are either empirical or rational. The former, drawn from the principle of happiness, are built on physical or moral feelings; the latter, drawn from the principle of perfection, are built either on the rational conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that of an independent perfection (the will of God) as the determining cause of our will.


Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which these should hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human nature, or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. The principle of private happiness, however, is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct... because it contributes nothing to the establishment of morality- since it is quite a different thing to make a prosperous man and a good man, or to make one prudent and sharp-sighted for his own interests and to make him virtuous- but because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather undermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives to virtue and to vice in the same class and only teach us to make a better calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice being entirely extinguished. On the other hand, as to moral feeling, this supposed special sense, * the appeal to it is indeed superficial when those who cannot think believe that feeling will help them out, even in what concerns general laws: and besides, feelings, which naturally differ infinitely in degree, cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and evil, nor has anyone a right to form judgments for others by his own feelings: nevertheless this moral feeling is nearer to morality and its dignity in this respect, that it pays virtue the honor of ascribing ...the satisfaction and esteem we have for ... profit.


Among the rational principles of morality, the ontological conception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better than the theological conception which derives morality from a Divine absolutely perfect will. The former is, no doubt, empty and indefinite and consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of possible reality the greatest amount suitable for us... it is nevertheless preferable to the theological view, first, because we have no intuition of the divine perfection and can only deduce it from our own conceptions, the most important of which is that of morality, and our explanation would thus be involved in a gross circle...if we avoid this, the only notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of the attributes of desire of glory and dominion, combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance, and any system of morals erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality.


In every case where an object of the will has to be supposed, in order that the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the will, there the rule is simply heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely, if or because one wishes for this object, one should act so and so: hence it can never command morally, that is, categorically. Whether the object determines the will by means of inclination, as in the principle of private happiness, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally, as in the principle of perfection, in either case the will never determines itself immediately by the conception of the action, but only by the influence which the foreseen effect of the action has on the will; I ought to do something, on this account, because I wish for something else; and here there must be yet another law assumed in me as its subject, by which I necessarily will this other thing, and this law again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim. For the influence which the conception of an object within the reach of our faculties can exercise on the will of the subject, in consequence of its natural properties, depends on the nature of the subject, either the sensibility (inclination and taste), or the understanding and reason, the employment of which is by the peculiar constitution of their nature attended with satisfaction. It follows that the law would be, properly speaking, given by nature, and, as such, it must be known and proved by experience and would consequently be contingent and therefore incapable of being an apodeictic practical rule, such as the moral rule must be. Not only so, but it is inevitably only heteronomy; the will does not give itself the law, but is given by a foreign impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject adapted to receive it. An absolutely good will, then, the principle of which must be a categorical imperative, will be indeterminate as regards all objects and will contain merely the form of volition generally, and that as autonomy,..the capability of the maxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law, is itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes on itself, without needing to assume any spring or interest as a foundation.


The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the Will
The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes determining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes.


Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely the effect, must be produced; hence, although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws...of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: "The will is in every action a law to itself," only expresses the principle: "To act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law." Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.


It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from Whatever reason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same of all rational beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only because we are rational beings, it must also hold for all rational beings; and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom, it must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational beings... we must show that it belongs to the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will. Now I say every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free, that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. * Now I affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgements, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgement not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of foreign influences. Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom. This idea must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being.


We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom...it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, i.e., as endowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom.


One resource remains to us, namely, to inquire whether we do not occupy different points of view when by means of freedom we think ourselves as causes efficient a priori, and when we form our conception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see before our eyes.


we may assume that even the commonest understanding can make, although it be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgement which it calls feeling, that all the "ideas" that come to us involuntarily (as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects otherwise than as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us, and consequently that as regards "ideas" of this kind even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding can apply to them, we can by them only attain to the knowledge of appearances, never to that of things in themselves... we must admit and assume behind the appearance something else that is not an appearance, namely, the things in themselves; although we must admit that as they can never be known to us except as they affect us, we can come no nearer to them, nor can we ever know what they are in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, however crude, between a world of sense and the world of understanding, of which the former may be different according to the difference of the sensuous impressions in various observers, while the second which is its basis always remains the same, Even as to himself, a man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by internal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself, and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by the inner sense and, consequently, only through the appearances of his nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected. At the same time beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere appearances, he must necessarily suppose something else as their basis, namely, his ego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon himself as belonging to the world of sense; but in respect of whatever there may be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness immediately and not through affecting the senses), he must reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, he has no further knowledge. To such a conclusion the reflecting man must come with respect to all the things which can be presented to him: it is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest understanding, who, as is well known, are very much inclined to suppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible and acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by presently sensualizing this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make it an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the wiser.


...reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call ideas [ideal conceptions] that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of understanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding itself.


For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua intelligence (not from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging not to the world of sense, but to that of understanding; hence he has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognize laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which being independent of nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone.


when we conceive ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and recognise the autonomy of the will with its consequence, morality; whereas, if we conceive ourselves as under obligation, we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and at the same time to the world of understanding.


If therefore I were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world of sense, they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) Since, however, the world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also...it follows that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belonging to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must recognize myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, i.e., to reason, which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will: consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for me and the actions which conform to them as duties.


There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided only that he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with great sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not wish that he might also possess these qualities. Only on account of his inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself, but at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which are burdensome to himself. He proves by this that he transfers himself in thought with a will free from the impulses of the sensibility into an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in the field of the sensibility; since he cannot expect to obtain by that wish any gratification of his desires, nor any position which would satisfy any of his actual or supposable inclinations (for this would destroy the pre-eminence of the very idea which wrests that wish from him): he can only expect a greater intrinsic worth of his own person. This better person, however, he imagines himself to be when be transfers himself to the point of view of a member of the world of the understanding, to which he is involuntarily forced by the idea of freedom, i.e., of independence on determining causes of the world of sense; and from this point of view he is conscious of a good will, which by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will that he possesses as a member of the world of sense- a law whose authority he recognizes while transgressing it. What he morally "ought" is then what he necessarily "would," as a member of the world of the understanding, and is conceived by him as an "ought" only inasmuch as he likewise considers himself as a member of the world of sense.


The claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is independent of merely subjectively determined causes which together constitute what belongs to sensation only and which consequently come under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering himself in this way as an intelligence places himself thereby in a different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequently with causality, and when on the other he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold good at the same time. For there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in appearance (belonging to the world of sense) is subject to certain laws, of which the very same as a thing or being in itself is independent, and that he must conceive and think of himself in this twofold way, rests as to the first on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses, and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an intelligence, i.e., as independent on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason (in other words as belonging to the world of understanding).


Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and inclinations and, on the contrary, conceives actions as possible to him, nay, even as necessary which can only be done by disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations. The causality of such actions lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of effects and actions [which depend] on the principles of an intelligible world, of which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure reason alone independent of sensibility gives the law; moreover since it is only in that world, as an intelligence, that he is his proper self (being as man only the appearance of himself), those laws apply to him directly and categorically, so that the incitements of inclinations and appetites (in other words the whole nature of the world of sense) cannot impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence.


The conception of a world of the understanding is then only a point of view which reason finds itself compelled to take outside the appearances in order to conceive itself as practical, which would not be possible if the influences of the sensibility had a determining power on man, but which is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of himself as an intelligence and, consequently, as a rational cause, energizing by reason, that is, operating freely. This thought certainly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws different from that of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the sensible world; and it makes the conception of an intelligible world necessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational beings as things in themselves). But it does not in the least authorize us to think of it further than as to its formal condition only, that is, the universality of the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently the autonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its freedom; whereas, on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite object give heteronomy, which only belongs to laws of nature and can only apply to the sensible world.
It holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from mere desire (namely, a faculty of determining itself to action as an intelligence, in other words, by laws of reason independently on natural instincts). Now where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there all explanation ceases also, and nothing remains but defence, i.e., the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible.
Hence we say of rational beings only that they take an interest in a thing; irrational beings only feel sensual appetites. Reason takes a direct interest in action then only when the universal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest alone is pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of another object of desire or on the suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then reason takes only an indirect interest in the action, and, as reason by itself without experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a special feeling actuating it, this latter interest would only be empirical and not a pure rational interest. The logical interest of reason (namely, to extend its insight) is never direct, but presupposes purposes for which reason is employed.

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The Quinisext Council (often called the Council in Trullo or the Penthekte Synod) was a church council held in 692 at Constantinople under Justinian II. It rejected most of the Constitutions of the Holy Apostles on account of the interpolations (redaction, editing) of heretics. Only the forty-seventh and last chapter of the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions contains the eighty-five Canons of the Apostles, of it to which has been given the name Canons of the Apostles was received in the Eastern Christianity. It is interesting to see what is viewed as cannon and what is not. The Book of Revelation and the Gospel of Barnabas are not mentioned.

The Apostolic Canons

Canon 85

Let the following books be counted venerable and sacred by all of you, both clergy and laity. Of the Old Testament, five books of Moses, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy; of Joshua the Son of Nun, one; of the Judges, one; of Ruth, one; of the Kings, four; of the Chronicles of the book of the days, two; of Ezra, two; of Esther, one; [some texts read "of Judith, one";] of the Maccabees, three; of Job, one; of the Psalter, one; of Solomon, three, viz.: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs; of the Prophets, twelve; of Isaiah, one; of Jeremiah, one; of Ezekiel, one; of Daniel, one. But besides these you are recommended to teach your young persons the Wisdom of the very learned Sirach. Our own books, that is, those of the New Testament, are: the four Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; fourteen Epistles of Paul; two Epistles of Peter; three of John; one of James, and one of Jude. Two Epistles of Clemens, and the Constitutions of me Clemens, addressed to you Bishops, in eight books, which are not to be published to all on account of the mystical things in them. And the Acts of us the Apostles.

The Statutes of the Fathers (Either the Didache, Didascalia, or most likely the Constitutions of the Apostles) was mentioned in Pope Gregory's I (papacy 590 - 604) response to Luminosus, abbot of the monastery of St. Andrew and St. Thomas, in the city of Ariminum (presently known as Rimini in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy) dispute with Castorius, Bishop of Ariminum. It was the city of Arinimum in 358, that Roman Emperor Constantius II requested western bishops at Ariminum to resolve the Arian controversy over the nature of the divinity of Jesus Christ, which divided the 4th-century church.

Register of the Epistles of Saint Gregory the Great

Book III

Epistle XLII
To Luminosus, Abbot

Gregory to Luminosus, abbot of the monastery of Saint Thomas of Ariminum.

We were glad to receive thine own and thy congregation's petition, and accede to thy requests, in accordance with the Statutes of the Fathers and with form of law. For to our brother and fellow-bishop Castorius a letter has been sent by our order, whereby we have taken away entirely from him and his successors all power to harm thy monastery; so that neither may he any longer come among you to be a burden to you, nor schedules be made of the property of the monastery, nor any public procession take place there; this only jurisdiction being still left to him, that he must ordain in the place of a deceased abbot another whom the common consent of the congregation may have chosen as worthy. But now, these things being thus accomplished, be you diligent in the work of God, and assiduously devote yourselves to prayer, lest you should seem not so much to have sought security of mind for prayer, as to have wished to escape strict episcopal control over you while living amiss.


Sergius I did not attend the Quinisext Council of 692, which was attended by 226 or 227 bishops, overwhelmingly from the patriarchate of Constantinople. The participation of Basil of Gortyna in Crete, belonging to the Roman patriarchate, has been seen in the East as representing Rome and even as signifying Roman approval, but he was in fact no papal legate.

Sergius rejected the canons of the council as invalid and declared that he would "rather die than consent to erroneous novelties". Though a loyal subject of the Empire, he would not be "its captive in matters of religion" and refused to sign the canons. The Apostolic Constitutions were rejected as canonical by the Decretum Gelasianum.

Writers such as Andrew J. Ekonomou have speculated on which canons in particular Sergius found objectionable. Ekonomou himself excludes the anathemizing of Pope Honorius I, the declaration of Constantinople as equal in privileges but second in honour to Rome. However, all popes since Leo I had adamantly rejected the 28th canon of the Council of Chalcedon, which on the basis of political considerations tried to raise the ecclesiastical status of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to equality with that of old Rome. Ekonomou mentions rather the approval by the Quinisext Council of all 85 Apostolic Canons, of which Sergius would have supported only the first 50.

The Corpus Juris Canonici (lit. 'Body of Canon Law') is a collection of significant sources of the canon law of the Catholic Church that was applicable to the Latin Church.

These canons were later approved by the Eastern Council in Trullo in 692 but rejected by Pope Sergius I. In the Western Church only fifty of these canons circulated, translated in Latin by Dionysius Exiguus in about 500 AD, and included in the Western collections and afterwards in the "Corpus Juris Canonici".

Canon n. 85 is a list of canonical books:a 46-book Old Testament canon which essentially corresponds to that of the Septuagint, 26 books of what is now the New Testament (excludes Revelation), the Didache, two Epistles of Clement, and the Apostolic Constitutions themselves, also here attributed to Clement, at least as compiler.

In the year 632 AD a similar life vs. death teaching was shared by Mohamed to his followers.

Al-Baqarah (The Cow)

There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.

Allah is the ally of those who believe. He brings them out from darknesses into the light. And those who disbelieve - their allies are Taghut. They take them out of the light into darknesses. Those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein.


Watch "Oldest Bible found in Palestine." The title is incorrect. The narrator mistakes the Didache as a long lost gospel. That is incorrect. The Didache is a catechism of rules for reformed Jews that followed the Messiah is confirmed in the Torah, Gospels, and the philosophical teaching of Saint Paul's Epistles. It is similar to the Leviticus for the Jews.

Like the Dead Sea Scrolls the Didache's impact on Christianity is not fully understood. The Didache has a message from the Apostles to share with us all, its community rules and prayers can still be applied to contemporary daily living. In my personal opinion the Didache is the Torah Law for Christians to follow. The Teaching of the Apostles is more than a list of do's and don'ts. The Didache is a window to early Jewish Christian community rules and prayers, By connecting the Apostles Teaching to actual scripture and historical catechisms, I hope Christians will see that we are truly brothers and sisters with those of the Jewish and Muslim faith. What is said in the Old Testament is echoed in the New Testament. I am so grateful for this enlightenment. The moral framework of Didache can be seen in the Talmud and Quran as well. In addition, the teaching helped me realize how imperfect I really am.

Here is a Google link to where the Didache can viewed at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, also called the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre, or the Church of the Resurrection by Eastern Christians, within short walk from the Muristan (market area) in the Christian Quarter of the walled Old City of Jerusalem.


The site is venerated as Golgotha (the Hill of Calvary), where Jesus was crucified, and is said also to contain the place where Jesus was buried (the Sepulchre). The church has been a paramount – and for many Christians the most important – pilgrimage destination since at least the 4th century, as the purported site of the resurrection of Jesus. Today, the church is home to branches of Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy as well as to Roman Catholicism.

Indeed the Didache is the most ancient Christian catechism and has been acknowledged by all the major Christian churches.

Those who proclaim salvation should have a great understanding in the light of what Jesus taught about faith and the meaning of His crucifixion. When I was young I was honored to be considered a brother in a Jewish fraternity. Now, I consider myself humbly blessed to be an adopted brother to the great Israelite nation. I would be lost without their wisdom and guidance.

Watch "Church History Literacy - Chapter 3: The Didache." The speaker explains the reasons why following the "Teaching" will make your life better for you.


The moral laws of the Didache are a derivative of what St. Paul refers to as the natural law and the commands given by our Creator to the mankind. Martin Luther coined the term "antinomianism," to criticize those that believe they are saved without having to keep moral laws derived from scripture.


Antinomainism derived from the teachings of Marcion of Sinope, a bishop of Asia Minor who was the first of record to propose that many of the teachings of Jesus were incompatible with the actions of Yahweh, the God of the Hebrew Bible. According to Marcion, the god of the Greek Old Testament, whom he called the Demiurge, the creator of the material universe, is a jealous tribal deity of the Jews, whose law represents legalistic reciprocal justice and who punishes mankind for its sins through suffering and death. Contrastingly, the god that Jesus professed is an altogether different being, a universal god of compassion and love who looks upon humanity with benevolence and mercy. Marcion also produced his Antitheses contrasting the Demiurge of the Old Testament with the Heavenly Father of the New Testament.

The Apostle John and Marcion of Sinope (according to R. Eisler, The Enigma of the Fourth Apostle, Methuen & Co., 1938, p. 158, plate XIII). Source: J. Pierpoint Morgan Library


Marcion's belief appear to have evolved from Zoroastrian and Jewish Qumran communities duelist belief.

Zoroastrianism is a monotheistic religion that believes that Ahura Mazda is the eternal creator of all good things. Any violations of Ahura Mazda's order arise from druj, which is everything uncreated.

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“Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure."
Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, ... a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision
Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves. Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. 
This endeavor, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform.
Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.
Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. 
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. 
if the body, and consequently the mind has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.
I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain, and desire.
Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.
the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, and consequently according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it, in other words, according as it may love or hate the same.
Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.
The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus, when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be accidentally a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.
Pride,... is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.
In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of his self-approval, that is, of his pleasure; he will, therefore, endeavor, as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him: this endeavor or desire will be increased, if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire. But this endeavor or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore he will for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival, which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object. 
This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. 
Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
 since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavor, appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love.
If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it. For love is a pleasure which a man endeavors as far as he can to render permanent; he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavor is greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the endeavor to bring about that the beloved should return his affection . Now these endeavors are constrained by hatred towards the object of love; wherefore the lover will for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater.
Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.
Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are the causes also of pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and endeavor either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed (attacked). However, I do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations (uncertainty) springing from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope. Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred.
Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.
We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse, it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions, hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid (fearless), others timid (fearful), others by some other epithet (attribute).
Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavors to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency. Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; Self-complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free.
As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those others, and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many. For we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects. But when we suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only. 
This mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called Consternation (confusion), because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration; otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence (wisdom), industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater, and when joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature.
To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c., we are, in consequence, determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name.
When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity.
A man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof. When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or  to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity.
This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself; thus he is himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself.
The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.
When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat.
The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity. Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is checked in its endeavor—in other words, it feels pain
This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or self-complacency.
For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure, in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly-that is, in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain he will endeavor to remove, by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can, embellishing his own.
It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honor and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and venerate their possessors. 
Envy is a species of hatred or  pain, that is, a modification whereby a man's power of activity, or endeavor towards activity, is checked. But a man does not endeavor or desire to do anything, which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature as himself.
When, therefore, we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous.
There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations (wavering) of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.
Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given modification of itself; therefore, according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.
Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice (greed), and ambition, being merely species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions. ... It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. 
All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's nature or essence; therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavor to persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But by the endeavor to persist in its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we mean appetite and desire ; therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs
Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another.  
 Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.
Now by pain we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked; therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is diminished or checked; therefore, no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which are attributable to the mind in that condition
All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.
Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.
Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.
Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.

No one can deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained 

Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain


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The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza, [1883], at sacred-texts.com


Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.

emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by virtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion.

Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed.

From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire, the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises. But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active, and must therefore be understood through our essence only; consequently its force and increase can be defined solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it; hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. 

Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.

Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix. Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or quenched,

Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present.

I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet: 12— "The better path I gaze at and approve, The worse—I follow."

Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increases knowledge increases sorrow." I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.

Desire is the essence of a man, that is, the endeavor whereby a man endeavors to persist in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger of the two.

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him-I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavor as far as he can to preserve his own being. 

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.

The knowledge of good and evil is the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence. Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other

The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.

To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us

 The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.

that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.

 A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature.

The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature, but it must be defined by the power, by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected ), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object, and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant. 

 the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state

In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature.

In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at variance one with another

there is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature

As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are men most useful one to another.

Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their fellow men

The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also

He who, guided by emotion only, endeavors to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavor, to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves. 

emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats. 

Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

 In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides.

Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man.

Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

Pleasure  is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked; therefore  pleasure in itself is good

Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest; the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body, and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such be good . But, as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own, we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion; we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. 

He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavor to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for he seems unlike a man.

As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. 

He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire; therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.

Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive, and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil; hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil.

The knowledge of evil is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature; therefore it is a passive state which depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof, namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.

 if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.

Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another; therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil.

We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter.

We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.

If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. 

Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above, none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavor to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.

In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

the eternal part of the mind is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination, through which only we are said to be passive; therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter.

Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them.

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.

Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts.

Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand; that is, so much the more power has it over the emotions, and so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself.

how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.


1:7 God did not give us a Spirit of fear but of power and love and self-control.


4:13 For the promise 22  to Abraham or to his descendants that he would inherit the world was not fulfilled through the law, but through the righteousness that comes by faith. 4:14 For if they become heirs by the law, faith is empty and the promise is nullified. 23  4:15 For the law brings wrath, because where there is no law there is no transgression 24  either. 4:16 For this reason it is by faith so that it may be by grace, 25  with the result that the promise may be certain to all the descendants – not only to those who are under the law, but also to those who have the faith of Abraham, 26  who is the father of us all 

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The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza, [1883], at sacred-texts.com


Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation...we do not possess absolute dominion over them...Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them...Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland... He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27)... Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain.

If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed?

That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause; wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed

An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea. If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason; therefore, the emotion will cease to be a passion. 

 there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body, and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive 

The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.

The mind understands all things to be necessary and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore, it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and feels less emotion towards the things themselves.

The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies.

Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think; therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else... the mind's essence, in other words, its power, consists solely in thought, the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion, in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.

The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is, which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding.

By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand.

This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.

God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection; therefore he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect; wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active; consequently there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words, no one can hate God.

This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason, it is common to all men, and we desire that all should rejoice therein

Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. 

 We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge, founded on the actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions; at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind

The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body endures; and, consequently, it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything, or remember things past, except while the body endures

God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence. This essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God, and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity; and this conception must necessarily exist in God

The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

the highest virtue of the mind, that is the power, or nature, or highest endeavor of the mind, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind.

The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge: consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus, from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.

ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; 

Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration. Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity, and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity

Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God

Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.

Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows,

The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.

In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.

Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

rom this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is, pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause.

From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

 If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself.

The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.

This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind; it is itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.

Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.

From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which ) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same

 Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God, it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind, is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second kind... all things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God

There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

The mind's essence consists in knowledge; therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures, and, consequently, the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil. Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.

 death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence, it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures.

He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil-that is, by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; therefore, he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that he will be affected with love towards God, which must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore, such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.

we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.

we primarily endeavor to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect,

In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

the eternal part of the mind is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act ; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination

The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them.

 If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.

Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts.

Blessedness consists in love towards God, which love springs from the third kind of knowledge; therefore this love must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand; that is, so much the more power has it over the emotions, and so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. 

how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

 Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.


29:11 A fool lets fly with all his temper, 
but a wise person keeps it back. 

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Descartes' Meditations



For, in the first place, I discover that it is impossible for him ever to deceive me, for in all fraud and deceit there is a certain imperfection: and although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without doubt of malice and weakness; and such, accordingly, cannot be found in God.

I am conscious that I possess a certain faculty of judging [or discerning truth from error], which I doubtless received from God, along with whatever else is mine; and since it is impossible that he should will to deceive me, it is likewise certain that he has not given me a faculty that will ever lead me into error, provided I use it aright. 

knowing already that my nature is extremely weak and limited, and that the nature of God, on the other hand, is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no longer any difficulty in discerning that there is an infinity of things in his power whose causes transcend the grasp of my mind.

Whereupon, regarding myself more closely, and considering what my errors are (which alone testify to the existence of imperfection in me), I observe that these depend on the concurrence of two causes, viz, the faculty of cognition, which I possess, and that of election or the power of free choice,--in other words, the understanding and the will. For by the understanding alone, I [neither affirm nor deny anything but] merely apprehend (percipio) the ideas regarding which I may form a judgment; nor is any error, properly so called, found in it thus accurately taken.

for the power of will consists only in this, that we are able to do or not to do the same thing (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or shun it), or rather in this alone, that in affirming or denying, pursuing or shunning, what is proposed to us by the understanding, we so act that we are not conscious of being determined to a particular action by any external force. For, to the possession of freedom, it is not necessary that I be alike indifferent toward each of two contraries; but, on the contrary, the more I am inclined toward the one, whether because I clearly know that in it there is the reason of truth and goodness, or because God thus internally disposes my thought, the more freely do I choose and embrace it; and assuredly divine grace and natural knowledge, very far from diminishing liberty, rather augment and fortify it.

For, to the possession of freedom, it is not necessary that I be alike indifferent toward each of two contraries; but, on the contrary, the more I am inclined toward the one, whether because I clearly know that in it there is the reason of truth and goodness, or because God thus internally disposes my thought, the more freely do I choose and embrace it; and assuredly divine grace and natural knowledge, very far from diminishing liberty, rather augment and fortify it. But the indifference of which I am conscious when I am not impelled to one side rather than to another for want of a reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and manifests defect or negation of knowledge rather than perfection of will; for if I always clearly knew what was true and good, I should never have any difficulty in determining what judgment I ought to come to, and what choice I ought to make, and I should thus be entirely free without ever being indifferent.

 I not only know that I exist, in so far as I am a thinking being, but there is likewise presented to my mind a certain idea of corporeal nature; hence I am in doubt as to whether the thinking nature which is in me, or rather which I myself am, is different from that corporeal nature, or whether both are merely one and the same thing, and I here suppose that I am as yet ignorant of any reason that would determine me to adopt the one belief in preference to the other; whence it happens that it is a matter of perfect indifference to me which of the two suppositions I affirm or deny, or whether I form any judgment at all in the matter.

If I abstain from judging of a thing when I do not conceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly, and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm, I then do not make a right use of my free will; and if I affirm what is false, it is evident that I am deceived; moreover, even although I judge according to truth, I stumble upon it by chance, and do not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of my freedom; for it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will. And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him... acts are wholly true and good, in so far as they depend on God; and the ability to form them is a higher degree of perfection in my nature than the want of it would be. With regard to privation, in which alone consists the formal reason of error and sin, this does not require the concurrence of Deity, because it is not a thing [or existence], and if it be referred to God as to its cause, it ought not to be called privation, but negation [according to the signification of these words in the schools]. For in truth it is no imperfection in Deity that he has accorded to me the power of giving or withholding my assent from certain things of which he has not put a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is doubtless an imperfection in me that I do not use my freedom aright, and readily give my judgment on matters which I only obscurely and confusedly conceive.

 have even good reason to remain satisfied on the ground that, if he has not given me the perfection of being superior to error by the first means I have pointed out above, which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the matters regarding which I can deliberate, he has at least left in my power the other means, which is, firmly to retain the resolution never to judge where the truth is not clearly known to me: for, although I am conscious of the weakness of not being able to keep my mind continually fixed on the same thought, I can nevertheless, by attentive and oft-repeated meditation, impress it so strongly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it as often as I require it, and I can acquire in this way the habitude of not erring.

I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge, that it forms no judgment except regarding objects which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived; because every clear and distinct conception is doubtless something, and as such cannot owe its origin to nothing, but must of necessity have God for its author-- God, I say, who, as supremely perfect, cannot, without a contradiction, be the cause of any error; and consequently it is necessary to conclude that every such conception [or judgment] is true. Nor have I merely learned to-day what I must avoid to escape error, but also what I must do to arrive at the knowledge of truth; for I will assuredly reach truth if I only fix my attention sufficiently on all the things I conceive perfectly, and separate these from others which I conceive more confusedly and obscurely; to which for the future I shall give diligent heed.


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Descartes' Meditations



 I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt.

All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.

although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt...I sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived

Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing certain...it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect ) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause... if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false.

But it is not sufficient to have made these observations; care must be taken likewise to keep them in remembrance. For those old and customary opinions perpetually recur-- long and familiar usage giving them the right of occupying my mind, even almost against my will, and subduing my belief; nor will I lose the habit of deferring to them and confiding in them so long as I shall consider them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions to some extent doubtful, as I have already shown, but still highly probable, and such as it is much more reasonable to believe than deny.

It is for this reason I am persuaded that I shall not be doing wrong, if, taking an opposite judgment of deliberate design, I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for a time, that all those opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at length, having thus balanced my old by my new prejudices, my judgment shall no longer be turned aside by perverted usage from the path that may conduct to the perception of truth. For I am assured that, meanwhile, there will arise neither peril nor error from this course, and that I cannot for the present yield too much to distrust, since the end I now seek is not action but knowledge.

I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me

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Descartes' Meditations



Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.

 I will now consider anew what I formerly believed myself to be, before I entered on the present train of thought; and of my previous opinion I will retrench all that can in the least be invalidated by the grounds of doubt I have adduced, in order that there may at length remain nothing but what is certain and indubitable.

In the first place, then, I thought that I possessed a countenance, hands, arms, and all the fabric of members that appears in a corpse, and which I called by the name of body. It further occurred to me that I was nourished, that I walked, perceived, and thought, and all those actions I referred to the soul; but what the soul itself was I either did not stay to consider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtile, like wind, or flame, or ether, spread through my grosser parts. As regarded the body, I did not even doubt of its nature, but thought I distinctly knew it, and if I had wished to describe it according to the notions I then entertained, 

Let us pass, then, to the attributes of the soul. The first mentioned were the powers of nutrition and walking; but, if it be true that I have no body, it is true likewise that I am capable neither of walking nor of being nourished. Perception is another attribute of the soul; but perception too is impossible without the body; besides, I have frequently, during sleep, believed that I perceived objects which I afterward observed I did not in reality perceive. Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am--I exist: this is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be. I now admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind (mens sive animus), understanding, or reason, terms whose signification was before unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but what thing? The answer was, a thinking thing.

 I can only judge of things that are known to me: I am conscious that I exist, and I who know that I exist inquire into what I am. It is, however, perfectly certain that the knowledge of my existence, thus precisely taken, is not dependent on things, the existence of which is as yet unknown to me: and consequently it is not dependent on any of the things I can feign in imagination. Moreover, the phrase itself, I frame an image (efffingo), reminds me of my error; for I should in truth frame one if I were to imagine myself to be anything, since to imagine is nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing; but I already know that I exist, and that it is possible at the same time that all those images, and in general all that relates to the nature of body, are merely dreams [or chimeras]. From this I discover that it is not more reasonable to say, I will excite my imagination that I may know more distinctly what I am, than to express myself as follows: I am now awake, and perceive something real; but because my perception is not sufficiently clear, I will of express purpose go to sleep that my dreams may represent to me the object of my perception with more truth and clearness. And, therefore, I know that nothing of all that I can embrace in imagination belongs to the knowledge which I have of myself, and that there is need to recall with the utmost care the mind from this mode of thinking, that it may be able to know its own nature with perfect distinctness.

what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives.

there are besides so many other things in the mind itself that contribute to the illustration of its nature, that those dependent on the body, to which I have here referred, scarcely merit to be taken into account.

bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and since they are not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood [ or rightly comprehended by thought ], I readily discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly apprehended than my own mind. But because it is difficult to rid one's self so promptly of an opinion to which one has been long accustomed, it will be desirable to tarry for some time at this stage, that, by long continued meditation, I may more deeply impress upon my memory this new knowledge

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Descartes' Meditations



In this first knowledge, doubtless, there is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth except the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm, which would not indeed be sufficient to give me the assurance that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that anything I thus clearly and distinctly perceived should prove false; and accordingly it seems to me that I may now take as a general rule, that all that is very clearly and distinctly apprehended (conceived) is true.

in truth, as I have no ground for believing that Deity is deceitful, and as, indeed, I have not even considered the reasons by which the existence of a Deity of any kind is established, the ground of doubt that rests only on this supposition is very slight, and, so to speak, metaphysical. But, that I may be able wholly to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God, as soon as an opportunity of doing so shall present itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must examine likewise whether he can be a deceiver; for, without the knowledge of these two truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything.

f my thoughts some are, as it were, images of things, and to these alone properly belongs the name IDEA; as when I think [ represent to my mind ] a man, a chimera, the sky, an angel or God. Others, again, have certain other forms; as when I will, fear, affirm, or deny, I always, indeed, apprehend something as the object of my thought, but I also embrace in thought something more than the representation of the object; and of this class of thoughts some are called volitions or affections, and others judgments.[

Now, with respect to ideas, if these are considered only in themselves, and are not referred to any object beyond them, they cannot, properly speaking, be false; for, whether I imagine a goat or chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than the other. Nor need we fear that falsity may exist in the will or affections; for, although I may desire objects that are wrong, and even that never existed, it is still true that I desire them. There thus only remain our judgments, in which we must take diligent heed that we be not deceived. But the chief and most ordinary error that arises in them consists in judging that the ideas which are in us are like or conformed to the things that are external to us; for assuredly, if we but considered the ideas themselves as certain modes of our thought (consciousness), without referring them to anything beyond, they would hardly afford any occasion of error.

But among these ideas, some appear to me to be innate, others adventitious, and others to be made by myself (factitious); for, as I have the power of conceiving what is called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, it seems to me that I hold this power from no other source than my own nature; but if I now hear a noise, if I see the sun, or if I feel heat, I have all along judged that these sensations proceeded from certain objects existing out of myself; and, in fine, it appears to me that sirens, hippogryphs, and the like, are inventions of my own mind. But I may even perhaps come to be of opinion that all my ideas are of the class which I call adventitious, or that they are all innate, or that they are all factitious; for I have not yet clearly discovered their true origin. 

 it seems to me I am so taught by nature; and the second that I am conscious that those ideas are not dependent on my will, and therefore not on myself, for they are frequently presented to me against my will, as at present, whether I will or not, I feel heat; and I am thus persuaded that this sensation or idea (sensum vel ideam) of heat is produced in me by something different from myself, viz., by the heat of the fire by which I sit. And it is very reasonable to suppose that this object impresses me with its own likeness rather than any other thing.

I am because I doubt, and other truths of the like kind; inasmuch as I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from error, which can teach me the falsity of what the natural light declares to be true, and which is equally trustworthy; but with respect to [seemingly] natural impulses, I have observed, when the question related to the choice of right or wrong in action, that they frequently led me to take the worse part; nor do I see that I have any better ground for following them in what relates to truth and error. 

 ideas do not depend on my will, they must arise from objects existing without me, I do not find it more convincing than the former, for just as those natural impulses, of which I have lately spoken, are found in me, notwithstanding that they are not always in harmony with my will, so likewise it may be that I possess some power not sufficiently known to myself capable of producing ideas without the aid of external objects, and, indeed, it has always hitherto appeared to me that they are formed during sleep, by some power of this nature, without the aid of aught external.

I have observed, in a number of instances, that there was a great difference between the object and its idea. Thus, for example, I find in my mind two wholly diverse ideas of the sun; the one, by which it appears to me extremely small draws its origin from the senses, and should be placed in the class of adventitious ideas; the other, by which it seems to be many times larger than the whole earth, is taken up on astronomical grounds, that is, elicited from certain notions born with me, or is framed by myself in some other manner. These two ideas cannot certainly both resemble the same sun; and reason teaches me that the one which seems to have immediately emanated from it is the most unlike.

the idea by which I conceive a God [sovereign], eternal, infinite, [immutable], all-knowing, all-powerful, and the creator of all things that are out of himself, this, I say, has certainly in it more objective reality than those ideas by which finite substances are represented.

Now, it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect; for whence can the effect draw its reality if not from its cause ? And how could the cause communicate to it this reality unless it possessed it in itself? And hence it follows, not only that what is cannot be produced by what is not, but likewise that the more perfect, in other words, that which contains in itself more reality, cannot be the effect of the less perfect; and this is not only evidently true of those effects, whose reality is actual or formal, but likewise of ideas, whose reality is only considered as objective.

we ought to consider that, [as every idea is a work of the mind], its nature is such as of itself to demand no other formal reality than that which it borrows from our consciousness, of which it is but a mode [that is, a manner or way of thinking]. But in order that an idea may contain this objective reality rather than that, it must doubtless derive it from some cause in which is found at least as much formal reality as the idea contains of objective; for, if we suppose that there is found in an idea anything which was not in its cause, it must of course derive this from nothing. But, however imperfect may be the mode of existence by which a thing is objectively [or by representation] in the understanding by its idea, we certainly cannot, for all that, allege that this mode of existence is nothing, nor, consequently, that the idea owes its origin to nothing.

since the reality which considered in these ideas is only objective, the same reality need not be formally (actually) in the causes of these ideas, but only objectively: for, just as the mode of existing objectively belongs to ideas by their peculiar nature, so likewise the mode of existing formally appertains to the causes of these ideas (at least to the first and principal), by their peculiar nature. And although an idea may give rise to another idea, this regress cannot, nevertheless, be infinite; we must in the end reach a first idea, the cause of which is, as it were, the archetype in which all the reality [or perfection] that is found objectively [or by representation] in these ideas is contained formally [and in act]. I am thus clearly taught by the natural light that ideas exist in me as pictures or images, which may, in truth, readily fall short of the perfection of the objects from which they are taken, but can never contain anything greater or more perfect.

if the objective reality [or perfection] of any one of my ideas be such as clearly to convince me, that this same reality exists in me neither formally nor eminently, and if, as follows from this, I myself cannot be the cause of it, it is a necessary consequence that I am not alone in the world, but that there is besides myself some other being who exists as the cause of that idea; while, on the contrary, if no such idea be found in my mind, I shall have no sufficient ground of assurance of the existence of any other being besides myself, for, after a most careful search, I have, up to this moment, been unable to discover any other ground.

But, among these my ideas, besides that which represents myself, respecting which there can be here no difficulty, there is one that represents a God; others that represent corporeal and inanimate things; others angels; others animals; and, finally, there are some that represent men like myself.

But with respect to the ideas that represent other men, or animals, or angels, I can easily suppose that they were formed by the mingling and composition of the other ideas which I have of myself, of corporeal things, and of God, although they were, apart from myself, neither men, animals, nor angels.

There only remains, therefore, the idea of God, in which I must consider whether there is anything that cannot be supposed to originate with myself. By the name God, I understand a substance infinite, [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that the more attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, from all that I have before said, that God exists.

I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception (notion) of the infinite before that of the finite, that is, the perception of God before that of myself, for how could I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I knew the deficiencies of my nature ?

The idea, I say, of a being supremely perfect, and infinite, is in the highest degree true; for although, perhaps, we may imagine that such a being does not exist, we cannot, nevertheless, suppose that his idea represents nothing real, as I have already said of the idea of cold. It is likewise clear and distinct in the highest degree, since whatever the mind clearly and distinctly conceives as real or true, and as implying any perfection, is contained entire in this idea. And this is true, nevertheless, although I do not comprehend the infinite, and although there may be in God an infinity of things that I cannot comprehend, nor perhaps even compass by thought in any way; for it is of the nature of the infinite that it should not be comprehended by the finite; and it is enough that I rightly understand this, and judge that all which I clearly perceive, and in which I know there is some perfection, and perhaps also an infinity of properties of which I am ignorant, are formally or eminently in God, in order that the idea I have of him may be come the most true, clear, and distinct of all the ideas in my mind.

t may be that all those perfections which I attribute to God, in some way exist potentially in me, although they do not yet show themselves, and are not reduced to act. Indeed, I am already conscious that my knowledge is being increased [and perfected] by degrees; and I see nothing to prevent it from thus gradually increasing to infinity, nor any reason why, after such increase and perfection, I should not be able thereby to acquire all the other perfections of the Divine nature; nor, in fine, why the power I possess of acquiring those perfections, if it really now exist in me, should not be sufficient to produce the ideas of them.

although my knowledge increase more and more, nevertheless I am not, therefore, induced to think that it will ever be actually infinite, since it can never reach that point beyond which it shall be incapable of further increase. But I conceive God as actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection. And, in fine, I readily perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being that is merely potentially existent, which, properly speaking, is nothing, but only by a being existing formally or actually.

since I am a thinking thing and possess in myself an idea of God, whatever in the end be the cause of my existence, it must of necessity be admitted that it is likewise a thinking being, and that it possesses in itself the idea and all the perfections I attribute to Deity....Then it may again be inquired whether this cause owes its origin and existence to itself, or to some other cause. For if it be self-existent, it follows, from what I have before laid down, that this cause is God; for, since it possesses the perfection of self-existence, it must likewise, without doubt, have the power of actually possessing every perfection of which it has the idea--in other words, all the perfections I conceive to belong to God. But if it owe its existence to another cause than itself, we demand again, for a similar reason, whether this second cause exists of itself or through some other, until, from stage to stage, we at length arrive at an ultimate cause, which will be God.

 the unity, the simplicity, or inseparability of all the properties of Deity, is one of the chief perfections I conceive him to possess; and the idea of this unity of all the perfections of Deity could certainly not be put into my mind by any cause from which I did not likewise receive the ideas of all the other perfections; for no power could enable me to embrace them in an inseparable unity, without at the same time giving me the knowledge of what they were [and of their existence in a particular mode

Finally, with regard to my parents [ from whom it appears I sprung ], although all that I believed respecting them be true, it does not, nevertheless, follow that I am conserved by them, or even that I was produced by them, in so far as I am a thinking being. All that, at the most, they contributed to my origin was the giving of certain dispositions ( modifications ) to the matter in which I have hitherto judged that I or my mind, which is what alone I now consider to be myself, is inclosed; and thus there can here be no difficulty with respect to them, and it is absolutely necessary to conclude from this alone that I am, and possess the idea of a being absolutely perfect, that is, of God, that his existence is most clearly demonstrated.

here remains only the inquiry as to the way in which I received this idea from God; for I have not drawn it from the senses, nor is it even presented to me unexpectedly, as is usual with the ideas of sensible objects, when these are presented or appear to be presented to the external organs of the senses; it is not even a pure production or fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to take from or add to it; and consequently there but remains the alternative that it is innate, in the same way as is the idea of myself.

considering only that God is my creator, it is highly probable that he in some way fashioned me after his own image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself, in other words, when I make myself the object of reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete, [imperfect] and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but, at the same time, I am assured likewise that he upon whom I am dependent possesses in himself all the goods after which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find in my mind], and that not merely indefinitely and potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that he is thus God. And the whole force of the argument of which I have here availed myself to establish the existence of God, consists in this, that I perceive I could not possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of a God, if God did not in reality exist--this same God, I say, whose idea is in my mind--that is, a being who possesses all those lofty perfections, of which the mind may have some slight conception, without, however, being able fully to comprehend them, and who is wholly superior to all defect [ and has nothing that marks imperfection]: whence it is sufficiently manifest that he cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud and deception spring from some defect.

I think it proper to remain here for some time in the contemplation of God himself--that I may ponder at leisure his marvelous attributes--and behold, admire, and adore the beauty of this light so unspeakably great, as far, at least, as the strength of my mind, which is to some degree dazzled by the sight, will permit. For just as we learn by faith that the supreme felicity of another life consists in the contemplation of the Divine majesty alone, so even now we learn from experience that a like meditation, though incomparably less perfect, is the source of the highest satisfaction of which we are susceptible in this life.


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Descartes' Meditations



before considering whether such objects as I conceive exist without me, I must examine their ideas in so far as these are to be found in my consciousness, and discover which of them are distinct and which confused.

 I distinctly imagine that quantity which the philosophers commonly call continuous, or the extension in length, breadth, and depth that is in this quantity, or rather in the object to which it is attributed. Further, I can enumerate in it many diverse parts, and attribute to each of these all sorts of sizes, figures, situations, and local motions; and, in fine, I can assign to each of these motions all degrees of duration.

I discover innumerable particulars respecting figures, numbers, motion, and the like, which are so evidently true, and so accordant with my nature, that when I now discover them I do not so much appear to learn anything new, as to call to remembrance what I before knew, or for the first time to remark what was before in my mind, but to which I had not hitherto directed my attention.

And what I here find of most importance is, that I discover in my mind innumerable ideas of certain objects, which cannot be esteemed pure negations, although perhaps they possess no reality beyond my thought, and which are not framed by me though it may be in my power to think, or not to think them, but possess true and immutable natures of their own. As, for example, when I imagine a triangle, although there is not perhaps and never was in any place in the universe apart from my thought one such figure, it remains true nevertheless that this figure possesses a certain determinate nature, form, or essence, which is immutable and eternal, and not framed by me, nor in any degree dependent on my thought; as appears from the circumstance, that diverse properties of the triangle may be demonstrated, viz, that its three angles are equal to two right, that its greatest side is subtended by its greatest angle, and the like, which, whether I will or not, I now clearly discern to belong to it, although before I did not at all think of them, when, for the first time, I imagined a triangle, and which accordingly cannot be said to have been invented by me.

Nor is it a valid objection to allege, that perhaps this idea of a triangle came into my mind by the medium of the senses, through my having. seen bodies of a triangular figure; for I am able to form in thought an innumerable variety of figures with regard to which it cannot be supposed that they were ever objects of sense, and I can nevertheless demonstrate diverse properties of their nature no less than of the triangle, all of which are assuredly true since I clearly conceive them: and they are therefore something, and not mere negations; for it is highly evident that all that is true is something, [truth being identical with existence]; and I have already fully shown the truth of the principle, that whatever is clearly and distinctly known is true.

It is certain that I no less find the idea of a God in my consciousness, that is the idea of a being supremely perfect, than that of any figure or number whatever: and I know with not less clearness and distinctness that an [actual and] eternal existence pertains to his nature than that all which is demonstrable of any figure or number really belongs to the nature of that figure or number; and, therefore, although all the conclusions of the preceding Meditations were false, the existence of God would pass with me for a truth at least as certain as I ever judged any truth of mathematics to be.

I cannot conceive a God unless as existing, any more than I can a mountain without a valley, yet, just as it does not follow that there is any mountain in the world merely because I conceive a mountain with a valley, so likewise, though I conceive God as existing, it does not seem to follow on that account that God exists; for my thought imposes no necessity on things; and as I may imagine a winged horse, though there be none such, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God, though no God existed.

I cannot conceive God unless as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and therefore that he really exists: not that this is brought about by my thought, or that it imposes any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, the necessity which lies in the thing itself, that is, the necessity of the existence of God, determines me to think in this way: for it is not in my power to conceive a God without existence, that is, a being supremely perfect, and yet devoid of an absolute perfection, as I am free to imagine a horse with or without wings.

each time I happen to think of a first and sovereign being, and to draw, so to speak, the idea of him from the storehouse of the mind, I am necessitated to attribute to him all kinds of perfections, though I may not then enumerate them all, nor think of each of them in particular. And this necessity is sufficient, as soon as I discover that existence is a perfection, to cause me to infer the existence of this first and sovereign being;

there is a vast difference between false suppositions, as is the one in question, and the true ideas that were born with me, the first and chief of which is the idea of God. For indeed I discern on many grounds that this idea is not factitious depending simply on my thought, but that it is the representation of a true and immutable nature: in the first place because I can conceive no other being, except God, to whose essence existence [necessarily] pertains; in the second, because it is impossible to conceive two or more gods of this kind; and it being supposed that one such God exists, I clearly see that he must have existed from all eternity, and will exist to all eternity; and finally, because I apprehend many other properties in God, none of which I can either diminish or change.

of the objects I conceive in this manner, some, indeed, are obvious to every one, while others are only discovered after close and careful investigation; nevertheless after they are once discovered, the latter are not esteemed less certain than the former..with respect to God if I were not pre-occupied by prejudices, and my thought beset on all sides by the continual presence of the images of sensible objects, I should know nothing sooner or more easily then the fact of his being. For is there any truth more clear than the existence of a Supreme Being, or of God, seeing it is to his essence alone that [necessary and eternal] existence pertains.

it may happen meanwhile that other reasons are presented to me which would readily cause me to change my opinion, if I did not know that God existed; and thus I should possess no true and certain knowledge, but merely vague and vacillating opinions. as soon as I cease from attending to the process of proof, although I still remember that I had a clear comprehension of it, yet I may readily come to doubt of the truth demonstrated, if I do not know that there is a God: for I may persuade myself that I have been so constituted by nature as to be sometimes deceived, even in matters which I think I apprehend with the greatest evidence and certitude, especially when I recollect that I frequently considered many things to be true and certain which other reasons afterward constrained me to reckon as wholly false.

ut after I have discovered that God exists, seeing I also at the same time observed that all things depend on him, and that he is no deceiver, and thence inferred that all which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true: although I no longer attend to the grounds of a judgment, no opposite reason can be alleged sufficient to lead me to doubt of its truth, provided only I remember that I once possessed a clear and distinct comprehension of it. My knowledge of it thus becomes true and certain. And this same knowledge extends likewise to whatever I remember to have formerly demonstrated, as the truths of geometry and the like: for what can be alleged against them to lead me to doubt of them? Will it be that my nature is such that I may be frequently deceived? But I already know that I cannot be deceived in judgments of the grounds of which I possess a clear knowledge. Will it be that I formerly deemed things to be true and certain which I afterward discovered to be false ? But I had no clear and distinct knowledge of any of those things, and, being as yet ignorant of the rule by which I am assured of the truth of a judgment, I was led to give my assent to them on grounds which I afterward discovered were less strong than at the time I imagined them to be... the rule still holds that all which is clearly presented to my intellect is indisputably true.

I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God, insomuch that, before I knew him, I could have no perfect knowledge of any other thing. And now that I know him, I possess the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge respecting innumerable matters, as well relative to God himself and other intellectual objects as to corporeal nature, in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics [which do not consider whether it exists or not].




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The brain's angular gyrus allows us to formulate ideas. Recent experiments have demonstrated the possibility that stimulation of the right angular gyrus is the cause of out-of-body experiences. Stimulation of the left angular gyrus in one experiment caused a woman to perceive a shadowy person lurking behind her. The shadowy figure is actually a perceived double of the self.[21] Another such experiment gave the test subject the sensation of being on the ceiling. This is attributed to a discrepancy in the actual position of the body, and the mind's perceived location of the body.


Out-of-Body Experience? Your Brain Is to Blame

Corporeal may refer to:

Matter (corporeal, or actual, physical substance or matter), generally considered to be a substance (often a particle) that has rest mass and (usually) also volume
Body, of or relating to the body

Descartes' Meditations



there can be no doubt that God possesses the power of producing all the objects I am able distinctly to conceive, and I never considered anything impossible to him, unless when I experienced a contradiction in the attempt to conceive it aright...the faculty of imagination which I possess, and of which I am conscious that I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of material things, is sufficient to persuade me of their existence: for, when I attentively consider what imagination is, I find that it is simply a certain application of the cognitive faculty ( facultas cognoscitiva) to a body which is immediately present to it, and which therefore exists...I observe that a special effort of mind is necessary to the act of imagination, which is not required to conceiving or understanding (ad intelligendum); and this special exertion of mind clearly shows the difference between imagination and pure intellection (imaginatio et intellectio pura).

I easily understand that, if some body exists, with which my mind is so conjoined and united as to be able, as it were, to consider it when it chooses, it may thus imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only in this respect, that the mind in conceiving turns in some way upon itself, and considers some one of the ideas it possesses within itself; but in imagining it turns toward the body, and contemplates in it some object conformed to the idea which it either of itself conceived or apprehended by sense. I easily understand, I say, that imagination may be thus formed, if it is true that there are bodies; and because I find no other obvious mode of explaining it, I thence, with probability, conjecture that they exist, but only with probability; and although I carefully examine all things, nevertheless I do not find that, from the distinct idea of corporeal nature I have in my imagination, I can necessarily infer the existence of any body.

I am accustomed to imagine many other objects besides that corporeal nature which is the object of the pure mathematics, as, for example, colors, sounds, tastes, pain, and the like, although with less distinctness; and, inasmuch as I perceive these objects much better by the senses, through the medium of which and of memory, they seem to have reached the imagination, I believe that, in order the more advantageously to examine them, it is proper I should at the same time examine what sense-perception is, and inquire whether from those ideas that are apprehended by this mode of thinking ( consciousness), I cannot obtain a certain proof of the existence of corporeal objects.

what was beneficial I remarked by a certain sensation of pleasure, and what was hurtful by a sensation of pain. And besides this pleasure and pain, I was likewise conscious of hunger, thirst, and other appetites, as well as certain corporeal inclinations toward joy, sadness, anger, and similar passions. And, out of myself, besides the extension, figure, and motions of bodies, I likewise perceived in them hardness, heat, and the other tactile qualities, and, in addition, light, colors, odors, tastes, and sounds, the variety of which gave me the means of distinguishing the sky, the earth, the sea, and generally all the other bodies, from one another. And certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities, which were presented to my mind, and which alone I properly and immediately perceived, it was not without reason that I thought I perceived certain objects wholly different from my thought, namely, bodies from which those ideas proceeded; for I was conscious that the ideas were presented to me without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of sense; and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus present. And because the ideas I perceived by the senses were much more lively and clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct than any of those I could of myself frame by meditation, or which I found impressed on my memory, it seemed that they could not have proceeded from myself, and must therefore have been caused in me by some other objects; and as of those objects I had no knowledge beyond what the ideas themselves gave me, nothing was so likely to occur to my mind as the supposition that the objects were similar to the ideas which they caused. And because I recollected also that I had formerly trusted to the senses, rather than to reason, and that the ideas which I myself formed were not so clear as those I perceived by sense, and that they were even for the most part composed of parts of the latter, I was readily persuaded that I had no idea in my intellect which had not formerly passed through the senses. Nor was I altogether wrong in likewise believing that that body which, by a special right, I called my own, pertained to me more properly and strictly than any of the others; for in truth, I could never be separated from it as from other bodies; I felt in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections, and in fine I was affected in its parts by pain and the titillation of pleasure, and not in the parts of the other bodies that were separated from it. But when I inquired into the reason why, from this I know not what sensation of pain, sadness of mind should follow, and why from the sensation of pleasure, joy should arise, or why this indescribable twitching of the stomach, which I call hunger, should put me in mind of taking food, and the parchedness of the throat of drink, and so in other cases, I was unable to give any explanation, unless that I was so taught by nature; for there is assuredly no affinity, at least none that I am able to comprehend, between this irritation of the stomach and the desire of food, any more than between the perception of an object that causes pain and the consciousness of sadness which springs from the perception. And in the same way it seemed to me that all the other judgments I had formed regarding the objects of sense, were dictates of nature; because I remarked that those judgments were formed in me, before I had leisure to weigh and consider the reasons that might constrain me to form them.

I also discovered error in judgments founded on the external senses; and not only in those founded on the external, but even in those that rested on the internal senses; for is there aught more internal than pain ? And yet I have sometimes been informed by parties whose arm or leg had been amputated, that they still occasionally seemed to feel pain in that part of the body which they had lost, --a circumstance that led me to think that I could not be quite certain even that any one of my members was affected when I felt pain in it. And to these grounds of doubt I shortly afterward also added two others of very wide generality: the first of them was that I believed I never perceived anything when awake which I could not occasionally think I also perceived when asleep, and as I do not believe that the ideas I seem to perceive in my sleep proceed from objects external to me, I did not any more observe any ground for believing this of such as I seem to perceive when awake; the second was that since I was as yet ignorant of the author of my being or at least supposed myself to be so, I saw nothing to prevent my having been so constituted by nature as that I should be deceived even in matters that appeared to me to possess the greatest truth. And, with respect to the grounds on which I had before been persuaded of the existence of sensible objects, I had no great difficulty in finding suitable answers to them; for as nature seemed to incline me to many things from which reason made me averse, I thought that I ought not to confide much in its teachings. And although the perceptions of the senses were not dependent on my will, I did not think that I ought on that ground to conclude that they proceeded from things different from myself, since perhaps there might be found in me some faculty, though hitherto unknown to me, which produced them.18

I know that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive can be produced by God exactly as I conceive it, it is sufficient that I am able clearly and distinctly to conceive one thing apart from another, in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, seeing they may at least be made to exist separately, by the omnipotence of God; and it matters not by what power this separation is made, in order to be compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence beyond my being a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only in my being a thinking thing [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, [that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it.

I find I possess the faculties of imagining and perceiving, without which I can indeed clearly and distinctly conceive myself as entire, but I cannot reciprocally conceive them without conceiving myself, that is to say, without an intelligent substance in which they reside, for [in the notion we have of them, or to use the terms of the schools] in their formal concept, they comprise some sort of intellection; whence I perceive that they are distinct from myself as modes are from things. I remark likewise certain other faculties, as the power of changing place, of assuming diverse figures, and the like, that cannot be conceived and cannot therefore exist, any more than the preceding, apart from a substance in which they inhere. It is very evident, however, that these faculties, if they really exist, must belong to some corporeal or extended substance, since in their clear and distinct concept there is contained some sort of extension, but no intellection at all. Further, I cannot doubt but that there is in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and taking knowledge of the ideas of sensible things; but this would be useless to me, if there did not also exist in me, or in some other thing, another active faculty capable of forming and producing those ideas. But this active faculty cannot be in me [in as far as I am but a thinking thing], seeing that it does not presuppose thought, and also that those ideas are frequently produced in my mind without my contributing to it in any way, and even frequently contrary to my will. This faculty must therefore exist in some substance different from me, in which all the objective reality of the ideas that are produced by this faculty is contained formally or eminently, as I before remarked; and this substance is either a body, that is to say, a corporeal nature in which is contained formally [and in effect] all that is objectively [and by representation] in those ideas; or it is God himself, or some other creature, of a rank superior to body, in which the same is contained eminently. But as God is no deceiver, it is manifest that he does not of himself and immediately communicate those ideas to me, nor even by the intervention of any creature in which their objective reality is not formally, but only eminently, contained. For as he has given me no faculty whereby I can discover this to be the case, but, on the contrary, a very strong inclination to believe that those ideas arise from corporeal objects, I do not see how he could be vindicated from the charge of deceit, if in truth they proceeded from any other source, or were produced by other causes than corporeal things: and accordingly it must be concluded, that corporeal objects exist. Nevertheless, they are not perhaps exactly such as we perceive by the senses, for their comprehension by the senses is, in many instances, very obscure and confused; but it is at least necessary to admit that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive as in them, that is, generally speaking all that is comprehended in the object of speculative geometry, really exists external to me.

God is no deceiver, and that consequently he has permitted no falsity in my opinions which he has not likewise given me a faculty of correcting, I think I may with safety conclude that I possess in myself the means of arriving at the truth. And, in the first place, it cannot be doubted that in each of the dictates of nature there is some truth: for by nature, considered in general, I now understand nothing more than God himself, or the order and disposition established by God in created things; and by my nature in particular I understand the assemblage of all that God has given me.

Nature likewise teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity. 

 nature teaches me that my own body is surrounded by many other bodies, some of which I have to seek after, and others to shun. And indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are in the bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like them; and since, among these diverse perceptions of the senses, some are agreeable, and others disagreeable, there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my entire self, in as far as I am composed of body and mind, may be variously affected, both beneficially and hurtfully, by surrounding bodies.

there are many other beliefs which though seemingly the teaching of nature, are not in reality so, but which obtained a place in my mind through a habit of judging inconsiderately of things. It may thus easily happen that such judgments shall contain error: thus, for example, the opinion I have that all space in which there is nothing to affect [or make an impression on] my senses is void: that in a hot body there is something in every respect similar to the idea of heat in my mind; that in a white or green body there is the same whiteness or greenness which I perceive; that in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste, and so in other instances; that the stars, towers, and all distant bodies, are of the same size and figure as they appear to our eyes, etc. But that I may avoid everything like indistinctness of conception, I must accurately define what I properly understand by being taught by nature. For nature is here taken in a narrower sense than when it signifies the sum of all the things which God has given me; seeing that in that meaning the notion comprehends much that belongs only to the mind [to which I am not here to be understood as referring when I use the term nature]

nature, taking the term in the sense explained, teaches me to shun what causes in me the sensation of pain, and to pursue what affords me the sensation of pleasure, and other things of this sort; but I do not discover that it teaches me, in addition to this, from these diverse perceptions of the senses, to draw any conclusions respecting external objects without a previous [ careful and mature ] consideration of them by the mind: for it is, as appears to me, the office of the mind alone, and not of the composite whole of mind and body, to discern the truth in those matters. Thus, although the impression a star makes on my eye is not larger than that from the flame of a candle, I do not, nevertheless, experience any real or positive impulse determining me to believe that the star is not greater than the flame; the true account of the matter being merely that I have so judged from my youth without any rational ground...I have been accustomed to pervert the order of nature, because these perceptions of the senses, although given me by nature merely to signify to my mind what things are beneficial and hurtful to the composite whole of which it is a part, and being sufficiently clear and distinct for that purpose, are nevertheless used by me as infallible rules by which to determine immediately the essence of the bodies that exist out of me, of which they can of course afford me only the most obscure and confused knowledge.

A difficulty, however, here presents itself, respecting the things which I am taught by nature must be pursued or avoided, and also respecting the internal sensations in which I seem to have occasionally detected error, [and thus to be directly deceived by nature]...thus we can infer nothing from this circumstance beyond that our nature is not omniscient; at which there is assuredly no ground for surprise, since, man being of a finite nature, his knowledge must likewise be of a limited perfection.

 there is a vast difference between mind and body, in respect that body, from its nature, is always divisible, and that mind is entirely indivisible. For in truth, when I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind; nor can the faculties of willing, perceiving, conceiving, etc., properly be called its parts, for it is the same mind that is exercised [all entire] in willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving, etc. But quite the opposite holds in corporeal or extended things; for I cannot imagine any one of them [how small soever it may be], which I cannot easily sunder in thought, and which, therefore, I do not know to be divisible. This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on other grounds.

 the mind does not immediately receive the impression from all the parts of the body, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one small part of it, viz, that in which the common sense (senses communis) is said to be, which as often as it is affected in the same way gives rise to the same perception in the mind, although meanwhile the other parts of the body may be diversely disposed, as is proved by innumerable experiments, which it is unnecessary here to enumerate.

experience shows us that all the perceptions which nature has given us are of such a kind as I have mentioned; and accordingly, there is nothing found in them that does not manifest the power and goodness of God.

It is true that God could have so constituted the nature of man as that the same motion in the brain would have informed the mind of something altogether different: the motion might, for example, have been the occasion on which the mind became conscious of itself, in so far as it is in the brain, or in so far as it is in some place intermediate between the foot and the brain, or, finally, the occasion on which it perceived some other object quite different, whatever that might be; but nothing of all this would have so well contributed to the preservation of the body as that which the mind actually feels. 

And certainly this consideration is of great service, not only in enabling me to recognize the errors to which my nature is liable, but likewise in rendering it more easy to avoid or correct them: for, knowing that all my senses more usually indicate to me what is true than what is false, in matters relating to the advantage of the body, and being able almost always to make use of more than a single sense in examining the same object, and besides this, being able to use my memory in connecting present with past knowledge, and my understanding which has already discovered all the causes of my errors, I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be met with in what is daily presented to me by the senses... for I now find a very marked difference between the two states, in respect that our memory can never connect our dreams with each other and with the course of life, in the way it is in the habit of doing with events that occur when we are awake. And, in truth, if some one, when I am awake, appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared, as do the images I see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he came or whither he went, I should not without reason esteem it either a specter or phantom formed in my brain, rather than a real man. But when I perceive objects with regard to which I can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that in which they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without interruption, I can connect the perception I have of them with the whole of the other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive occurs while I am awake and not during sleep. And I ought not in the least degree to doubt of the truth of these presentations, if, after having called together all my senses, my memory, and my understanding for the purpose of examining them, no deliverance is given by any one of these faculties which is repugnant to that of any other: for since God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am not herein deceived. But because the necessities of action frequently oblige us to come to a determination before we have had leisure for so careful an examination, it must be confessed that the life of man is frequently obnoxious to error with respect to individual objects; and we must, in conclusion, ac. knowledge the weakness of our nature


14:13 So then, one who speaks in a tongue should pray that he may interpret. 14:14 If 6  I pray in a tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is unproductive. 14:15 What should I do? 7  I will pray with my spirit, but I will also pray with my mind. I will sing praises with my spirit, but I will also sing praises with my mind. 14:16 Otherwise, if you are praising God with your spirit, how can someone without the gift 8  say “Amen” to your thanksgiving, since he does not know what you are saying? 14:17 For you are certainly giving thanks well, but the other person is not strengthened. 14:18 I thank God that I speak in tongues more than all of you, 14:19 but in the church I want to speak five words with my mind to instruct others, rather than ten thousand words in a tongue.

14:20 Brothers and sisters, 9  do not be children in your thinking. Instead, be infants in evil, but in your thinking be mature. 14:21 It is written in the law: “By people with strange tongues and by the lips of strangers I will speak to this people, yet not even in this way will they listen to me,” 10  says the Lord. 14:22 So then, tongues are a sign not for believers but for unbelievers. Prophecy, however, is not for unbelievers but for believers. 14:23 So if the whole church comes together and all speak in tongues, and unbelievers or uninformed people enter, will they not say that you have lost your minds? 14:24 But if all prophesy, and an unbeliever or uninformed person enters, he will be convicted by all, he will be called to account by all. 14:25 The secrets of his heart are disclosed, and in this way he will fall down with his face to the ground and worship God, declaring, “God is really among you.”


28:9 Who is the Lord 19  trying to teach?
To whom is he explaining a message? 20 
Those just weaned from milk!
Those just taken from their mother’s breast! 21 
28:10 Indeed, they will hear meaningless gibberish,
senseless babbling,
a syllable here, a syllable there. 22 
28:11 For with mocking lips and a foreign tongue
he will speak to these people. 23 
28:12 In the past he said to them, 24 
“This is where security can be found.
Provide security for the one who is exhausted!
This is where rest can be found.” 25 
But they refused to listen.
28:13 So the Lord’s word to them will sound like
meaningless gibberish,
senseless babbling,
a syllable here, a syllable there. 26 
As a result, they will fall on their backsides when they try to walk, 27 
and be injured, ensnared, and captured. 

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Pneuma (πνεῦμα) is an ancient Greek word for "breath", and in a religious context for "spirit" or "soul". It has various technical meanings for medical writers and philosophers of classical antiquity, particularly in regard to physiology, and is also used in Greek translations of the Hebrew Bible and in the Greek New Testament. In classical philosophy, it is distinguishable from psyche (ψυχή), which originally meant "breath of life", but is regularly translated as "spirit" or most often "soul".

In ancient Greek medicine, pneuma is the form of circulating air necessary for the systemic functioning of vital organs. It is the material that sustains consciousness in a body. According to Diocles and Praxagoras, the psychic pneuma mediates between the heart, regarded as the seat of Mind in some physiological theories of ancient medicine, and the brain.

The disciples of Hippocrates explained the maintenance of vital heat to be the function of the breath within the organism. Around 300 BC, Praxagoras discovered the distinction between the arteries and the veins. In the corpse arteries are empty; hence, in the light of these preconceptions they were declared to be vessels for conveying pneuma to the different parts of the body. A generation afterwards, Erasistratus made this the basis of a new theory of diseases and their treatment. The pneuma, inhaled from the outside air, rushes through the arteries till it reaches the various centres, especially the brain and the heart, and there causes thought and organic movement.

The association of physical and spiritual cleanliness is, if not universal, widespread and continues into the 21st century: "To be virtuous is to be physically clean and free from the impurity that is sin," notes an article in Scientific American published 10 March 2009.[5] Some scholarship[6] seeks to differentiate between "unclean spirit" and "evil spirit" (pneuma ponêron) or "demon" (daimonion).

Animal spirits were thought to be weightless, invisible entities that flowed through the hollow nerves to mediate the functioning of the body. The animal spirits theory was related to the notion of the four humours (blood, phlegm, and yellow and black bile), and was popularised by the Roman physician Galen (c. 129 -216) in the second century AD. Because of Galen, animal spirits dominated thinking about the nervous system for 1,500 years

The disciples of Hippocrates explained the maintenance of vital heat to be the function of the breath within the organism. Around 300 BC, Praxagoras discovered the distinction between the arteries and the veins. In the corpse arteries are empty; hence, in the light of these preconceptions they were declared to be vessels for conveying pneuma to the different parts of the body. A generation afterwards, Erasistratus made this the basis of a new theory of diseases and their treatment. The pneuma, inhaled from the outside air, rushes through the arteries till it reaches the various centres, especially the brain and the heart, and there causes thought and organic movement.

In the narratives pertaining to the ministry of Jesus, temptation to sin is not the primary role played by demons, but rather the causing of disease, disability, mental illness, and antisocial behavior; they defile and compel their human hosts to suffer both physically and spiritually. Although healing and exorcism are distinguished

Animal Spirits, a term borrowed from the writings of John Maynard Keynes

 the power of emotions, or “animal spirits,”

and occasionally of the universal nature of man.

The First Article

There is nothing more clearly evinces the learning which we receive from the Ancients to be defective, than what they have written concerning the passions. For although it be a matter the understanding whereof has even been hunted after; and that it seems to be none of the hardest, because every one feeling them in himself, need not borrow foreign observations to discover their nature. Yet what the Ancients have taught concerning them, is so little, and for the most part so little credible that I cannot hope to draw nigh truth, but by keeping aloof off from those roads which they followed. Wherefore I shall here be forced to write in such a sort, as if I treated of a matter never before handled. And first of all I consider that all which is done, or happens anew, is by the philosophers called generally a passion in relation to the subject on whom it befalls, and an action in respect of that which causes it. So that although the agent and patient be things often differing, action and passion are one and the same thing, which has two several names, because of the two several subjects whereunto they may relate.

The Second Article

That to understand the passions of the soul, it is necessary to distinguish the functions thereof from those of the body.
Furthermore, I consider that we observe not anything which more immediately agitates our soul, than the body joined to it, and consequently we ought to conceive that what in that is a passion, is commonly in this an action; so that there is no better way to attain to the understanding of our passions, than by examining the difference between the soul and the body, that we may know to which of them each function in us ought to be attributed.

The Third Article

What rule ought to be observed for the purpose.
Which will not be found a very hard task, if it be taken notice of, that what we experimentally find to be in us, and which we see are in bodies totally inanimate, ought not to be attributed to ought else but the body, and contrarily, that
all which is within us, and which we conceive cannot in any way appertain to a body must be imputed to our soul.

The Fourth Article

That heat, and the motion of the members proceed from the body, and thoughts from the soul.
Wherefore since we do not comprehend that the body in any manner thinks, 'tis but equitable in us to believe that all sorts of thoughts within us belong to the soul. And since we make no question but there are inanimate bodies which move as many or more several ways than ours, and which have as much or more heat (which experience shows us in flame, which alone has more heat and motion than any of our limbs) we may be assured that heat and all the motions within us, seeing they depend not on the mind, belong only to the body.

The Fifth Article

That it is an error to believe the soul gives motion and heat to the body.
Whereby we shall eschew a very considerable error which many have fallen into so far, that I believe it the cause of hindering the passions, and other things which belong to the soul from being explained hitherto. It is this, that seeing all dead bodies are deprived of heat, and consequently of motion, people imagine the absence of the soul wrought this cessation of motion and heat, and so erroneously conceive that our natural heat, and all the motions of our body depend on the soul: whereas indeed the contrary should be supposed that the soul absents itself in death, only because this natural heat ceases, and the organs which seem to move the body are corrupted.

The Sixth Article

What is the difference betwixt a living and a dead body.
That we may then avoid this error, let us consider that death never comes by any defect of the soul, but only because some one of the principal parts of the body is corrupted; and conceive that the body of a living man differs as much from that of a dead one, as a watch or any other AUTOMA (that is any kind of machine that moves of itself) wound up, having in itself the corporeal principle of those motions for which it was instituted, with all things requisite for its action, and the same watch or other engine when it is broken and the principle of its motion ceases to act.

The Seventh Article

A brief explication of the parts of the body, and of some of its functions.
To make this more intelligible, I will in few words display the pieces and lineaments, whereof this machine our body is composed. There is none that does not already know there is within us, a heart, a brain, a stomach, muscles, sinews, arteries, veins, and the like. It is as commonly known, that meats eaten descend into the stomach, and bowels, from whence the juice of them trickling into the liver, and all the veins, mixes itself with the blood in them, and by this means augments the quantity thereof. Those who have heard talk never so little of physics, know besides this, how the heart is composed, and how all the blood of the veins may with facility drop into the hollow vein, on the right side of it, and from thence pass into the liver, by a vessel called the venous artery, then return from the liver into the left side of the heart, through the pipe, called the arterial vein, and at length pass from thence into the great artery, the branches whereof spread themselves all over the body. Yea even all those whom the authority of the Ancients has not totally blinded, and who have vouchsafed to open their eyes to examine the opinion of Harvey, concerning the circulation of the blood, make no doubt but all the veins and arteries of the body are like channels, through which the blood continually and easily glides, taking its course from the right cavity of the heart, through the arterial vein, whereof the branches are dispersed into every part of the liver, and joined to those of the venous artery by which it passes from the liver into the left side of the heart, from thence going into the great artery, the branches whereof being scattered over all the rest of the body are joined to the branches of the hollow vein which carry the same blood again into the right cavity of the heart: so that the two cavities are as it were the sluices of it, through each of which all the blood passes, every round it walks about the body. Moreover it is notorious that all the motions of the members depend upon the muscles, and that these muscles are opposite to one another in such a manner, that when one of them shrinks up, it draws after it that part of the body whereto it is knit, which causes the muscle opposite to it to stretch forth at the same time. Then again if at another time this last shrink up, the first gives way, suffering the other to attract that part it is joined unto. Finally, it is known that all these motions of the muscles, as also all the senses depend on the sinews, which are as little strings, or like small tunnels coming all from the brain, and containing as that does a certain air, or exceeding[ly] subtle wind, which is termed the animal spirits.

The Eighth Article

What is the principle of all these functions.
But it is not commonly known in what manner these animal spirits and nerves contribute to these motions and senses, nor what is the corporeal principle that makes them act. Wherefore, although I have already glanced upon it in former writings, I will not here omit to say succinctly, that while we live there is a continual heat in our heart, which is a kind of fire that the blood of the veins feeds, and this fire is the corporeal principle of all the motions of our members.

The Ninth Article

How the motion of the heart is wrought.  

Hence, only is that pulse or palpitation of the heart and arteries, for this beating is reiterated as often as any new blood gets into the heart. It is also this alone which gives motion to the blood, and causes it incessantly to run very swiftly in all the arteries and veins, by means whereof it conveys the heat acquired in the heart, to all the other parts of the body, and is their nutriment.

The Tenth Article

How the animal spirits are begotten in the brain.
But what here is most considerable is, that all the most lively, and subtle parts of the blood, that heat has rarefied in the heart, continually enter in abundance into the cavities of the brain, and the reason why they go thither rather than anywhere else, is, because all the blood that issues out of the heart by the great artery bends its course in a direct line thitherward, and it not being possible for all to get in, because there are none but very narrow passages, those parts thereof that are the most agitated, and subtlest, only get in, while the rest is dispersed into all the other parts of the body. Now these very subtle parts of the blood make the animal spirits; and they need not, to this end, undergo any other change in the brain, but only be separated from the other less subtle parts of the blood. For what I here call spirits, are but bodies, and have no other property, unless that they are bodies exceeding[ly] small, which move very nimbly, as the parts of a flame issuing from a torch so that they stay not in any one place, but still as some get into the cavities of the brain, some others get out through the pores in the substance of it; which pores convey them into the nerves, and from thence into the muscles, by means whereof they mold the body into all the several postures it can move.

The 11th Article

How the muscles are moved.
For the only cause of the motion of all the members is that some muscles shrink up, and their opposites extend, as has been already said. And the only cause why one muscle shrinks rather than his opposite, is, that there come (though never so little) more spirits to the one than the other.
Not that the spirits which flow immediately from the brain are alone sufficient to move these muscles, but they dispose the other spirits, which already are in these two muscles, to sally forth immediately from one of them into the other, by means whereof that from whence they came becomes longer, and flaggier*; that wherein they are, being suddenly swelled up by them, shortens and attracts the member appendant to it, which is easily conceived when it is known that there are but very few animal spirits which proceed continually from the brain to every muscle, but that there are abundance of others locked in the same muscle, which move very swiftly in it, sometimes in whirling round only in the places where they are (this is, when they find no passages open to get out at) and sometimes by slipping into the opposite muscle. For there are little overtures in each of these muscles through which these spirits can slide from one to another, which are so disposed too, that when the spirits which come from the brain towards one of them, are but never so little stronger than those going to the other, they open all the entries through which the spirits of the other muscle can fly into this, and in the same instant bar up all those, through which the spirits of this might get into that, whereby all the spirits formerly contained in both muscles crowd suddenly into one, so swelling it up, and shortening it, while the other extends itself, and gives.

The 12th Article

How outward objects act contrary to the organs of the senses.
It remains yet to know the causes why the spirits slide not from the brain into the muscles always after one manner, and wherefore they come sometimes more towards some than others. For besides the action of the soul, which in truth, is in us one of the causes, as I shall show hereafter, there are yet two besides, which depend not of anything but the body, which it is necessary to take notice of. The first consists in the diversity of motions, excited in the organs of the senses by their objects, which I have already amply enough explained in the Dioptrics. But that those who see this, may not need to have read ought else, I will here repeat, that there are three things to be considered in the sinews, to wit: their marrow or interior substance, which stretches itself out in the form of little threads from the brain, the original thereof, to the extremities of the other members whereunto these threads are fastened; next, the skins wherein they are lapped, which being continuous with those that envelop the brain, make up little pipes wherein these threads are enclosed; lastly, the animal spirits, which being conveyed through these very pipes from the brain to the muscles, are the cause that these threads remain there entirely unmolested, and extended in such a manner, that the least thing that moves that part of the body, whereunto the extremity of any one of them is fastened, does by the same reason move that part of the brain from whence it comes. Just as when a man pulls at one end of a string, he causes the other end to stir.

The 13th Article

That this action of objects without, may differently convey the spirits into the muscles. .
And I have made it evident in the Dioptrics, how all the objects of the sight are not communicated to us any way but thus; they move locally, (by mediation of transparent bodies between them and us) those little threads of the optic nerves, which are at the bottom of our eyes, and after them, the places of the brain from whence those nerves come. They move them, I say, as many several kinds of ways, as there are diversities of objects in things, nor are they immediately the motions made in the eye, but in the brain, that represent these objects to the soul in imitation whereof it is easy to conceive that sounds, odors, heat, pain, hunger, thirst, and generally all objects, as well of our other exterior senses, as our interior appetites, do also excite some motion in our nerves, which passes by means of them unto the brain. And besides, that these several motions of the brain create in our soul different resentments, it may so be that * without her, the spirits direct their course rather towards some muscles than others, and so they may move our members, which I will prove here, only by one example. If anyone lift up his hand on a sudden towards our eyes, as if he were about to strike, although we know he is our friend, that he does this only in jest, and that he will be careful enough not to do us any hurt, yet we can scarce restrain from shutting them. Which shows it is not by the intermeddling of our soul that they shut, since it is against our will, which is the only, or at least the principal action thereof, but by reason this machine of our body is so composed, that the moving of this hand up towards our eyes, excites another motion in our brain, which conveys the animal spirits into those muscles that close the eyelids.

The 14th Article

That the diversity of the spirits may diversify their course.
The other cause which serves to convey the animal spirits variously into the muscles, is the unequal agitation of these spirits, and the diversity of their parts. For when any of their parts are more gross and agitated than the rest, they pass forwards in a direct line into the cavities and pores of the brain, and by this means are conveyed into other muscles, whereinto they should not, had they been weaker.

The 15th Article

What are the causes of their diversity.
And this inequality may proceed from the divers matters whereof they are composed, as is seen in those who have drunk much wine. The vapors of this wine entering suddenly into the blood mount up from the heart to the brain where they convert into spirits, which being stronger and more abundant than ordinary, are apt to move the body after many strange fashions. This inequality of the spirits may also proceed from the divers dispositions of the heart, liver, stomach, spleen, and all other parts contributing to their production. For it is principally necessary here to observe certain little nerves inserted in the basis of the heart, which serve to lengthen and contract the entries of its concavities, by means whereof, the blood there dilating more, or less strongly, produces spirits diversely disposed. It is also to be noted, that although the blood which enters into the heart, comes thither from all the other parts of the body, yet it falls out often times that more is driven thither from some parts than others, by reason the nerves or muscles which answer to those parts oppress or agitate it more. And, for that according to the diversity of the parts from whence it comes most, it dilates itself diversely in the heart, and at last produces spirits of different natures, as for example, that which comes from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is, dilates itself otherwise in the heart, than that which comes from the spleen. And this after another manner than that which comes from the veins of the legs, or arms, and lastly, this quite otherwise than the juice of meats, when being newly come out of the stomach, and bowels, it passes through the liver to the heart.

The 17th Article

What the functions of the soul are. .
Having thus considered all the functions belonging to the body only, it is easy to know there remains nothing in us which we ought to attribute to our soul, unless our thoughts, which are chiefly of two kinds, to wit, some actions of the soul, others, her passions. Those which I call her actions are all our wills because we experimentally find they come directly from our soul and seem to depend on nought but it. As on the contrary, one may generally call her passions all those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us because oftimes our soul does not make them such as they are to us, and she always receives things as they are represented to her by them.

The 18th Article

Of the will.
Again our wills are of two sorts. For some are actions of the soul which terminate in the soul itself, as when we will love God, or generally apply our thought to any object which is not material. The other are actions which terminate in our body, as in this case, that we have only a will to walk, it follows that our legs must stir and we go.

The 19th Article

Of the apprehension.
Our apprehensions also are of two sorts: the soul is the cause of some, the body of the other. Those whereof the soul is the cause are the apprehensions of our wills and all the imaginations or other* thoughts thereon depending. For we cannot will anything but we must at the same time perceive that we do will it. And although in respect of our soul it be an action to will anything, it may be said also a passion in her to apprehend that she wills. Yet because this apprehension and this will are in effect but one, and the same thing, the denomination comes still from that which is most noble. Therefore it is not customary to call it a passion, but only an action. thoughts thereon depending. For we cannot will any thing, but we must at the same time perceive that we do will it. And although in respect of our soul it be an action to will any thing, it may be said also a passion in her to apprehend that she wills. Yet because this apprehension, and this will are in effect but one, and the same thing, the denomination comes still from that which is most noble: therefore it is not customary to call it a passion, but only an action.

The 20th Article

Of imaginations, and other thoughts framed by the soul.
When our soul applies herself to fancy anything which is not, as to represent to itself an enchanted palace, or a chimera, and also when she bends herself to consider anything that is only intelligible, and not imaginable, for example, to ruminate on one's own nature, the apprehension she has of things depends principally on the will which causes her to perceive them. Wherefore it is usual to consider them as actions rather than passions.

The 21st Article

Of imaginations caused only by the body.
Among the apprehensions caused by the body, the greatest part depend on the nerves. But yet there are some that depend not at all on them, which are called imaginations too, as well as those I lately spoke of, from which nevertheless they differ herein, that our will has no hand in framing them, which is the reason wherefore they cannot be numbered among the actions of the soul. And they proceed from nothing but this: that the spirits being agitated several ways, and meeting the traces of divers impressions preceding them in the brain, they take their course at haphazard through some certain pores, rather than others. Such are the illusions of our dreams, and those dotages we often are troubled with waking, when our thought carelessly roams without applying itself to anything of its own. Now, though some of these imaginations be passions of the soul, taking this word in the genuine and peculiar signification, and though they may be all called so if it be taken in a more general acceptation,* yet seeing they have not so notorious and determined a cause as those apprehensions which the soul receives by mediation of the nerves, and that they seem to be only the shadow and representation of the others, before we can well distinguish them, it is necessary to examine the difference between them.

The 22nd Article

Of the difference betwixt them and the other apprehensions.
All the apprehensions which I have not yet explained come to the soul by mediation of the nerves, and there is this difference between them: that we attribute some of them to the objects from without that beat upon our senses; some to our body, or some parts of it; and lastly, the rest to our soul.

The 25th Article

Of the apprehensions which we attribute to our soul.
The apprehensions attributed only to the soul are those whereof the effects are felt as in the soul itself, and whereof any near cause, whereunto it may be attributed is commonly unknown. Such are the resentments of joy, wrath and the like, which are sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves, and sometimes too by other causes. Now, although all our apprehensions, as well those attributed to objects without us, as those relating to divers affections of our body, be, in truth, passions in respect of our soul, when this word is taken in the more general signification, yet it is usual to restrain it to signify only those attributed to the soul itself. And they are only these latter which I here undertake to explain under the notion of passions of the soul.

The 26th Article

That the imaginations, which depend only on the accidental motion of the spirits, may be as real passions, as the apprehensions depending on the nerves.
It is here to be observed that all the same things which the soul perceives by intercourse with the nerves, may also be represented to it by the accidental course of the spirits.
And [there is] no difference between them but this, that the impressions which come from the brain by the nerves, are usually more lively, and manifest than those the spirits excite there, which made me say in the one and twentieth Article, that these are only as the shadow, and representation of these. It is also to be noted, that it sometimes falls out, this picture is so like the thing it represents, that it is possible to be deceived concerning the apprehensions attributed to whose objects without us, or those referred to any parts of our body, but not to be served so concerning the passions, for as much as they are so near, and interior to our soul that it is impossible she should feel them, unless they were truly such as she does feel them. So oftentimes when one sleeps, and sometimes too being awake, a man fancies things so strongly that he thinks he sees them before him, or feels them in his body, though there be no such thing. But although a man be asleep, and doate*, he cannot feel himself sad or moved with another passion, but it is most true that the soul has in it that passion.

The 27th Article

The definition of the passions of the soul.
After we have thus considered wherein the passions of the soul differ from all other thoughts, me thinks they may be generally defined thus:
apprehension, resentments, or emotions of the soul, attributed particularly to it, and caused, fomented, and fortified by some motion of the spirits.

The 28th Article

An explication of the first part of the definition.
They may be called apprehensions when this word is used in a general sense to signify all thoughts that are not actions of the soul, or the wills, but not then when it only signifies evident knowledge. For experience shows us that those who are most agitated by their passions are not such as understand them best, and that they are in the catalogue of those apprehensions which the alliance between the soul and the body renders confused and obscure. They may also be called resentments because they are received into the soul in the same manner as the objects of the exterior senses, and are not otherwise understood by her. But they may justlier* be styled the emotions of the soul, not only because this name may be attributed to all the mutations befalling her, (that is all the various thoughts thereof) but particularly, because, of all kinds of thoughts that she can have, there are many that agitate and shake it so hard as these passions do.

The 30th Article

That the soul is united to all the parts of the body jointly.
But to understand all these things more perfectly, it is necessary to know that the soul is really joined to all the body, but it cannot properly be said to be in any of the parts thereof, excluding the rest, because it is one, and in some sort indivisible by reason of the disposition of the organs, which do all so relate one to another that when any one of them is taken away, it renders the whole body defective. And, because it is of a nature that has no reference to extension, dimensions, or other properties of matter, whereof the body is composed, but only to the whole mass or contexture of organs as appears by this: that you cannot conceive the half or third part of a soul, nor what space it takes up, and that it becomes not any whit less by cutting off any part of the body, but absolutely withdraws when the contexture of its organs is dissolved.

The 31st Article

That there is a little kernel* in the brain wherein the soul exercises her functions more peculiarly than in the other parts.
It is also necessary to know that although the soul be joined to all the body, yet there is some part in that body wherein she exercises her functions more peculiarly than all the rest. And, it is commonly believed that this part is the brain, or it may be the heart. The brain, because thither tend the organs of the senses, and the heart because therein the passions are felt. But having searched this business carefully, me thinks I have plainly found out that that part of the body wherein the soul immediately exercises her function is not a jot of the heart, nor yet all the brain, but only the most interior part of it, which is a certain very small kernel situated in the middle of the substance of it and so hung on the top of the conduit by which the spirits of its anterior cavities have communication with those of the posterior, whose least motions in it cause the course of the spirits very much to change, and reciprocally, the least alteration befalling the course of the spirits cause the motions of the kernel very much to alter.

The 32nd Article

How this kernel is known to be the principal seat of the soul.
The reason which persuades me that the soul can have no other place in the whole body but this kernel where she immediately exercises her* functions is for that I see: all the other parts of our brain are paired, as also we have two eyes two hands, two ears; lastly, all the organs of our exterior senses are double and forasmuch as we have but one very thing at one and the same time. It must necessarily be that there is some place where the two images that come from the two eyes, or the two other impressions that come from any single object through the double organs of the other senses, have somewhere to meet in one, before they come to the soul, that they may not represent two objects instead of one. And it may be easily conceived that these images, or other impressions, join to hither in this kernel by intercourse of the spirits that fill the cavities of the brain, but there is no other place in the body where they can be so united, unless it be granted that they are in this kernel.

The 36th Article

An example how the passions are excited in the soul.
Furthermore, if this figure be very strange and hideous, that is, if it have much similitude with such things as have formerly been offensive to the body, it excites in the soul the passion of fear, afterwards, that of boldness, or else an affright or scaring according to the various temper of the body, or the force of the soul, and according as a man has formerly protected himself by defence or flight against noxious things whereunto the present impression has some resemblance. For this renders the grain so disposed in some men that the spirits reflected from the image so formed on the kernel go from thence to fall, part into the nerves, which serve to turn the back and stir the legs to run away, and part into those which (as is spoken of before) let out or draw up together the orifices of the heart, or which else so agitate the rest of the parts from whence the blood is sent, that this blood not being rarefied there in the usual manner, sends spirits to the brain that are fitting to maintain, and confirm the passion of fear, that is, such as are proper to hold open, or open again the pores of the brain that convey them into the very same nerves. For the mere entry of these spirits into these pores excites in this kernel a particular motion instituted by nature to make the soul feel that passion. And because these pores relate principally to the little nerves that serve to lock up or open wide the orifices of the heart, this makes the soul feel it as if it were chiefly in the heart.

The 37th Article

How it appears they are all caused by some motion of the spirits.
And because the like happens in all the other passions, to wit, that they are principally caused by the spirits contained in the cavities of the brain--seeing they direct their course towards the nerves which serve to enlarge or straighten the orifices of the heart either to thrust the blood in the other parts differently to it, or whatsoever other way it be, to feed the self same passion--it may be clearly understood by this: wherefore, I formerly inserted in my definition that they are caused by some peculiar motion of the spirits.

The 38th Article

An example of the motions of the body that accompany the passions and depend not of the soul.
Moreover, as the course which these spirits take towards the nerves of the heart is sufficient to give a motion to the kernel, whereby fear is put into the soul, even so, by the mere going of the spirits at that time into those nerves which serve to stir the legs to run away, they cause another motion in the same kernel, by means whereof the soul feels and perceives this flight, which may in this manner be excited in the body, by the mere disposition of the organs, the soul not at all contributing to it.

The 40th Article

What the principal effect of the passions is.
For it must be observed that the principal effect of all the passions in men is, they incite and dispose their souls to will the things for which they prepare their bodies so that the resentment of fear incites him to be willing to fly; that of boldness, to be willing to fight, and so of the rest.

The 41st Article

What is the power of the soul in respect of the body.
But the will is so free by nature that it can never be constrained. And of two sorts of thoughts which I have distinguished in the soul, whereof some are her actions, to wit her wills; others, her passions, taking that word in its general signification, which comprehends all forms of apprehensions. The first are absolutely in her own power, and cannot, but indirectly, be changed by the body; as on the contrary, the last depend absolutely upon the actions which produce them, and they cannot, unless indirectly, be changed by the soul, except then when her self is the cause of them. And all the action of the soul consists in this, that she merely by willing anything can make the little kernel, whereunto she is strictly joined, move in the manner requisite to produce the effect relating to this will.

The 42nd Article

How the things one would remember are found in the memory.
So when the soul would remember anything, this will is the cause that the kernel nodding successively every way, drives the spirits towards several places of the brain, until they encounter that where the traces (which were left there) of the object one would remember, are. For these traces are nothing else but the pores of the brain through which the spirits formerly took their course, [and] by reason of the presence of that object have thereby acquired a greater facility to be open in the same manner again than the rest can have, by the spirits that come to them so that these spirits, meeting these pores, enter into them easier than the others, whereby, they excite a peculiar motion in the kernel, which represents the same object to the soul, and makes it know, that is it she would remember.

The 45th Article

What the power of the soul is, in respect of her passions.
Our passions also cannot be directly excited or taken away by the action of our will, but they may indirectly, by the representation of things which use[d] to be joined with the passions which we will have, and which are contrary to these we will reject. Thus to excite in oneself boldness, and remove fear, it is not enough to have a will to do so, but reasons, objects and examples are to be considered of, that persuade the danger is not great, that there is ever more security in defense than flight, that there is glory and joy in vanquishing, whereas there is nothing to be expected but
grief and dishonor in flying and the like.

The 48th Article

Wherein the strength or weakness of souls is known, and what is the misery of the weakest.
Now it is by the successes of these contestations that every one may understand the strength or weakness of his soul. For those in whom the will can most easily conquer the passions, and stop the motions of the body that come along with them, have without doubt the strongest souls. But there are some who can never try their own strength, because they never let the will fight with her own weapons, but only with such as are borrowed from some passions to resist others. Those which I call her own weapons are firm and determinate judgements concerning the knowledge of good and
evil according to which she has resolved to steer the actions of her life. And the weakest soul of all is such a one whose will has not at all determined to follow certain judgements, but suffers itself to be swayed with the present passions which being often contrary one to the other draw it backward and forwards to either side, and keeping her busy, in contesting against herself, put the soul into the most miserable estate she can be. As then, when fearfulness represents death as an extreme evil, which cannot be shunned but by flight. If, on the other side, ambition represents the infamy of this flight, as a mischief worse than death, these two passions variously agitate the will, which obeying now the one and then the other, continually opposes its own self, and yields up the soul to slavery and misfortune.

The 49th Article

That the strength of the soul is not enough without the knowledge of truth.
It is true, there are very few men so wake* and irresolute, that they will nothing but what their present passion dictates to them. The most part have determinate judgments according to which they regulate part of their actions. And though oft times these judgments be false, and indeed grounded on some passions, by which the will has formerly suffered herself to be vanquished, or seduced, yet because she perseveres in following them then when the passion that caused them is absent, they may be considered as her own weapons, and souls may be thought stronger or weaker according as they do more or less follow these judgments and resist the present passions contrary to them. But there is a great deal of difference between the resolutions proceeding from some false opinion, and those which are only held up by the knowledge of the truth. Since following these last, man is sure never to acquire sorrow or repentance, whereas following the first, they are inseparably companions, after the error is discovered.

The 50th Article

That there is no soul so weak, but well managed, may acquire an absolute mastery over her passions.
It will be commodious here to know that (as before has been said) although every motion of the kernel, seen to have been joined by nature to each of our thoughts even from the beginning of our life, they may yet be annexed to others by habits, as experience shows in words that excite motions in the kernel, which according to the institution of nature represent only to the soul their sound, when they are pronounced by the will; or by the figure of their letters when they are written and which yet never the less by a habit acquired by thinking what they signify, as soon as ever their sound is heard, or their letters seen, use to make us conceive the signification rather then the form of our letters or the sound of their syllables. It is also convenient to know that although the motions, as well of the kernel as the spirits and brain, which represent certain objects to the soul, be naturally joined with those that excite certain passions in her, yet they may by habit be separated, and annexed to others very different; and moreover that this habit may be acquired by one action only, and requires not a long usage. As when a man at unawares meets with any nasty thing in a dish of meat which he has a very good stomach to, this accident may so alter the disposition of the brain, that a man shall never afterwards see any such kind of meat without loathing, whereas before he took delight in eating it. The very same thing may be seen in beasts, for although they have no reason, nor it may be any thought, all the motions of the spirits and the kernel, which excite passions in us, yet are in them, and serve to foment and fortify (not as in us the passions but) the motions of the nerves and muscles their concomitants. So when a dog sees a partridge, he is naturally inclined to run to it and when he hears a piece go off, this noise incites him naturally to run away. Yet nevertheless, we ordinarily breed up spaniels so, that the fight of a partridge makes them couch and the noise of a discharged piece makes them run to it. Now these things are profitable to know, to encourage every one to study the regulation of his passions. For since with a little art the motions of the brain in beasts who are void of reason may be altered, it is evident they may more easily in men and that even those who have the weakest souls, may acquire a most absolute empire over all their passions, if art and industry be used to manage and govern them.

The 52nd Article

What is the use of them and that they may be numbered.
Furthermore, I observe that the objects which move the senses excite not diverse passions in us by reason of so many diversities in them, but merely because they may several ways hurt or profit us, or else, in general, be important to us. And, that the use of all the passions consists only in this, that they dispose the soul to will the things which nature dictates are profitable to us, and to persist in this will. As also the very agitation of the spirits, accustomed to cause them, dispose the body to the motions that further the execution of those things. Wherefore to calculate them, we are only to examine in order after how many considerable manners our senses may be moved by their objects. And I will here make a general muster of all the principal passions according to order, that so they may be found.

The 56th Article

Love and hatred.
Now, all the precedent passions may be excited in us, and we not [in] any way perceive whether the object that causes them is good or
bad. But when a thing is represented to us as good in relation to us, that is, as being convenient for us, this breeds in us love to that. And when it is represented to us as evil or hurtful this excites hatred in us.

The 58th Article

Hope, fear, jealousy, security and despair.
It is sufficient to think that the acquisition of a good, or the avoiding an
evil, is possible to be incited to desire it. But when a man considers further whether there be much or small probability that he may obtain what he desires, that which represents much excites hope in us, and that which represents small excites fear, whereof jealousy is one sort. And when hope is extreme it changes its nature and is called security or assurance; as on the contrary, extreme fear becomes despair.

The 63rd Article

Satisfaction of a man's self, and repentance.
We may also consider the cause of good or
evil, as well present as past. And the good which has been done by us gives us an
inward satisfaction, which is the sweetest of all the passions. Whereas evil excites repentance, which is the bitterest.

The 65th Article

Indignation and wrath.
In the same manner, evil done by others, having no relation to us, breeds only in us indignation against them; and when it relates to us, it moves wrath also.

The 66th Article

Glory and shame.
Moreover, the good, which is or has been in us in reference to the opinion other men may have of it, excites glory in us; and the evil, shame.

The 67th Article

Distaste, sorrow, and lightheartedness.
And sometimes the continuance of a good causes weariness or distaste, whereas that of evil allays sorrow. Lastly, from good past proceeds discontent, which is a sort of sorrow; and from evil past, lightheartedness a sort of joy.

The 68th Article

Wherefore this numeration of the passions is different from that commonly received.
This is the order which seems best to me for reckoning of the passions. Wherein, I know very well I digress from the opinion of all who have written before me. But I do it not without great cause. For they deduce their numeration thus: they distinguish in the sensitive parts of the soul two appetites, the one they call concupiscible, the other irascible. And because I understand not any distinction of parts in the soul (as I said before), me thinks it signifies nothing, unless that it has two faculties, one to desire, another to be angry. And because it has, in the same manner, faculties to admire, love, hope, fear, and also to admit into it every one of the other passions, or to do the actions whereunto these passions impel them, I see not what they meant by attributing them all to desire, or anger. Besides, their catalogue comprehends not all the principal passions, as, I believe, this does. I speak here only of the principal, because one might yet distinguish many more particular ones, and their number is indefinite.

The 69th Article

That there are but six primitive passions.
But the number of those which are simple and primitive is not very great. For do but review all those I have cast up, and it may easily be noted that there are but six such, to wit, admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, and that all the otherare compounded of some of these six, or are sorts of them. Wherefore, that the multitude of them might not perplex the readers, I will here treat distinctly of the six primitive ones and afterwards show in what manner the rest derive their pedigree from them.

The 70th Article

Of admiration, the definition and cause of it.
Admiration is a sudden surprise of the soul, which causes in her an inclination to consider with attention the objects which seem rare and extraordinary to her. It is caused first by an imperfection in the brain that represents the object as rare, and consequently, worthy to be seriously considered. After that, by the motion of the spirits which are disposed by this impression to tend with might and main towards that place of the brain where it is, to fortify and conserve it there


16:26 For all the gods of the nations are worthless,
but the Lord made the heavens.
16:27 Majestic splendor emanates from him,  
he is the source of strength and joy.
16:28 Ascribe to the Lord, O families of the nations,
ascribe to the Lord splendor and strength!
16:29 Ascribe to the Lord the splendor he deserves!
Bring an offering and enter his presence!
Worship the Lord in holy attire! 
16:30 Tremble before him, all the earth!
The world is established, it cannot be moved.


73:21 Yes, my spirit was bitter,  
and my insides felt sharp pain.
73:22 I was ignorant and lacked insight;  
I was as senseless as an animal before you.
73:23 But I am continually with you;
you hold my right hand.
73:24 You guide me by your wise advice,
and then you will lead me to a position of honor.  
73:25 Whom do I have in heaven but you?
I desire no one but you on earth. 
73:26 My flesh and my heart may grow weak, 
but God always protects my heart and gives me stability.
73:27 Yes, look! Those far from you die;
you destroy everyone who is unfaithful to you.
73:28 But as for me, God’s presence is all I need. 
I have made the sovereign Lord my shelter,
as I declare all the things you have done.


35:4 Tell those who panic, 
“Be strong! Do not fear!
Look, your God comes to avenge!
With divine retribution he comes to deliver you.”
35:5 Then blind eyes will open,
deaf ears will hear.
35:6 Then the lame will leap like a deer,
the mute tongue will shout for joy;
for water will flow in the desert,
streams in the wilderness. 
35:7 The dry soil will become a pool of water,
the parched ground springs of water.
Where jackals once lived and sprawled out,
grass, reeds, and papyrus will grow.
35:8 A thoroughfare will be there –
it will be called the Way of Holiness. 
The unclean will not travel on it;
it is reserved for those authorized to use it  –
fools will not stray into it.


4:23 Jesus went throughout all of Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, preaching the gospel of the kingdom, and healing all kinds of disease and sickness among the people.

4:24 So a report about him spread throughout Syria. People brought to him all who suffered with various illnesses and afflictions, those who had seizures,   paralytics, and those possessed by demons, and he healed them.

4:25 And large crowds followed him from Galilee, the Decapolis,  Jerusalem,  Judea, and beyond the Jordan River. 


12:43 “When an unclean spirit goes out of a person,  it passes through waterless places looking for rest but does not find it.

12:44 Then it says, ‘I will return to the home I left.’ When it returns, it finds the house empty, swept clean, and put in order.

12:45 Then it goes and brings with it seven other spirits more evil than itself, and they go in and live there, so the last state of that person is worse than the first. It will be that way for this evil generation as well!”


11:22 Jesus said to them, “Have faith in God.

11:23 I tell you the truth, if someone says to this mountain, ‘Be lifted up and thrown into the sea,’ and does not doubt in his heart but believes that what he says will happen, it will be done for him.

11:24 For this reason I tell you, whatever you pray and ask for, believe that you have received it, and it will be yours.

11:25 Whenever you stand praying, if you have anything against anyone, forgive him, so that your Father in heaven will 37  also forgive you your sins.”


8:3 and Joanna the wife of Cuza  (Herod’s household manager), Susanna, and many others who provided for them out of their own resources.

The demon returns to the person it had left discovering that he or she is still receptive to the demon’s presence because no superior power occupies that person. Consequently the demon invites seven other demons, a full complement, and they take up residence in the person.


18:1 Jesus told his disciples a parable to show them they should always pray and not lose heart.

18:3 There was also a widow in that city who kept coming to him and saying, ‘Give me justice against my adversary.’

18:4 For a while he refused, but later on he said to himself, ‘Though I neither fear God nor have regard for people, \

\18:5 yet because this widow keeps on bothering me, I will give her justice, or in the end she will wear me out by her unending pleas.’” \

\18:6 And the Lord said, “Listen to what the unrighteous judge says!

18:7 Won’t God give justice to his chosen ones, who cry out to him day and night? Will he delay long to help them?

18:8 I tell you, he will give them justice speedily. Nevertheless, when the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on earth?”


8:12 So then,  brothers and sisters, we are under obligation, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh

8:13 (for if you live according to the flesh, you will die), but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body you will live.

8:14 For all who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God.

8:15 For you did not receive the spirit of slavery leading again to fear, but you received the Spirit of adoption, by whom we cry, “Abba, Father.”

8:16 The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are God’s children.

8:17 And if children, then heirs (namely, heirs of God and also fellow heirs with Christ)  – if indeed we suffer with him so we may also be glorified with him.


12:12 For just as the body is one and yet has many members, and all the members of the body – though many – are one body, so too is Christ.

12:13 For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body. Whether Jews or Greeks or slaves or free, we were all made to drink of the one Spirit.

12:14 For in fact the body is not a single member, but many.

12:15 If the foot says, “Since I am not a hand, I am not part of the body,” it does not lose its membership in the body because of that.

12:16 And if the ear says, “Since I am not an eye, I am not part of the body,” it does not lose its membership in the body because of that.

12:17 If the whole body were an eye, what part would do the hearing? If the whole were an ear, what part would exercise the sense of smell?

12:18 But as a matter of fact, God has placed each of the members in the body just as he decided.

12:19 If they were all the same member, where would the body be? 12:20 So now there are many members, but one body.

12:21 The eye cannot say to the hand, “I do not need you,” nor in turn can the head say to the foot, “I do not need you.”

12:22 On the contrary, those members that seem to be weaker are essential,

12:23 and those members we consider less honorable we clothe with greater honor, and our unpresentable members are clothed with dignity,

12:24 but our presentable members do not need this. Instead, God has blended together the body, giving greater honor to the lesser member,

12:25 so that there may be no division in the body, but the members may have mutual concern for one another.

12:26 If one member suffers, everyone suffers with it. If a member is honored, all rejoice with it.


2:1 ...although you were dead in your transgressions and sins,

2:2 in which you formerly lived according to this world’s present path, according to the ruler of the kingdom of the air, the ruler of the spirit that is now energizing  the sons of disobedience,  

2:3 among whom all of us also formerly lived out our lives in the cravings of our flesh, indulging the desires of the flesh and the mind, and were by nature children of wrath even as the rest… 

2:4 But God, being rich in mercy, because of his great love with which he loved us,

2:5 even though we were dead in transgressions, made us alive together with Christ – by grace you are saved!  –

2:6 and he raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly realms in Christ Jesus,

2:7 to demonstrate in the coming ages the surpassing wealth of his grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus.

2:8 For by grace you are saved through faith, and this is not from yourselves, it is the gift of God;

2:9 it is not from works, so that no one can boast.

2:10 For we are his workmanship, having been created in Christ Jesus for good works that God prepared beforehand so we may do them.


6:10 ...be strengthened in the Lord and in the strength of his power.

6:11 Clothe yourselves with the full armor of God so that you may be able to stand against the schemes of the devil.

6:12 For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the powers, against the world rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavens.

6:13 For this reason, take up the full armor of God so that you may be able to stand your ground on the evil day, and having done everything, to stand.

6:14 Stand firm therefore, by fastening the belt of truth around your waist, by putting on the breastplate of righteousness,

6:15 by fitting your feet with the preparation that comes from the good news of peace,

6:16 and in all of this, by taking up the shield of faith with which you can extinguish all the flaming arrows of the evil one.

6:17 And take the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.

6:18 With every prayer and petition, pray at all times in the Spirit, and to this end be alert, with all perseverance and requests for all the saints. 


6:13 Now when God made his promise to Abraham, since he could swear by no one greater, he swore by himself, 6:14 saying, “Surely I will bless you greatly and multiply your descendants abundantly.” 12  6:15 And so by persevering, Abraham 13  inherited the promise. 6:16 For people 14  swear by something greater than themselves, 15  and the oath serves as a confirmation to end all dispute. 16  6:17 In the same way 17  God wanted to demonstrate more clearly to the heirs of the promise that his purpose was unchangeable, 18  and so he intervened with an oath, 6:18 so that we who have found refuge in him 19  may find strong encouragement to hold fast to the hope set before us through two unchangeable things, since it is impossible for God to lie. 6:19 We have this hope as an anchor for the soul, sure and steadfast, which reaches inside behind the curtain, 20  6:20 where Jesus our forerunner entered on our behalf, since he became a priest forever in the order of Melchizedek.

7:1 Now this Melchizedek, king of Salem, priest of the most high God, met Abraham as he was returning from defeating the kings and blessed him. 1  7:2 To him 2  also Abraham apportioned a tithe 3  of everything. 4  His name first means 5  king of righteousness, then king of Salem, that is, king of peace. 7:3 Without father, without mother, without genealogy, he has neither beginning of days nor end of life but is like the son of God, and he remains a priest for all time. 7:4 But see how great he must be, if 6  Abraham the patriarch gave him a tithe 7  of his plunder. 7:5 And those of the sons of Levi who receive the priestly office 8  have authorization according to the law to collect a tithe from the people, that is, from their fellow countrymen, 9  although they too are descendants of Abraham. 10  7:6 But Melchizedek 11  who does not share their ancestry 12  collected a tithe 13  from Abraham and blessed 14  the one who possessed the promise. 7:7 Now without dispute the inferior is blessed by the superior, 7:8 and in one case tithes are received by mortal men, while in the other by him who is affirmed to be alive. 7:9 And it could be said that Levi himself, who receives tithes, paid a tithe through Abraham. 7:10 For he was still in his ancestor Abraham’s loins 15  when Melchizedek met him.

7:11 So if perfection had in fact been possible through the Levitical priesthood – for on that basis 16  the people received the law – what further need would there have been for another priest to arise, said to be in the order of Melchizedek and not in Aaron’s order? 7:12 For when the priesthood changes, a change in the law must come 17  as well. 7:13 Yet the one these things are spoken about belongs to 18  a different tribe, and no one from that tribe 19  has ever officiated at the altar. 7:14 For it is clear that our Lord is descended from Judah, yet Moses said nothing about priests in connection with that tribe. 7:15 And this is even clearer if another priest arises in the likeness of Melchizedek, 7:16 who has become a priest not by a legal regulation about physical descent 20  but by the power of an indestructible life. 7:17 For here is the testimony about him: 21  “You are a priest forever in the order of Melchizedek.” 22  7:18 On the one hand a former command is set aside 23  because it is weak and useless, 24  7:19 for the law made nothing perfect. On the other hand a better hope is introduced, through which we draw near to God. 7:20 And since 25  this was not done without a sworn affirmation – for the others have become priests without a sworn affirmation, 7:21 but Jesus 26  did so 27  with a sworn affirmation by the one who said to him, “The Lord has sworn and will not change his mind, ‘You are a priest forever’” 28  – 7:22 accordingly Jesus has become the guarantee 29  of a better covenant. 7:23 And the others 30  who became priests were numerous, because death prevented them 31  from continuing in office, 32  7:24 but he holds his priesthood permanently since he lives forever. 7:25 So he is able to save completely those who come to God through him, because he always lives to intercede for them. 7:26 For it is indeed fitting for us to have such a high priest: holy, innocent, undefiled, separate from sinners, and exalted above the heavens. 7:27 He has no need to do every day what those priests do, to offer sacrifices first for their own sins and then for the sins of the people, since he did this in offering himself once for all. 7:28 For the law appoints as high priests men subject to weakness, 33  but the word of solemn affirmation that came after the law appoints a son made perfect forever.


1 JOHN 4

4:1 Dear friends, do not believe every spirit, but test  the spirits to determine if they are from God, because many false prophet have gone out into the world.

4:2 By this you know the Spirit of God: Every spirit that confesses Jesus as the Christ who has come in the flesh is from God,

4:3 but every spirit that does not confess Jesus is not from God, and this is the spirit of the antichrist, which you have heard is coming, and now is already in the world.

4:4 You are from God, little children, and have conquered them,  because the one who is in you is greater than the one who is in the world.

4:5 They are from the world; therefore they speak from the world’s perspective and the world listens to them.

4:6 We are from God; the person who knows God listens to us, but whoever is not from God does not listen to us. By this  we know the Spirit of truth and the spirit of deceit. 

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The 72nd Article

Wherein consists the power of admiration.
This does not hinder it from being exceedingly powerful, notwithstanding the surprise, that is, the sudden, and unexpected arrival of the impression that alters the motion of the spirits: which surprise is proper, and peculiar to this passion: so that if at any time it does happen to any of the rest, as it usually does to all, and increases them, it is because admiration is joined with them. And, the power of it consists in two things, to wit, the novelty, and for that the motion which it causes, from the very beginning has its full strength. For it is certain such a motive is more operative than those which being weak at first, and growing but by little and little, may easily be diverted. Also, it is certain that those objects of the senses which are new touch the brain in certain parts where it used not to be touched, and that these parts being more tender, or less firm than those that frequent agitation has hardened, augments the operation of the motions which they excite there. [All of] which will not be deemed incredible, if it be considered, that is the like reason which causes the soles of our feet, accustomed to a pretty stubborn touch by the weight of the body they bear, but very little to feel this touch when we go; whereas another far lighter and softer (when they are tickled) is almost insupportable to us, only because it is not usual.

The 73rd Article

What astonishment is.
this surprise has so much power to cause the spirits in the cavities of the brain to bend their course from thence to the place where the impression of the object admired is, that it sometimes drives them all thither and finds them such work to conserve this impression that there are none which pass from thence into the muscles, nor yet so much as deviate any way from the first tracts they followed into the brain. This causes all the body to be unmovable like a statue and that one can only perceive the first represented face of the object, and consequently not acquire any further knowledge of it. It is thus when a man is said to be astonished, for astonishment is an excess of admiration which can never be but evil.

The 74th Article

For what use the passions serve and what they are naught for.
Now, it is easy to gather by what has formerly been said that
the utility of all the passions consists only in this; that they fortify and conserve in the soul those thoughts which are good for her and which may else be easily obliterated; as also all the discommodity they can cause consists in this, that they strengthen and maintain those thoughts more than is necessary, or fortify and conserve others which ought not to be fixed there.

The 75th Article

What is the peculiar use of admiration.
And it may be said
peculiarly of admiration that it is as beneficial for causing us to apprehend and keep in memory things whereof we were formerly ignorant, for we admire nothing but what seems rare and extraordinary to us. And nothing can seem so to us, but because we were ignorant of it, or else at least because it differs from those things we knew before, for it is this difference that makes it be called extraordinary. Now although a thing unknown to us represent itself newly to our understanding, or our senses, we do not therefore retain it in memory unless the idea we have of it be fortified in our brain by some passion or other, or at least by application of our understanding, which our wills determines to a peculiar attention and reflection. And the rest of the passions may serve to make us observe things as they seem either good or evil. But we admire only those which seem rare. We see too that
those who have no natural inclination to this passion are commonly very ignorant.

The 76th Article

Wherein it is hurtful and how the want of it may be supplied and the excess corrected.
But it falls out
more often that a man admires too much and is astonished in perceiving things of little or no consideration than too little, and this may either absolutely take away or pervert the use of reason. Wherefore although it is good to be born with some kind of inclination to this passion because it disposes us to the acquisition of sciences, yet we ought afterwards to endeavor as much as we can to be rid of it. For it is easy to supply the want of it by a peculiar reflection and attention whereunto our will may always oblige our understanding, when we conceive the thing represented is worth the labor. But there is no remedy to cure excessive admiration but to acquire the knowledge of most things and to be exercised in the consideration of all such as may seem to be most rare and strange.

The 78th Article

That the excess of it may be translated to a habit for want of correction.
although this passion seems to decrease by use because the more a man meets with rare things which he admires,
the more he usually ceases to admire them and thinks those which may be presented to him afterwards but common. Yet when it is excessive and causes the attention to be fixed only on the first image of the objects represented not acquiring any farther knowledge, it leaves behind it a habit that disposes the soul to stop in the same manner on all other objects which present themselves, provided they appear never so little new. This prolongs the disease of those who are blindly inquisitive, that is, who seek out rarities only to admire them, and not to understand them, for by little and little they become so full of admiration, that things of no consequence are as apt to puzzle them, as those whose scrutiny is commodious.

The 79th Article

The definitions of love and hatred.
Love is an emotion of the soul caused by the motion of the spirits which incite it to join in will to the objects which seem convenient to her. And,
hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits which incite the soul to will to be separated from objects represented, to be hurtful to her. I say these emotions are caused by the spirits to distinguish love and hatred which are passions and depend of the body, as well from the judgments that incline the soul to join in the will to the things she esteems good and separate from those she esteems evil, as from the emotions which these judgments alone excite in the soul.

The 80th Article

What is meant by joining or separating in will.
by the word will I do not mean here desire, which is a passion apart and relates to the future; that of the consent whereby he at that instant considers himself as it were, joined to what he loves: so that he imagines a whole, whereof he thinks himself to be but one part, and the thing beloved another.
As on the contrary, in hatred he considers himself alone as a whole, absolutely separated from the thing whereunto he has an aversion.

The 81st Article

Of the usual distinction between the love of concupiscence and benevolence.
It is frequent to distinguish that there are two sorts of love, one called benevolence, that is to say, wishing well to what a man loves; the other concupiscence, that is to say, which causes to desire the thing beloved. But me thinks
this distinction belongs to the effects only, and not the essence of love. For as soon as a man is joined in will to any object, of what nature soever it be, he has a well-wishing to it. That is to say, he also thereunto joins in will the things he believes convenient for it, which is one of the main effects of love. And if he conceive it a good to possess it, or to be associated with him in any other manner than in will; he desires it, which is also one of the most ordinary effects of love.


24:45 “Who then is the faithful and wise slave, whom the master has put in charge of his household, to give the other slaves their food at the proper time?

24:46 Blessed is that slave whom the master finds at work when he comes.

24:47 I tell you the truth, the master will put him in charge of all his possessions.

24:48 But if that evil slave should say to himself,  ‘My master is staying away a long time,’

24:49 and he begins to beat his fellow slaves and to eat and drink with drunkards,

24:50 then the master of that slave will come on a day when he does not expect him and at an hour he does not foresee,

24:51 and will cut him in two, and assign him a place with the hypocrites, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.


3:19 Now this is the basis for judging: that the light has come into the world and people loved the darkness rather than the light, because their deeds were evil.

3:20 For everyone who does evil deeds hates the light and does not come to the light, so that their deeds will not be exposed.

3:21 But the one who practices the truth comes to the light, so that it may be plainly evident that his deeds have been done in God.  

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The 82nd Article

How different passions concur in that they participate of love.
Nor is it necessary to distinguish as many sorts of love as there are diversity of objects which may be beloved. For example, although the passions of the ambitious man for glory, the avaricious for money, the drunkard for wine, the bestial for a woman he would violate, the man of honor for his friend or mistress, and a good father for his children, be in themselves very different, yet, in that they participate of love, they are alike. But the four first bear a love merely for the possession of the objects where unto their passion relates, and none at all to the objects themselves for which they have only a desire, mingled with other particular passions. Whereas the love a good father bears to his children is so pure that he desires to have nothing of them, and would not possess them any otherwise than he does, nor be joined nearer to them than he is already. But considering them as other selves, he seeks out their good as he would his own, or rather with more care, because representing to himself that he and they make but one whole, whereof he is not the better part, he oft-times prefers their interests before his own, and fears not his ruin to save them. The affections which men of honor bear to their friends is of this very same nature, though it seldom be so perfect; and that they bear to their mistress participates much of, but it has also a smatch* of the other.

The 83rd Article

Of the difference between bare affection, friendship, and devotion.
Me thinks
love may more justly be distinguished by the esteem a man makes of what he loves in comparison of himself. For when he values the object of his love less than himself, he bears only a bare affection to it. When he rates it equal with himself, it is called friendship. When more, that passion may be called devotion. Thus a man may bear an affection to a flower*, a bird, a horse, but unless he have a brain greatly out of tune, he cannot have friendship but for men. And they are so far the object of this passion, that there is no man so defective, but one may bear a perfect friendship to him, if one but think oneself beloved by him, and that one have a soul truly noble and generous; as shall accordingly be explained in the hundred fifty-forth, and hundred fifty-sixth article. As for devotion, the principal object thereof is undoubtedly the sovereign divinity, whereunto a man cannot choose but be devout. If he but understand it as he ought to do, but a man may carry a devotion to his prince too, to his country, to his city, and even to a particular man, when he esteems him much more than himself. Now, the difference betwixt these three sorts of love appears chiefly by their effects: for since in all of them a man considers himself as joined and united to the things beloved, he is ever ready to abandon the least part of all, which to conserve the other, he atones therewith. Therefore, in bare affection he always prefers himself before what he loves; and contrariwise in devotion he so much prefers the thing before himself that he fears not to die for the conservation of it. Whereof we have seen frequent examples of those who have exposed themselves to a certain death for the defense of their prince, or their city, and sometimes too, of particular persons to whom they have been devoted.

The 85th Article

Of liking and horror.
And I find only one considerable distinction alike in each. It consists in this, that the objects as well of love as
hatred, may be represented to the soul by the exterior senses or else by the interior, and one's own reason. For we commonly call that good or evil, which our interior senses or* reason makes us judge convenient for, or contrary to our nature. But we call that handsome or ugly, which is so represented to us by our exterior senses, chiefly by the sight, which alone is more considered than all the rest. From whence arise two sorts of love: that which a man bears to good things; and that he bears to handsome things, whereunto we may give the name of liking, that we may not confound it with the other, nor yet with desire, whereunto the name of love is often attributed. And from hence spring, in the same manner, two forms of hatred, one whereof relates to things evil, the other to ugly. And this last, for distinction sake, may be called horror, or aversion. But the most observable thing herein is that these passions of liking and horror are usually more violent than the other kinds of love and hatred because that which comes to the soul by the senses touches more to the quick than what is represented by her reason. And yet most commonly they have less truth. So that of all the passions, these are the greatest cheaters whom a man ought most carefully to beware of.


 28:37 You will become an occasion of horror, a proverb, and an object of ridicule to all the peoples to whom the Lord will drive you.

Job 18

18:5 “Yes, 10  the lamp 11  of the wicked is extinguished;
his flame of fire 12  does not shine.
18:6 The light in his tent grows dark;
his lamp above him is extinguished. 13 
18:7 His vigorous steps 14  are restricted, 15 
and his own counsel throws him down. 16 
18:8 For he has been thrown into a net by his feet 17 
and he wanders into a mesh. 18 
18:9 A trap 19  seizes him by the heel;
a snare 20  grips him.
18:10 A rope is hidden for him 21  on the ground
and a trap for him 22  lies on the path.
18:11 Terrors 23  frighten him on all sides
and dog 24  his every step.
18:12 Calamity is 25  hungry for him, 26 
and misfortune is ready at his side. 27 
18:13 It eats away parts of his skin; 28 
the most terrible death 29  devours his limbs.
18:14 He is dragged from the security of his tent, 30 
and marched off 31  to the king 32  of terrors.
18:15 Fire resides in his tent; 33 
over his residence burning sulfur is scattered.
18:16 Below his roots dry up,
and his branches wither above.
18:17 His memory perishes from the earth,
he has no name in the land. 34 
18:18 He is driven 35  from light into darkness
and is banished from the world.

18:19 He has neither children nor descendants 36  among his people,
no survivor in those places he once stayed. 37 
18:20 People of the west 38  are appalled at his fate; 39 
people of the east are seized with horror, 40  saying, 41 
18:21 ‘Surely such is the residence 42  of an evil man;
and this is the place of one who has not known God.’”


Listen, O God, to my prayer!
Do not ignore 3  my appeal for mercy!
55:2 Pay attention to me and answer me!
I am so upset 4  and distressed, 5  I am beside myself, 6 
55:3 because of what the enemy says, 7 
and because of how the wicked 8  pressure me, 9 
for they hurl trouble 10  down upon me 11 
and angrily attack me.
55:4 My heart beats violently 12  within me;
the horrors of death overcome me.
55:5 Fear and panic overpower me; 14 
terror overwhelms 15  me.

55:6 I say, 16  “I wish I had wings like a dove!
I would fly away and settle in a safe place!


13:18 The one who neglects 67  discipline ends up in 68  poverty and shame,
but the one who accepts reproof is honored. 69 
13:19 A desire fulfilled is sweet to the soul,
but fools abhor 70  turning away from evil.
13:20 The one who associates 71  with the wise grows wise,
but a companion of fools suffers harm. 72 
13:21 Calamity 73  pursues sinners,
but prosperity rewards the righteous. 74 


21:4 My heart palpitates, 7 
I shake in fear; 8 
the twilight I desired
has brought me terror.


13:44 “The kingdom of heaven is like a treasure, hidden in a field, that a person found and hid. Then because of joy he went and sold all that he had and bought that field.

13:45 “Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a merchant searching for fine pearls. 13:46 When he found a pearl of great value, he went out and sold everything he had and bought it.

13:47 “Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a net that was cast into the sea that caught all kinds of fish. 13:48 When it was full, they pulled it ashore, sat down, and put the good fish into containers and threw the bad away. 13:49 It will be this way at the end of the age. Angels will come and separate the evil from the righteous 13:50 and throw them into the fiery furnace, 62  where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

13:51 “Have you understood all these things?” They replied, “Yes.” 13:52 Then he said to them, “Therefore every expert in the law 63  who has been trained for the kingdom of heaven is like the owner of a house who brings out of his treasure what is new and old.”

Mark 7

7:18 He said to them, “Are you so foolish? Don’t you understand that whatever goes into a person from outside cannot defile him? 7:19 For it does not enter his heart but his stomach, and then goes out into the sewer.” 22  (This means all foods are clean.) 23  7:20 He said, “What comes out of a person defiles him. 7:21 For from within, out of the human heart, come evil ideas, sexual immorality, theft, murder, 7:22 adultery, greed, evil, deceit, debauchery, envy, slander, pride, and folly. 7:23 All these evils come from within and defile a person.”

Luke 22

22:14 Now 36  when the hour came, Jesus 37  took his place at the table 38  and the apostles joined 39  him. 22:15 And he said to them, “I have earnestly desired 40  to eat this Passover with you before I suffer. 22:16 For I tell you, I will not eat it again 41  until it is fulfilled 42  in the kingdom of God.

John 8

8:44 You people 105  are from 106  your father the devil, and you want to do what your father desires. 107  He 108  was a murderer from the beginning, and does not uphold the truth, 109  because there is no truth in him. Whenever he lies, 110  he speaks according to his own nature, 111  because he is a liar and the father of lies. 112  8:45 But because I am telling you 113  the truth, you do not believe me. 8:46 Who among you can prove me guilty 114  of any sin? 115  If I am telling you 116  the truth, why don’t you believe me? 8:47 The one who belongs to 117  God listens and responds 118  to God’s words. You don’t listen and respond, 119  because you don’t belong to God.” 120 


5:14 For the whole law can be summed up in a single commandment, 24  namely, “You must love your neighbor as yourself.” 25  5:15 However, if you continually bite and devour one another, 26  beware that you are not consumed 27  by one another. 5:16 But I say, live 28  by the Spirit and you will not carry out the desires of the flesh. 29  5:17 For the flesh has desires that are opposed to the Spirit, and the Spirit has desires 30  that are opposed to the flesh, for these are in opposition to 31  each other, so that you cannot do what you want. 5:18 But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law. 5:19 Now the works of the flesh 32  are obvious: 33  sexual immorality, impurity, depravity, 5:20 idolatry, sorcery, 34  hostilities, 35  strife, 36  jealousy, outbursts of anger, selfish rivalries, dissensions, 37  factions, 5:21 envying, 38  murder, 39  drunkenness, carousing, 40  and similar things. I am warning you, as I had warned you before: Those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God!

5:22 But the fruit of the Spirit 41  is love, 42  joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 43  5:23 gentleness, and 44  self-control. Against such things there is no law. 5:24 Now those who belong to Christ 45  have crucified the flesh 46  with its passions 47  and desires. 5:25 If we live by the Spirit, let us also behave in accordance with 48  the Spirit. 5:26 Let us not become conceited, 49  provoking 50  one another, being jealous 51  of one another.


 1:14 Like obedient children, do not comply with 32  the evil urges you used to follow in your ignorance, 33  1:15 but, like the Holy One who called you, become holy yourselves in all of your conduct, 1:16 for it is written, “You shall be holy, because I am holy.” [LEVITICUS 21:1 The Lord said to Moses: “Say to the priests, the sons of Aaron – say to them, ‘For a dead person 1  no priest 2  is to defile himself among his people, 3  21:2 except for his close relative who is near to him: 4  his mother, his father, his son, his daughter, his brother, 21:3 and his virgin sister who is near to him, 5  who has no husband; he may defile himself for her. 21:4 He must not defile himself as a husband among his people so as to profane himself. 6  21:5 Priests 7  must not have a bald spot shaved on their head, they must not shave the corner of their beard, and they must not cut slashes in their body. 21:6 “‘They must be holy to their God, and they must not profane 9  the name of their God, because they are the ones who present the Lord’s gifts, 10  the food of their God. Therefore they must be holy. 11  21:7 They must not take a wife defiled by prostitution, 12  nor are they to take a wife divorced from her husband, 13  for the priest 14  is holy to his God. 15] 

34  1:17 And if you address as Father the one who impartially judges according to each one’s work, live out the time of your temporary residence here 35  in reverence.

Revelation 14

14:1 Then 1  I looked, and here was 2  the Lamb standing on Mount Zion, and with him were one hundred and forty-four thousand, who had his name and his Father’s name written on their foreheads. 14:2 I also heard a sound 3  coming out of heaven like the sound of many waters and like the sound of loud thunder. Now 4  the sound I heard was like that made by harpists playing their harps, 14:3 and they were singing a new song before the throne and before the four living creatures and the elders. No 5  one was able to learn the song except the one hundred and forty-four thousand who had been redeemed from the earth.

14:4 These are the ones who have not defiled themselves 6  with women, for they are virgins. These are the ones who follow the Lamb wherever he goes. These were redeemed from humanity as firstfruits to God and to the Lamb, 14:5 and no lie was found on their lips; 7  they 8  are blameless.

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The 86th Article

The definition of desire.
The passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which disposes it to will hereafter the things that she represents unto herself convenient. So a man not only desires the presence of an absent good, but the conservation of a present, and moreover, the absence of an evil, as well of that he now endures as that which he believes may befall him hereafter.

The 87th Article

That it is a passion which has no contrary.
I know very well that in the schools, that passion which tends to the seeking after good, which only is called desire, is opposed to that which tends to the avoiding of
evil, which is called aversion. But seeing there is no good, the privation whereof is not an evil, nor any evil taken in the notion of a positive thing the privation whereof is not good. For example, that in seeking after riches, a man necessarily eschews poverty; in avoiding diseases, he seeks after health; and so of the rest. Me thinks it is still the same motion which inclines to the seeking after good, and with all, to the avoiding evil, which is contrary to it, I only observe this difference, that the desire he has, when he tends towards some good, and withal, to the avoiding evil, which is contrary to it. I only observe this difference, that the desire he has when he tends towards some good is accompanied with love and afterwards with hope and joy. Whereas the same desire, when he tends to the avoiding an evil contrary to this good, is attended with hatred, fear, and sorrow, which is the reason why it is conceived contrary to itself. But if it be considered when it relates equally at the same time to a good sought after, and an opposite evil to shun it, it may be clearly perceived but one passion only which causes both the one and the other.

The 88th Article

What are the several kinds of it.
It is more fit to distinguish desire into as many several sorts as there are several objects sought after. For example, curiosity, which is nothing but a desire to know, differs much from the desire of glory, and this from the desire of revenge, and so of the rest. But it is enough here to know that there are as many sorts of it as of love or hatred, and that the most considerable and strongest desires are those which are derived from liking and loathing.

The 89th Article

What is the desire arising from horrors.
Now, although it is but one self-same desire which tends to the seeking after good and avoiding its contrary, evil, as has been said already. Yet
the desire springing from liking ceases not to be very different from that which arises from
horror, for this liking and this horror, which are in truth two contraries, are not the good and the evil which serve for objects to these desires, but only two emotions of the soul, which dispose it to seek after two very different things. Horror is instituted by nature to represent a sudden and unexpected death to the soul, so that if it is sometimes no more but the touch of a little worm, the noise of a shaking leaf, or one's own shadow that causes horror, a man immediately feels as great an emotion, as if a most evident danger of death were laid before his eyes. This causes a sudden agitation, which inclines the soul to employ all her strength to shun an evil, if present; and it is this kind of desire which is commonly called flight or aversion.


Paul identified the behavior that results when we rebel against the Holy Spirit’s leadership and follow the dictates of our sinful nature. Law exists for the purpose of restraint, but in the works of the Spirit there is nothing to restrain. The Law aroused sinful passions by prohibiting them. Forbidden fruit is the sweetest kind in the mouth, but it often produces a stomachache. Whenever someone establishes a law prohibiting something, the natural tendency of people is to resist it. Practicing sinful acts that we know are against our Creator's Commandments reminds us that we are spiritually dead. Paul’s sinful human nature influenced him to such an extent that he found himself volitionally doing (approving) the very things that he despised intellectually. The agony of this tension and our inability to rid ourselves of our sinful nature that urges us to do things that lead to death.


5:22 But the fruit of the Spirit is love,  joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness,

5:23 gentleness, and self-control. Against such things there is no law.

5:24 Now those who belong to Christ have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.

5:25 If we live by the Spirit, let us also behave in accordance with the Spirit.

5:26 Let us not become conceited, provoking one another, being jealous of one another.


7:4 So, my brothers and sisters, you also died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you could be joined to another, to the one who was raised from the dead, to bear fruit to God.

7:5 For when we were in the flesh, the sinful desires, aroused by the law, were active in the members of our body to bear fruit for death.

7:6 But now we have been released from the law, because we have died to what controlled us, so that we may serve in the new life of the Spirit and not under the old written code.

7:7 What shall we say then? Is the law sin? Absolutely not! Certainly, I would not have known sin except through the law. For indeed I would not have known what it means to desire something belonging to someone else if the law had not said, “Do not covet.”

7:8 But sin, seizing the opportunity through the commandment, produced in me all kinds of wrong desires. For apart from the law, sin is dead.

7:9 And I was once alive apart from the law, but with the coming of the commandment sin became alive

7:10 and I died. So I found that the very commandment that was intended to bring life brought death! 

7:11 For sin, seizing the opportunity through the commandment, deceived me and through it I died.

7:12 So then, the law is holy, and the commandment is holy, righteous, and good.

7:13 Did that which is good, then, become death to me? Absolutely not! But sin, so that it would be shown to be sin, produced death in me through what is good, so that through the commandment sin would become utterly sinful.

7:14 For we know that the law is spiritual – but I am unspiritual, sold into slavery to sin.

7:15 For I don’t understand what I am doing. For I do not do what I want – instead, I do what I hate.

7:16 But if I do what I don’t want, I agree that the law is good.

7:17 But now it is no longer me doing it, but sin that lives in me.

7:18 For I know that nothing good lives in me, that is, in my flesh. For I want to do the good, but I cannot do it.

7:19 For I do not do the good I want, but I do the very evil I do not want!

7:20 Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer me doing it but sin that lives in me.

7:21 So, I find the law that when I want to do good, evil is present with me.

7:22 For I delight in the law of God in my inner being.

7:23 But I see a different law in my members waging war against the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin that is in my members.

7:24 Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death?

7:25 Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin.



8:1 There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. 1  8:2 For the law of the life-giving Spirit 2  in Christ Jesus has set you 3  free from the law of sin and death. 8:3 For God achieved what the law could not do because 4  it was weakened through the flesh. By sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and concerning sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, 8:4 so that the righteous requirement of the law may be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit.

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The 90th Article

What is that arising from liking.
On the contrary, liking is peculiarly instituted by nature to represent the enjoyment of what is liked, as the greatest good belonging to man, which causes a man very earnestly to desire this enjoyment. It is true, there are several sorts of liking, and the desires which arise from them are not all alike in power. For example, the loveliness of flowers incite us only to look on them, and that of fruits to eat them. But the chief is that which proceeds from the perfections a man imagines in another person, which he thinks may become another self. For with the distinction of sexes, which nature has bestowed on man as well as irrational creatures, she has also put certain impressions in the brain, which makes a man at a certain age, and at a certain season to look on himself as defective. And as if he were but the half of a whole, whereof a person of the other sex ought to be the other half, so that the acquisition of this half is represented to us confusedly by nature, as the greatest of all imaginable goods. And although he sees many persons of the other sex, he does not therefore desire many at the same time. By reason nature makes him conceive that he has need of no more but one half. But when he observes something in anyone that likes him better than anything he has marked at the same time in the rest, that fixes the soul to feel all the inclination which nature has given him to seek after the good, that she represents to him as the greatest he can possibly possess on that woman only. And this inclination, or this desire which is bred thus by liking, is called by the name of love, more commonly than the passion of love formerly described. Indeed it has much more strange effects, and this is he that furnishes all the writers of romances and poets with stuff.

The 91st Article

The definition of joy.
Joy is a pleasing emotion of the soul, wherein consists her enjoyment of good that the impressions of the brain represent unto her as her own. I say, in this emotion consists the enjoyment of good, for in truth the soul receives no other fruit of all the good she possesses. And when there is no joy in her, a man may say she enjoys it no more then if she had not any. I also add, it is of that good which the impressions of the brain represent to her as her own that I may not confound this joy, which is a passion, with that joy purely intellectual, which comes into the soul by the sole action of the soul, and which may be called a pleasing emotion in her, excited by herself, wherein consists her enjoyment of good, which her understanding represents to her as her own. It is true, while the soul is joined to the body, this intellectual joy can hardly be rid of the company of that which is a passion. For as soon as ever our understanding perceives that we possess any good, although this good may be so far different from all that belongs to the body that it be not imaginable, yet will not the imagination forbear to make immediately some impression in the brain, whereupon ensue the motion of the spirits which excite the passion of joy.

The 92nd Article

The definition of sadness.
Sadness is an unpleasant languishing, wherein consists the discommodity the soul receives from evil, or defect, which the impressions of the brain represent unto her, as belonging to her. And there is also an intellectual sadness, which is not the passion, but which wants but little of being accompanied by it.

The 93rd Article

What are the causes of these two passions.
Now, when the intellectual joy or sadness so excites that which is a passion, their cause is evident enough. And one may see by their definitions that
joy comes from the opinion a man has that he possesses some good, and sadness from the opinion of some evil, or defect. But it oft falls out, that a man is sad or joyful, and yet he cannot distinctly observe the good or evil which are the cause of it. To wit, when this good or this evil make their impressions in the brain without the intercourse of the soul, sometimes because they belong only to the body, and sometimes too, although they belong to the soul, because she considers them not as good or evil, but under some other notion, the impression whereof is joined in the brain with that of good and evil.


34:12 Do you want to really live? 22 
Would you love to live a long, happy life? 23 
34:13 Then make sure you don’t speak evil words 24 
or use deceptive speech! 25 
34:14 Turn away from evil and do what is right! 26 
Strive for peace and promote it! 27 
34:15 The Lord pays attention to the godly
and hears their cry for help. 28 
34:16 But the Lord opposes evildoers
and wipes out all memory of them from the earth. 29 
34:17 The godly 30  cry out and the Lord hears;
he saves them from all their troubles. 31 
34:18 The Lord is near the brokenhearted;
he delivers 32  those who are discouraged. 33 
34:19 The godly 34  face many dangers, 35 
but the Lord saves 36  them 37  from each one of them.
34:20 He protects 38  all his bones; 39 
not one of them is broken. 40 
34:21 Evil people self-destruct; 41 
those who hate the godly are punished. 42 
34:22 The Lord rescues his servants; 43 
all who take shelter in him escape punishment. 44 


63:1 A psalm of David, written when he was in the Judean wilderness. 2 

O God, you are my God! I long for you! 3 
My soul thirsts 4  for you,
my flesh yearns for you,
in a dry and parched 5  land where there is no water.
63:2 Yes, 6  in the sanctuary I have seen you, 7 
and witnessed 8  your power and splendor.
63:3 Because 9  experiencing 10  your loyal love is better than life itself,
my lips will praise you.
63:4 For this reason 11  I will praise you while I live;
in your name I will lift up my hands. 12 
63:5 As if with choice meat 13  you satisfy my soul. 14 
My mouth joyfully praises you, 15 
63:6 whenever 16  I remember you on my bed,
and think about you during the nighttime hours.
63:7 For you are my deliverer; 17 
under your wings 18  I rejoice.
63:8 My soul 19  pursues you; 20 
your right hand upholds me.


97:10 You who love the Lord, hate evil!
He protects 7  the lives of his faithful followers;
he delivers them from the power 8  of the wicked.
97:11 The godly bask in the light;
the morally upright experience joy. 9 
97:12 You godly ones, rejoice in the Lord!
Give thanks to his holy name. 10 


21:10 The appetite 28  of the wicked desires 29  evil;
his neighbor is shown no favor 30  in his eyes.
21:11 When a scorner is punished, the naive 31  becomes wise;
when a wise person is instructed, 32  he gains knowledge.
21:12 The Righteous One 33  considers 34  the house 35  of the wicked;
he overthrows the wicked to their ruin. 36 
21:13 The one who shuts his ears 37  to the cry 38  of the poor,
he too will cry out and will not be answered. 39 


2:24 There is nothing better for 105  people 106  than 107  to eat and drink,
and to find enjoyment 108  in their 109  work.
I also perceived that this ability to find enjoyment 110  comes from God. 111 
2:25 For no one 112  can eat and drink 113 
or experience joy 114  apart from him. 115 
2:26 For to the one who pleases him, 116  God gives wisdom, knowledge, and joy,
but to the sinner, he gives the task of amassing 117  wealth 118  –
only to give 119  it 120  to the one who pleases God.
This 121  task of the wicked 122  is futile – like chasing the wind!


4:10 When he was alone, those around him with the twelve asked him about the parables. 4:11 He said to them, “The secret 12  of the kingdom of God has been given 13  to you. But to those outside, everything is in parables,

4:12 so that although they look they may look but not see,

and although they hear they may hear but not understand,

so they may not repent and be forgiven.” 14 

4:13 He said to them, “Don’t you understand this parable? Then 15  how will you understand any parable? 4:14 The sower sows the word. 4:15 These are the ones on the path where the word is sown: Whenever they hear, immediately Satan 16  comes and snatches the word 17  that was sown in them. 4:16 These are the ones sown on rocky ground: As soon as they hear the word, they receive it with joy. 4:17 But 18  they have no root in themselves and do not endure. 19  Then, when trouble or persecution comes because of the word, immediately they fall away. 4:18 Others are the ones sown among thorns: They are those who hear the word, 4:19 but 20  worldly cares, the seductiveness of wealth, 21  and the desire for other things come in and choke the word, 22  and it produces nothing. 4:20 But 23  these are the ones sown on good soil: They hear the word and receive it and bear fruit, one thirty times as much, one sixty, and one a hundred.”


3:27 John replied, 56  “No one can receive anything unless it has been given to him from heaven. 3:28 You yourselves can testify that I said, ‘I am not the Christ,’ 57  but rather, ‘I have been sent before him.’ 3:29 The one who has the bride is the bridegroom. The friend of the bridegroom, who stands by and listens for him, rejoices greatly 58  when he hears the bridegroom’s voice. This then is my joy, and it is complete. 59  3:30 He must become more important while I become less important.”


2:5 But if anyone has caused sadness, he has not saddened me alone, but to some extent (not to exaggerate) 8  he has saddened all of you as well. 2:6 This punishment on such an individual by the majority is enough for him, 2:7 so that now instead 9  you should rather forgive and comfort him. 10  This will keep him from being overwhelmed by excessive grief to the point of despair. 11  2:8 Therefore I urge you to reaffirm your love for him. 12  2:9 For this reason also I wrote you: 13  to test you to see 14  if you are obedient in everything. 2:10 If you forgive anyone for anything, I also forgive him – for indeed what I have forgiven (if I have forgiven anything) I did so for you in the presence of Christ, 2:11 so that we may not be exploited 15  by Satan (for we are not ignorant of his schemes).

1 JOHN 1

1:5 Now 12  this is the gospel 13  message 14  we have heard from him 15  and announce to you: God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all. 16  1:6 If we say we have fellowship with him and yet keep on walking 17  in the darkness, we are lying and not practicing 18  the truth. 1:7 But if we walk in the light as he himself is in the light, we have fellowship with one another and the blood of Jesus his Son cleanses 19  us from all sin.

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The 94th Article

How the passions are excited by goods and evils which only respect the body; and wherein consists tickling and pain.
So, when a man is in sound health, and the weather is fairer than ordinary, he feels a lightsomeness in himself, which proceeds not from any function of the understanding, but only from the impressions which the motion of the spirits makes in the brain. And he feels himself sad likewise, when his body is indisposed, although he know not that it is. Thus, the tickling of the senses is so closely followed by joy, and pain by sadness, that most men cannot distinguish them, yet, they differ so far, that a man may sometimes suffer pains with joy, and receive ticklings that displease. But the cause why joy commonly follows tickling is because all that is called tickling, or a pleasing touch, consists in this, that the objects of the senses excite some motions in the nerves,
which would be apt to hurt them if they had not strength enough to resist it or the body were not well disposed, which makes an impression in the brain, which being instituted by nature, to signify this good disposition, and this strength, represents it to the soul as a good belonging to her, seeing she is united to the body, and so excites joy in her. The cause is almost the same why a man naturally takes delight to feel himself moved to all sorts of passions, yea, even sadness, and hatred, when these passions are caused only by strange adventures, which he sees personated on a stage, or by such like occasion, which not being capable to trouble us any way, seem to tickle the soul by touching it. And the reason why pain usually produces sadness is because that feeling which is called pain proceeds always from some action, so violent that it offends the nerves. So that being instituted by nature to signify to the soul the damage the body receives by this action, and its weakness in not being able to resist it, it represents each of them to him, as evils always displeasing, unless then when they cause some good things, which she esteems of more than them.

The 95th Article

How they may also be excited by goods and evils which the soul observes not, though they belong to her, as the delight a man takes to run into a danger, or remember an evil past.
So the delight which oft-times young men take to undertake difficult things, and expose themselves to great perils, though they do not so much as look for any profit or honour thereby, comes from hence: the conceit they have that they undertake a difficult thing makes an impression in the brain, which being joined to that which they may make, if they thought it a good thing to be courageous, fortunate, active, or strong enough to dare to hazard so far, is the reason that they take delight in it. And the content which old men take, when they remember the miseries they suffered, proceeds from hence: they imagine to themselves it is a good thing that they could subsist in spite of them.

The 107th Article

What is the cause of these motions in love.
And I deduce the reason of all this from what has formerly been said, that there is such a tie betwixt our soul and body that when we have joined any corporeal action with any thought, one of them never presents itself to us afterwards, without the other. As may be seen in such who with much aversion, when they have been sick, have taken some drink. They can neither eat nor drink afterwards but they have the same aversion. Nay further, they cannot think of their aversion to medicines, but the very same taste comes into their thought. For methinks the first passions our soul admitted when she was first joined to our body came from hence, that sometimes the blood, or some other juice which got into the heart, was an alimony more convenient than ordinary to maintain heat there, which is the principle of life. This caused the soul to join in will to this alimony, that is, to love it. And at the same time the spirits trickled from the brain into the muscles, which might press or agitate the parts from whence it came to the heart, that they might send more of it thither. And these parts were the stomach, and entrails, whose agitation augments the appetite, or else the liver, and lungs which the muscles of the diaphragm may press. Wherefore the same motion of the spirits ever since accompanies the passion of love.

The 109th Article

In joy.
It has also come to pass at the beginning of our life, that the blood contained in the veins was an alimony sufficiently convenient to maintain the heat of the heart, and they contained so great an abundance of it, that there was no need to exhaust nutriment elsewhere. This has excited in the soul the passion of joy. And at the same time has caused the orifices of the heart to be more open than ordinary; and that the spirits trickling abundantly from the brain, not only into the nerves which serve to open theses orifices, but also universally into all the rest which drive the blood of the veins to the heart, hinder any from coming afresh from the liver, spleen, entrails, and stomach. Wherefore these very same motions accompany joy.

The 110th Article

In sadness.
Sometimes, on the contrary, it has happened that the body has wanted nutriment, and this has made the soul feel her first sadness, at least that which has not been joined with hatred. This very thing has also caused the orifices of the heart to be contracted because they received but little blood. And, that a good quantity of this blood came from the spleen, by reason that is as the last reserve which serves to supply the heart, when there comes none to it from any where else. Wherefore the same motion of the spirits and nerves, which so serve to contract the orifices of the heart, and to convey the blood thither from the spleen, always accompany sadness.

The 111th Article
In desire.
Lastly, all the original desires which the soul might have when it was newly joined to the body, were to admit things convenient for her and repel hurtful. And it was for the same purpose, that, from that instant, the spirits began to move all the muscles, and all the organs of the senses, in all manners that they could move. Which is the reason that now, when the soul desires anything, the whole body becomes more active and disposed to move than usually without it, and then it falls out, on the other side that the body is so disposed, then are the desires of the soul more strong and vehement.

The 115th Article
How joy causes blushing.
So joy renders the color livelier, and more vermilion, because by opening the sluices of the heart, it makes the blood flow quicker in all the veins, and becoming hotter, and more subtle, it moderately raises up all parts of the face, which makes the aspect of it more smiling and brisk.

The 118th Article

Of tremblings.
Tremblings have two several causes: one is, that there come sometimes too few spirits from the brain into the nerves; the other, that there come sometimes too many, so that the little passages of the muscles cannot be duly shut, which as has been said in the eleventh Article, ought to be shut to determine the motion of the members. The chief cause of it appears to be in sadness and fearfulness; as also when a man shakes with cold. For these passions, as well as the cold of the air, may so thicken the blood that it may not furnish the brain with spirits enough to send any into the nerves. The other cause appears often in those who ardently desire anything, and in those who are moved with wrath, as also in these who are drunk, for these two passions, as well as wine, sometimes make so many spirits go into the brain that they cannot regularly be conveyed from thence into the muscles.

The 119th Article

Of languishing.
Languishing is a disposition to ease one's self, and be without motion, which is felt in all the members. It comes as trembling because there are not spirits enough in the nerves, but in a different manner, for the cause of trembling is that there are not enough in the brain to obey the determinations of the kernel when that drives them to any muscle. Whereas languishing proceeds from hence, that the kernel does not determine them to go to some muscles rather [than] others.


8:4 “To you, O people, 6  I call out,
and my voice calls 7  to all mankind. 8 
8:5 You who are naive, discern 9  wisdom!
And you fools, understand discernment! 10 
8:6 Listen, for I will speak excellent things, 11 
and my lips will utter 12  what is right.
8:7 For my mouth 13  speaks truth, 14 
and my lips 15  hate wickedness. 16 
8:8 All the words of my mouth are righteous; 17 
there is nothing in them twisted 18  or crooked.
8:9 All of them are clear 19  to the discerning
and upright to those who find knowledge.
8:10 Receive my instruction 20  rather than 21  silver,
and knowledge rather than choice gold.
8:11 For wisdom is better than rubies,
and desirable things cannot be compared 22  to her.
8:12 “I, wisdom, live with prudence, 23 
and I find 24  knowledge and discretion.
8:13 The fear of the Lord is to hate 25  evil;
I hate arrogant pride 26  and the evil way
and perverse utterances. 27 
8:14 Counsel and sound wisdom belong to me; 28 
I possess understanding and might.


10:38 Now as they went on their way, Jesus 128  entered a certain village where a woman named Martha welcomed him as a guest. 129  10:39 She 130  had a sister named Mary, who sat 131  at the Lord’s feet 132  and listened to what he said. 10:40 But Martha was distracted 133  with all the preparations she had to make, 134  so 135  she came up to him and said, “Lord, don’t you care 136  that my sister has left me to do all the work 137  alone? Tell 138  her to help me.” 10:41 But the Lord 139  answered her, 140  “Martha, Martha, 141  you are worried and troubled 142  about many things, 10:42 but one thing 143  is needed. Mary has chosen the best 144  part; it will not be taken away from her.”


11:33 “No one after lighting a lamp puts it in a hidden place 104  or under a basket, 105  but on a lampstand, so that those who come in can see the light. 11:34 Your eye is the lamp of your body. When your eye is healthy, 106  your whole body is full of light, but when it is diseased, 107  your body is full of darkness. 11:35 Therefore see to it 108  that the light in you 109  is not darkness. 11:36 If 110  then 111  your whole body is full of light, with no part in the dark, 112  it will be as full of light as when the light of a lamp shines on you.”


12:22 Then 52  Jesus 53  said to his 54  disciples, “Therefore I tell you, do not worry 55  about your 56  life, what you will eat, or about your 57  body, what you will wear. 12:23 For there is more to life than food, and more to the body than clothing. 12:24 Consider the ravens: 58  They do not sow or reap, they have no storeroom or barn, yet God feeds 59  them. How much more valuable are you than the birds! 12:25 And which of you by worrying 60  can add an hour to his life? 61  12:26 So if 62  you cannot do such a very little thing as this, why do you worry about 63  the rest? 12:27 Consider how the flowers 64  grow; they do not work 65  or spin. Yet I tell you, not even Solomon in all his glory was clothed like one of these! 12:28 And if 66  this is how God clothes the wild grass, 67  which is here 68  today and tomorrow is tossed into the fire to heat the oven, 69  how much more 70  will he clothe you, you people of little faith! 12:29 So 71  do not be overly concerned about 72  what you will eat and what you will drink, and do not worry about such things. 73  12:30 For all the nations of the world pursue 74  these things, and your Father knows that you need them. 12:31 Instead, pursue 75  his 76  kingdom, 77  and these things will be given to you as well.

12:32 “Do not be afraid, little flock, for your Father is well pleased 78  to give you the kingdom. 12:33 Sell your possessions 79  and give to the poor. 80  Provide yourselves purses that do not wear out – a treasure in heaven 81  that never decreases, 82  where no thief approaches and no moth 83  destroys. 12:34 For where your treasure 84  is, there your heart will be also.


7:4 So, my brothers and sisters, 7  you also died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you could be joined to another, to the one who was raised from the dead, to bear fruit to God. 8  7:5 For when we were in the flesh, 9  the sinful desires, 10  aroused by the law, were active in the members of our body 11  to bear fruit for death. 7:6 But now we have been released from the law, because we have died 12  to what controlled us, so that we may serve in the new life of the Spirit and not under the old written code. 13 


3:5 So put to death whatever in your nature belongs to the earth: 2  sexual immorality, impurity, shameful passion, 3  evil desire, and greed which is idolatry. 3:6 Because of these things the wrath of God is coming on the sons of disobedience. 4  3:7 You also lived your lives 5  in this way at one time, when you used to live among them. 3:8 But now, put off all such things 6  as anger, rage, malice, slander, abusive language from your mouth. 

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The 120th Article

How it is caused by love and by desire.
And the passion which most commonly causes this effect is love joined to the desire of a thing, the acquisition whereof is not imagined possible for the present time for love so busies the soul in considering the object beloved that it employs all the spirits which are in the brain to represent the image of it to her, and stops all the motions of the kernel not subservient to this purpose. And it is to be noted concerning desire that the property which I have attributed to it, of rendering the body more active, agrees not to it, but when a man imagines the object desired to be such, that he may from that very time do something which may serve to acquire it. For
if, on the other side, he imagines it is impossible for him at that time to do anything that may conduce thereunto, all the agitation of desire remains in the brain, not at all passing into the nerves; and being wholly employed in fortifying the idea of the object desired there, leaves the rest of the body languishing.

The 121st Article

That it may also be caused by other passions.
It is true that hatred, sadness, yes, and joy too, may cause some kind of languishing too when they are very violent: because they wholly busy the soul in considering their objects, chiefly when the desire of a thing, to the acquisition whereof a man cannot contribute anything for the present, is joined with them. But because he fixes more on the consideration of the objects which he has joined in will to himself than those which he has separated, or any else; and because languishing depends not on a surprise but requires some time to be formed, it is more frequently found in love than any other passion.

The 136th Article

From whence proceed the passions which are peculiar to certain men.
Furthermore, that I may here in few words supply all that may be added hereunto concerning the several effects or causes of the passions, I am content to repeat the principle, whereon all that I have written of them is grounded: to wit, that there is such a tie betwixt our soul and body that when we once have joined any corporeal action with any thought, one of them never presents itself to us without the other; and that they are not always the same actions which are joined to the same thoughts. For this is sufficient to give a reason of all that any man can observe peculiar, either in himself or others, concerning this matter, which has not been here explained. And for example, it is easy to conceive that
the strange aversions of some, who cannot endure the smell of roses, the sight of a cat, or the like, come only from hence; that when they were but newly alive they were displeased with some such like objects, or else had a fellow feeling of their mother's resentment, who was so distasteful when she was with child. For it is certain there is an affinity between the motions of the mother and the child in her womb, so that whatsoever is displeasing to one, offends the other. And the smell of roses may have caused some great head-ache in the child, when it was in the cradle; or a cat may have frightened it, and none took notice of it, nor the child so much as remembered it; though the idea of that aversion he then had to roses, or a cat, remain imprinted in his brain to his life's end.

The 137th Article

Of the use of the five precedent passions as they relate to the body.
Now the definitions of love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness are laid down, and the corporeal motions that cause them or accompany them treated of, we have no further to do, but consider the use of them. Concerning which, it is to be observed, that according to the institution of nature they all relate to the body, and are not given to the soul, but as joined to it. So that their natural use is to incite the soul to consent and contribute to the actions, which may be useful to conserve the body, or make it in some kind more perfect. And in this sense
sadness and joy are the two first that are set on work, for the soul is immediately warned of those things that are hurtful to the body by the feeling of pain, which first of all produces the passion of sadness in her, then hatred of that which causes this pain, and in the third place the desire to be rid of it. As also, the soul is not immediately advertised of things beneficial to the body, but by some kind of tickling which exciting the passion of joy in her, breeds afterwards love of that she believes to be the cause of it, and at last desire to acquire that which may either cause this joy to continue in her, or to enjoy after it, another like it; which shows that they are all five very useful in behalf of the body. And indeed, that sadness is in some sort superior to, and more necessary than joy, and hate than love. Because it is of more moment to repel things noxious and destructive, than to acquire such as add some kind of perfection, without which it is possible to subsist.

JOB 35

35:2 “Do you think this to be 2  just:
when 3  you say, ‘My right before God.’ 4 
35:3 But you say, ‘What will it profit you,’ 5 
and, ‘What do I gain by not sinning?’ 6 
35:4 I 7  will reply to you, 8 
and to your friends with you.
35:5 Gaze at the heavens and see;
consider the clouds, which are higher than you! 9 
35:6 If you sin, how does it affect God? 10 
If your transgressions are many,
what does it do to him? 11 
35:7 If you are righteous, what do you give to God,
or what does he receive from your hand?
35:8 Your wickedness affects only 12  a person like yourself,
and your righteousness only other people. 13 
35:9 “People 14  cry out
because of the excess of oppression; 15 
they cry out for help
because of the power 16  of the mighty. 17 
35:10 But no one says, ‘Where is God, my Creator,
who gives songs in the night, 18 
35:11 who teaches us 19  more than 20  the wild animals of the earth,
and makes us wiser than the birds of the sky?’
35:12 Then 21  they cry out – but he does not answer –
because of the arrogance of the wicked.
35:13 Surely it is an empty cry 22  – God does not hear it;
the Almighty does not take notice of it.

35:14 How much less, then,
when you say that you do not perceive him,
that the case is before him
and you are waiting for him! 23 
35:15 And further, 24  when you say
that his anger does not punish, 25 
and that he does not know transgression! 26 
35:16 So Job opens his mouth to no purpose; 27 
without knowledge he multiplies words.”


3:12 Therefore, as the elect of God, holy and dearly loved, clothe yourselves with a heart of mercy, 9  kindness, humility, gentleness, and patience, 3:13 bearing with one another and forgiving 10  one another, if someone happens to have 11  a complaint against anyone else. Just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also forgive others. 12  3:14 And to all these 13  virtues 14  add 15  love, which is the perfect bond. 16  3:15 Let the peace of Christ be in control in your heart (for you were in fact called as one body 17  to this peace), and be thankful. 3:16 Let the word of Christ 18  dwell in you richly, teaching and exhorting one another with all wisdom, singing psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs, all with grace 19  in your hearts to God. 3:17 And whatever you do in word or deed, do it all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him.


“Look, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will complete a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah.

8:9 “It will not be like the covenant 18  that I made with their fathers, on the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of Egypt, because they did not continue in my covenant and I had no regard for them, says the Lord.

8:10 “For this is the covenant that I will establish with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord. I will put 19  my laws in their minds 20  and I will inscribe them on their hearts. And I will be their God and they will be my people. 21 

8:11 “And there will be no need at all 22  for each one to teach his countryman or each one to teach his brother saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ since they will all know me, from the least to the greatest. 23 

8:12 “For I will be merciful toward their evil deeds, and their sins I will remember no longer.” 24 

8:13 When he speaks of a new covenant, 25  he makes the first obsolete. Now what is growing obsolete and aging is about to disappear. 


3:14 Therefore, dear friends, since you are waiting for 48  these things, strive to be found 49  at peace, without spot or blemish, when you come into his presence. 50  3:15 And regard the patience of our Lord as salvation, 51  just as also our dear brother Paul 52  wrote to you, 53  according to the wisdom given to him, 3:16 speaking of these things in all his letters. 54  Some things in these letters 55  are hard to understand, things 56  the ignorant and unstable twist 57  to their own destruction, as they also do to the rest of the scriptures. 58  3:17 Therefore, dear friends, since you have been forewarned, 59  be on your guard that you do not get led astray by the error of these unprincipled men 60  and fall from your firm grasp on the truth. 61  3:18 But grow in the grace and knowledge 62  of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. To him be the honor both now and on 63  that eternal day. 64 

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The 138th Article

Of their faults, and the means to correct them.
But, though this use of the passions be the most natural they can have, and all irrational creatures regulate their life only by corporeal motions resembling those which in us use to follow them, and whereunto they incite our soul to consent, yet it is not always good, seeing there are many things hurtful to the body, which at first cause not any sadness, nor yet confer joy and others beneficial to it, though at first they be incommodious. And besides, they most commonly make the
evils and goods they represent to us, seem much greater and weightier than they are. So that they incite us to seek after the one, and avoid the other with more vehemence and anxiety than is convenient: as we see beasts are often entrapped by baits, and to shun little evils they precipitate themselves into greater. Wherefore, we ought to make use of our experience and reason to distinguish good from evil, and know their just value, that we may not take one for the other, nor addict ourselves to anything excessively.

The 139th Article

Of the use of the same passions, as they relate to the soul; and first of love.
This were sufficient, if we had only a body, or if that were our better part. But seeing it is the least, we ought chiefly to consider the passions as they relate to the soul, in respect whereof
love and hatred proceed from knowledge, and precede joy and sadness, except when these two last hold the place of knowledge whereof those are sorts; and when this knowledge is true, that is, when the things it inclines us to love, are truly good, and those it inclines us
to hate are truly evil, then love is incomparably better than hatred, nor can it be too great, or fail to produce joy. I say, this love is extraordinar[ily] good; because joining true goods to us, it makes us so much the more perfect. I say also, that it cannot be too great, for what the most excessive can do, is but to join us so absolutely to those goods that we put distinction between the love we bear to that, and ourselves, which, I believe, cannot be evil. And it is necessarily followed by joy because it represents what we love, as a good belonging to us.

The 140th Article

Of hatred.
Hatred, on the contrary, cannot be so small but it hurts, and it is never without sadness. I say it cannot be too small because we are not incited by hatred to any action, but what we may be by love of the good contrary to it; at least, when this good and evil are enough understood. For I confess that the hatred of evil which is not manifested but by pain, is necessary in respect of the body. But I speak here of that which proceeds from a more clear knowledge, and I attribute it only to the soul. I say also, that it is never without sadness, because evil being but a privation, it cannot be conceived without some real subject wherein it is, and there is nothing real but has some goodness in it, so that the hatred which make us refrain from evil, does also make us refrain from the good whereunto it is annexed; and the privation of this good, being represented to our soul as a defect in her, excites sadness. For example, the hatred which makes us refrain from the evil manners of anyone, does by the same means, make us refrain from his conversation, wherein we might otherwise find some good, which we are vexed to be deprived of. And so in all other kinds of hatred some subject of sadness may be observed.

1 JOHN 3

3:18 Little children, let us not love with word or with tongue but in deed and truth. 64  3:19 And by this 65  we will know that we are of the truth and will convince 66  our conscience 67  in his presence, 68  3:20 that 69  if our conscience condemns 70  us, that 71  God is greater than our conscience and knows all things. 3:21 Dear friends, if our conscience does not condemn us, we have confidence in the presence of God, 3:22 and 72  whatever we ask we receive from him, because 73  we keep his commandments and do the things that are pleasing to him. 3:23 Now 74  this is his commandment: 75  that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ and love one another, just as he gave 76  us the commandment. 3:24 And the person who keeps his commandments resides 77  in God, 78  and God 79  in him. Now by this 80  we know that God 81  resides in us: by the Spirit he has given us.


15:11 Death and Destruction 30  are before the Lord –
how much more 31  the hearts of humans! 32 
15:12 The scorner does not love 33  one who corrects him; 34 
he will not go to 35  the wise.
15:13 A joyful heart 36  makes the face cheerful, 37 
but by a painful heart the spirit is broken.
15:14 The discerning heart seeks knowledge,
but the mouth of fools feeds on folly. 38 
15:15 All the days 39  of the afflicted 40  are bad, 41 
but one with 42  a cheerful heart has a continual feast. 43 
15:16 Better 44  is little with the fear of the Lord
than great wealth and turmoil 45  with it. 46 
15:17 Better a meal of vegetables where there is love 47 
than a fattened ox where there is hatred. 48 
15:18 A quick-tempered person 49  stirs up dissension,
but one who is slow to anger 50  calms 51  a quarrel. 52 
15:19 The way of the sluggard is like a hedge of thorns, 53 
but the path of the upright is like 54  a highway. 55 
15:20 A wise child 56  brings joy to his father,
but a foolish person 57  despises 58  his mother.
15:21 Folly is a joy to one who lacks sense, 59 
but one who has understanding 60  follows an upright course. 61 


6:27 “But I say to you who are listening: Love your enemies, 91  do good to those who hate you, 6:28 bless those who curse you, pray for those who mistreat 92  you. 6:29 To the person who strikes you on the cheek, 93  offer the other as well, 94  and from the person who takes away your coat, 95  do not withhold your tunic 96  either. 97  6:30 Give to everyone who asks you, 98  and do not ask for your possessions 99  back 100  from the person who takes them away. 6:31 Treat others 101  in the same way that you would want them to treat you. 102 

6:32 “If 103  you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners 104  love those who love them. 105  6:33 And 106  if you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is that to you? Even 107  sinners 108  do the same. 6:34 And if you lend to those from whom you hope to be repaid, 109  what credit is that to you? Even sinners 110  lend to sinners, so that they may be repaid in full. 111  6:35 But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing back. 112  Then 113  your reward will be great, and you will be sons 114  of the Most High, 115  because he is kind to ungrateful and evil people. 116  6:36 Be merciful, 117  just as your Father is merciful.


 12:11 Now all discipline seems painful at the time, not joyful. 14  But later it produces the fruit of peace and righteousness 15  for those trained by it. 12:12 Therefore, strengthen 16  your listless hands and your weak knees, 17  12:13 and make straight paths for your feet, 18  so that what is lame may not be put out of joint but be healed.

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The 141st Article

Of desire, joy, and sadness.
For desire, it is evident that when it proceeds from a true knowledge, it cannot be
evil, provided it be not immoderate, and that this knowledge regulate it. It is evident also, that joy cannot choose but be good, nor sadness but be evil, in respect of the soul: because in the last consist all the inconveniences that the soul receives by evil, and in the first all the enjoyment of good belonging to her. So that, if we had no bodies, I dare say, we could not give ourselves up too much to love, and joy, nor too much shun hatred, and sadness. But the corporeal motions that accompany them, may be all hurtful to the health, when they are very violent, and on the other side useful when they are but moderate.

The 142nd Article

Of joy and love, compared with sadness and hatred.
since hatred and sadness ought to be rejected by the soul, even then when they proceed from a true knowledge, much more ought they to be when they come from any false opinion. But it may be doubted whether love and joy are good or no, when they likewise are ill grounded. And me thinks, if it be only considered what they are precisely in themselves, in respect of the soul, it may be said that although the joy be less solid and the love less advantageous than when they have a better foundation, they are at the worst to be preferred before sadness and hatred as ill grounded, so that in the occurrences of life, where we cannot avoid the hazard of being deceived, we do always best to lean to those passions which tend towards good than those which have relation to evil, although it be to shun it. Nay, sometimes a false joy is better than a sadness from a true cause. But I dare not say the same of love, in relation to hatred, for when hatred is just, it removes us not from anything but the subject which contains the evil from which it is good to be separated. Whereas unjust love joins us to hurtful things, or at least to such as desire not to be so much considered by us as they are, which devours and abases us.

The 143rd Article

Of the same passions as they relate to desire.
And it must be exactly noted that what I now speak of these four passions takes place only when they are considered precisely in themselves, and incline us not to any action. For seeing they excite desire in us, by whose interposition they regulate our manners, it is certain that
all those that come from a wrong cause may hurt, and on the other side, those that come of a just cause may be useful. And further, that when they are both equally ill grounded, joy is commonly more hurtful than sadness, because this, enduing a man with reserve and wariness, does in some sort incline him to prudence, whereas the other render those who give themselves up thereunto inconsiderate and rash.


7:15 “Watch out for false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing but inwardly are voracious wolves. 20  7:16 You will recognize them by their fruit. Grapes are not gathered 21  from thorns or figs from thistles, are they? 22  7:17 In the same way, every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad 23  tree bears bad fruit. 7:18 A good tree is not able to bear bad fruit, nor a bad tree to bear good fruit. 7:19 Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. 7:20 So then, you will recognize them by their fruit.


12:17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil; consider what is good before all people. 12  12:18 If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all people. 13  12:19 Do not avenge yourselves, dear friends, but give place to God’s wrath, 14  for it is written, “Vengeance is mine, I will repay,” 15  says the Lord. 12:20 Rather, if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him a drink; for in doing this you will be heaping burning coals on his head. 16  12:21 Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.


3:9 Do not return evil for evil or insult for insult, but instead bless 14  others 15  because you were called to inherit a blessing. 3:10 For

the one who wants to love life and see good days must keep 16  his tongue from evil and his lips from uttering deceit.

3:11 And he must turn away from evil and do good;

he must seek peace and pursue it.

3:12 For the eyes of the Lord are 17  upon the righteous and his ears are open to their prayer.

But the Lord’s face is against those who do evil. 18 

3:13 For 19  who is going to harm you if you are devoted to what is good? 3:14 But in fact, if you happen to suffer 20  for doing what is right, 21  you are blessed. But do not be terrified of them 22  or be shaken. 23  3:15 But set Christ 24  apart 25  as Lord in your hearts and always be ready to give an answer to anyone who asks about the hope you possess. 26  3:16 Yet do it with courtesy and respect, 27  keeping a good conscience, so that those who slander your good conduct in Christ may be put to shame when they accuse you. 28  3:17 For it is better to suffer for doing good, if God wills it, 29  than for doing evil.

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The 144th Article

Of desires whose events depend only on ourselves.
But because these passions cannot sway us to any actions but by the interposition of the desire that they excite, it is desire which we ought peculiarly to regulate, and therein consists the principal part of morality. Now, as I said just now, it is always good when it follows a true knowledge so
it cannot choose but be bad when it is grounded on an error. And me thinks, the most ordinary error committed in desire is when a man does not clearly enough distinguish the things which absolutely depend on ourselves, from those which do not. For concerning those which depend of us, that is of our free disposition, it is enough to know that they are good, [for us] not to desire them with too much vehemence, because it is a following of virtue to do the good things that depend of us. And it is certain, he cannot have too ardent a desire after virtue. Besides, what we thus desire cannot choose but be accomplished, since it depending only on us, we ever receive the plenary satisfaction we expect, but the usual fault herein is not that we desire too much, but too little, and the sovereign remedy against that is, as much as in us lies, to rid the spirit of all kind of desire less useful, than to strive to know clearly, and consider with attention, the goodness of that which is to be desired.

The 145th Article

Of those which depend merely on causes, and what fortune.
For those
things which depend not any ways of us, how good soever they be, they ought never to be desired with passion. Not only because they may not befall, and by this means afflict us so much the more, by how much more they were desired. But chiefly, because
when they possess our thoughts, they divert us from bending our affection to other things, the acquisition whereof depends of ourselves. And there are two general remedies against these idle desires; the first, generosity, which I will speak of hereafter; the second is that we ought to reflect on Divine Providence, and imagine to ourselves that it is impossible that anything happen otherwise than this Providence has determined from all eternity so that there is a kind of fatality, or irresistible necessity to oppose Fortune to destroy her, as a chimera proceeding only from the error of our understandings. For we can desire nothing but what we think in some manner possible, and we cannot suppose things which depend not of us possible, seeing we think they depend not on Fortune--that is, we suppose they may happen, and the like has happened formerly. Now, this opinion is only grounded upon this, that we not understanding all the causes contributory to every effect, for when a thing which we supposed to depend on Fortune does not fall out, that shows some of the causes necessary to produce was wanting. And consequently that it was absolutely impossible and that the like did never happen, that is, where a like cause of its production was wanting. So that had we not been ignorant of that before, we should never have imagined them possible, nor consequently should ever have desired them.

The 146th Article

Of those that depend of us and others too.
This vulgar opinion then, that t
here is without us a Fortune which causes things to fall out, or not to fall out, according to her pleasure, must be utterly rejected. And it must be understood that all things are guided by a Divine Providence whose eternal decree is so infallible and immutable that unless those things which the same decree has pleased to let depend on our free disposition, we ought to think, for our parts, that nothing happens but what of necessity must, as if it were fatal, so that without a crime we cannot desire it may happen otherwise. But because the most part of our desires extend to two things which depend not altogether on ourselves, nor altogether elsewhere, we ought exactly to distinguish what in them depends on ourselves, that we may not let our desire ramble any farther than that. And for what is over and above, though we should esteem the success thereof absolutely fatal and immutable that our desire busy not itself thereabout, we should not omit to consider the reasons why it ought less or more to be hoped for, that they may serve to regulate our actions. For if for example, we had any business at a place whither we might go two several ways, one whereof use[d] to be much safer than the other, although the decree of Providence may be such, that if we go that way which is conceived fastest, we shall not escape robbing. And on the contrary, we might have gone the other way without any danger, yet we ought not therefore to be indifferent which we take, nor rest upon the immutable fatality of this decree. But reason wills us to choose the way which used to be safest, and our desire herein ought to be fulfilled, whatsoever evil befall us by following it. Because this evil (or mischief) having been, as to us, inevitable we have no occasion to wish to be exempted from it but only do the best our understanding can comprehend, as, I suppose, we have done. And it is certain that when a man exercises himself so to distinguish betwixt fatality and fortune he easily habituates himself so to regulate his desires, that seeing the fulfilling of them depends only on ourselves, they may always give us an absolute satisfaction.


1:7 Fearing the Lord is the beginning of moral knowledge, 

but fools despise wisdom and instruction. 

1:8 Listen,  my child, to the instruction from your father,

and do not forsake the teaching from your mother.

1:9 For they will be like an elegant garland on your head,

and like pendants around your neck.


3:13 Who is wise and understanding among you? By his good conduct he should show his works done in the gentleness that wisdom brings.

3:14 But if you have bitter jealousy and selfishness in your hearts, do not boast and tell lies against the truth.

3:15 Such wisdom does not come from above but is earthly, natural, demonic.

3:16 For where there is jealousy and selfishness, there is disorder and every evil practice.

3:17 But the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, accommodating, full of mercy and good fruit, impartial, and not hypocritical.

3:18 And the fruit that consists of righteousness is planted in peace among those who make peace.


3:5 So put to death whatever in your nature belongs to the earth:

sexual immorality, impurity, shameful passion, evil desire, and greed which is idolatry.

3:6 Because of these things the wrath of God is coming on the sons of disobedience.

3:7 You also lived your lives in this way at one time, when you used to live among them.

3:8 But now, put off all such things as anger, rage, malice, slander, abusive language from your mouth.

3:9 Do not lie to one another since you have put off the old man with its practices

3:10 and have been clothed with the new man that is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of the one who created it.

3:11 Here there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all and in all.

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Every human being needs to trust in Jesus Christ because everyone lacks the righteousness that God requires before He will accept us.

the unfolding of history also reveals God’s hatred toward sin and His judgment of sin. The moral devolution of humanity is not just a natural consequence of man’s sinning but also a result of God’s judgment of sinners.


The 144th Article

Of desires whose events depend only on ourselves.
But because these passions cannot sway us to any actions but by the interposition of the desire that they excite, it is desire which we ought peculiarly to regulate, and therein consists the principal part of morality. Now, as I said just now, it is always good when it follows a true knowledge
so it cannot choose but be bad when it is grounded on an error. And me thinks, the most ordinary error committed in desire is when a man does not clearly enough distinguish the things which absolutely depend on ourselves, from those which do not. For concerning those which depend of us, that is of our free disposition, it is enough to know that they are good, [for us] not to desire them with too much vehemence, because it is a following of virtue to do the good things that depend of us. And it is certain, he cannot have too ardent a desire after virtue. Besides, what we thus desire cannot choose but be accomplished, since it depending only on us, we ever receive the plenary satisfaction we expect, but the usual fault herein is not that we desire too much, but too little, and the sovereign remedy against that is, as much as in us lies, to rid the spirit of all kind of desire less useful, than to strive to know clearly, and consider with attention, the goodness of that which is to be desired.

The 145th Article

Of those which depend merely on causes, and what fortune.
For those things which depend not any ways of us, how good soever they be, they ought never to be desired with passion. Not only because they may not befall, and by this means afflict us so much the more, by how much more they were desired. But chiefly, because when
they possess our thoughts, they divert us from bending our affection to other things, the acquisition whereof depends of ourselves. And there are two general remedies against these idle desires; the first, generosity, which I will speak of hereafter; the second is that we ought to reflect on Divine Providence, and imagine to ourselves that it is impossible that anything happen otherwise than this Providence has determined from all eternity so that there is a kind of fatality, or irresistible necessity to oppose Fortune to destroy her, as a chimera proceeding only from the error of our understandings. For we can desire nothing but what we think in some manner possible, and we cannot suppose things which depend not of us possible, seeing we think they depend not on Fortune--that is, we suppose they may happen, and the like has happened formerly. Now, this opinion is only grounded upon this, that we not understanding all the causes contributory to every effect, for when a thing which we supposed to depend on Fortune does not fall out, that shows some of the causes necessary to produce was wanting. And consequently that it was absolutely impossible and that the like did never happen, that is, where a like cause of its production was wanting. So that had we not been ignorant of that before, we should never have imagined them possible, nor consequently should ever have desired them.

The 146th Article

Of those that depend of us and others too.
This vulgar opinion then, that
there is without us a Fortune which causes things to fall out, or not to fall out, according to her pleasure, must be utterly rejected. And it must be understood that all things are guided by a Divine Providence whose eternal decree is so infallible and immutable that unless those things which the same decree has pleased to let depend on our free disposition, we ought to think, for our parts, that nothing happens but what of necessity must, as if it were fatal, so that without a crime we cannot desire it may happen otherwise. But because the most part of our desires extend to two things which depend not altogether on ourselves, nor altogether elsewhere, we ought exactly to distinguish what in them depends on ourselves, that we may not let our desire ramble any farther than that. And for what is over and above, though we should esteem the success thereof absolutely fatal and immutable that our desire busy not itself thereabout, we should not omit to consider the reasons why it ought less or more to be hoped for, that they may serve to regulate our actions. For if for example, we had any business at a place whither we might go two several ways, one whereof use[d] to be much safer than the other, although the decree of Providence may be such, that if we go that way which is conceived fastest, we shall not escape robbing. And on the contrary, we might have gone the other way without any danger, yet we ought not therefore to be indifferent which we take, nor rest upon the immutable fatality of this decree. But reason wills us to choose the way which used to be safest, and our desire herein ought to be fulfilled, whatsoever evil befall us by following it. Because this evil (or mischief) having been, as to us, inevitable we have no occasion to wish to be exempted from it but only do the best our understanding can comprehend, as, I suppose, we have done. And it is certain that when a man exercises himself so to distinguish betwixt fatality and fortune he easily habituates himself so to regulate his desires, that seeing the fulfilling of them depends only on ourselves, they may always give us an absolute satisfaction.


7:5 For when we were in the flesh, 9  the sinful desires, 10  aroused by the law, were active in the members of our body 11  to bear fruit for death. 7:6 But now we have been released from the law, because we have died 12  to what controlled us, so that we may serve in the new life of the Spirit and not under the old written code. 


1:3 I can pray this because his divine power 12  has bestowed on us everything necessary 13  for life and godliness through the rich knowledge 14  of the one who called 15  us by 16  his own glory and excellence. 1:4 Through these things 17  he has bestowed on us his precious and most magnificent promises, so that by means of what was promised 18  you may become partakers of the divine nature, 19  after escaping 20  the worldly corruption that is produced by evil desire. 21  1:5 For this very reason, 22  make every effort 23  to add to your faith excellence, 24  to excellence, knowledge; 1:6 to knowledge, self-control; to self-control, perseverance; 25  to perseverance, godliness; 1:7 to godliness, brotherly affection; to brotherly affection, unselfish 26  love. 27  1:8 For if 28  these things are really yours 29  and are continually increasing, 30  they will keep you from becoming 31  ineffective and unproductive in your pursuit of 32  knowing our Lord Jesus Christ more intimately.


7:24 “Everyone 27  who hears these words of mine and does them is like 28  a wise man 29  who built his house on rock. 7:25 The rain fell, the flood 30  came, and the winds beat against that house, but it did not collapse because it had been founded on rock. 7:26 Everyone who hears these words of mine and does not do them is like a foolish man who built his house on sand. 7:27 The rain fell, the flood came, and the winds beat against that house, and it collapsed; it was utterly destroyed!”

2 Corinthians

1:12 For our reason for confidence 23  is this: the testimony of our conscience, that with pure motives 24  and sincerity which are from God 25  – not by human wisdom 26  but by the grace of God – we conducted ourselves in the world, and all the more 27  toward you. 


28:16 Therefore, this is what the sovereign master, the Lord, says:

“Look, I am laying 34  a stone in Zion,

an approved 35  stone,

set in place as a precious cornerstone for the foundation. 36 

The one who maintains his faith will not panic. 37 

28:17 I will make justice the measuring line,

fairness the plumb line;

hail will sweep away the unreliable refuge, 38 

the floodwaters will overwhelm the hiding place.


5:24 Now those who belong to Christ 45  have crucified the flesh 46  with its passions 47  and desires. 5:25 If we live by the Spirit, let us also behave in accordance with 48  the Spirit. 5:26 Let us not become conceited, 49  provoking 50  one another, being jealous 51  of one another.


1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of people 39  who suppress the truth by their 40  unrighteousness, 41  1:19 because what can be known about God is plain to them, 42  because God has made it plain to them. 1:20 For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes – his eternal power and divine nature – have been clearly seen, because they are understood through what has been made. So people 43  are without excuse. 1:21 For although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give him thanks, but they became futile in their thoughts and their senseless hearts 44  were darkened. 1:22 Although they claimed 45  to be wise, they became fools 1:23 and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for an image resembling mortal human beings 46  or birds or four-footed animals 47  or reptiles.

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The 149th Article

On estimation and contempt.
Now the six original passions are explained which are as the kinds (or genera) whereof all the rest are but sorts (or species). I will here succinctly observe what there is peculiar in every one of the rest, and I will keep still the same order wherein I have formally marshaled them. The two first are estimation and contempt. For, though they commonly signify only the opinions a man has, without any passion of the value of anything, yet because from these opinions do often spring passions which want peculiar names, me thinks these may be attributed to them. And estimation, as it is a passion, is an inclination of the soul to represent unto herself the value of the thing esteemed, which inclination is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, so conveyed into the brain that they there fortify the impressions belonging to that purpose.
As, on the contrary, the passion of contempt is an inclination of the soul to consider the meanness or smallness of what it condemns, caused by the motion of the spirits, which fortify the idea of this smallness.

The 151st Article

That a man may esteem, or condemn himself.
Now, these two passions may generally relate to all sorts of objects, but they are especially remarkable when we refer them to ourselves, that is, when it is our own merit that we either esteem or
condemn, and the motion of the spirits which cause them is then so manifest that it even changes the countenance, gesture, gate and generally all the notions of those who conceive a better or worse opinion of themselves than ordinary.

The 152nd Article

For what cause a man may esteem himself.
And because one of the chief parts of wisdom is to know in what manner & for what cause everyone ought to esteem or
condemn himself, I will here endeavor to give my opinion thereof. I observe but one thing in us which may give us just cause to esteem ourselves, to wit, the use of our free disposition and our empire over our wills. For only the actions depending on this free disposition are those for which we may justly be praised or blamed. And it makes us in some manner like unto God, by making us masters of ourselves, provided we do not lose the privileges it gives us by our unworthiness.


6:16 There are six things that the Lord hates,

even 31  seven 32  things that are an abomination to him: 33 

6:17 haughty eyes, 34  a lying tongue, 35 

and hands that shed innocent blood, 36 

6:18 a heart that devises wicked plans, 37 

feet that are swift to run 38  to evil,

6:19 a false witness who pours out lies, 39 

and a person who spreads discord 40  among family members.


22:17 Incline your ear 45  and listen to the words of the wise,

and apply your heart to my instruction. 46 

22:18 For it is pleasing if 47  you keep these sayings 48  within you,

and 49  they are ready on your lips. 50 

22:19 So that 51  your confidence may be in the Lord,

I am making them known to you today 52  – even you.

22:20 Have I not written thirty sayings 53  for you,

sayings 54  of counsel and knowledge,

22:21 to show you true and reliable words, 55 

so that you may give accurate answers 56  to those who sent you?

22:22 Do not exploit 57  a poor person because he is poor

and do not crush the needy in court, 58 

22:23 for the Lord will plead their case 59 

and will rob those who are robbing 60  them.

22:24 Do not make friends with an angry person, 61 

and do not associate with a wrathful person,

22:25 lest you learn 62  his ways

and entangle yourself in a snare. 63 

22:26 Do not be one who strikes hands in pledge

or who puts up security for debts.

22:27 If you do not have enough to pay,

your bed 64  will be taken 65  right out from under you! 66 

22:28 Do not move an ancient boundary stone 67 

which was put in place by your ancestors. 68 

22:29 Do you see a person skilled 69  in his work?

He will take his position before kings;

he will not take his position 70  before obscure people. 71 

23:1 When you sit down to eat with a ruler,

consider carefully 1  what 2  is before you,

23:2 and put a knife to your throat 3 

if you possess a large appetite. 4 

23:3 Do not crave that ruler’s 5  delicacies,

for 6  that food is deceptive. 7 

23:4 Do not wear yourself out to become rich;

be wise enough to restrain yourself. 8 

23:5 When you gaze upon riches, 9  they are gone,

for they surely make wings for themselves,

and fly off into the sky like an eagle! 10 

23:6 Do not eat the food of a stingy person, 11 

do not crave his delicacies;

23:7 for he is 12  like someone calculating the cost 13  in his mind. 14 

“Eat and drink,” he says to you,

but his heart is not with you;

23:8 you will vomit up 15  the little bit you have eaten,

and will have wasted your pleasant words. 16 

23:9 Do not speak in the ears of a fool, 17 

for he will despise the wisdom of your words. 18 

23:10 Do not move an ancient boundary stone,

or take over 19  the fields of the fatherless,

23:11 for their Protector 20  is strong;

he will plead their case against you. 21 

23:12 Apply 22  your heart to instruction

and your ears to the words of knowledge.

23:13 Do not withhold discipline from a child;

even if you strike him with the rod, he will not die.

23:14 If you strike 23  him with the rod,

you will deliver him 24  from death. 25 

23:15 My child, 26  if your heart is wise,

then my heart also will be glad;

23:16 my soul 27  will rejoice

when your lips speak what is right. 28 

23:17 Do not let your heart envy 29  sinners,

but rather be zealous in fearing the Lord 30  all the time.

23:18 For surely there is a future, 31 

and your hope will not be cut off. 32 

23:19 Listen, my child, 33  and be wise,

and guide your heart on the right way.

23:20 Do not spend time 34  among drunkards, 35 

among those who eat too much 36  meat,

23:21 because drunkards and gluttons become impoverished,

and drowsiness 37  clothes them with rags. 38 

23:22 Listen to your father who begot you,

and do not despise your mother when she is old.

23:23 Acquire 39  truth and do not sell it –

wisdom, and discipline, and understanding.

23:24 The father of a righteous person will rejoice greatly; 40 

whoever fathers a wise child 41  will have joy in him.

23:25 May your father and your mother have joy;

may she who bore you rejoice. 42 

23:26 Give me your heart, my son, 43 

and let your eyes observe my ways;

23:27 for a prostitute is like 44  a deep pit;

a harlot 45  is like 46  a narrow well. 47 

23:28 Indeed, she lies in wait like a robber, 48 

and increases the unfaithful 49  among men. 50 

23:29 Who has woe? 51  Who has sorrow?

Who has contentions? Who has complaints?

Who has wounds without cause? Who has dullness 52  of the eyes?

23:30 Those who linger over wine,

those who go looking for mixed wine. 53 

23:31 Do not look on the wine when it is red,

when it sparkles 54  in the cup,

when it goes down smoothly. 55 

23:32 Afterward 56  it bites like a snake,

and stings like a viper.

23:33 Your eyes will see strange things, 57 

and your mind will speak perverse things.

23:34 And you will be like one who lies down in the midst 58  of the sea,

and like one who lies down on the top of the rigging. 59 

23:35 You will say, 60  “They have struck me, but I am not harmed!

They beat me, but I did not know it! 61 

When will I awake? I will look for another drink.” 62 

24:1 Do not envy evil people, 1 

do not desire 2  to be with them;

24:2 for their hearts contemplate violence,

and their lips speak harm. 3 

24:14 Likewise, know 22  that wisdom is sweet 23  to your soul;

if you find it, 24  you will have a future, 25 

and your hope will not be cut off.

24:15 Do not lie in wait like the wicked 26  against the place where the righteous live;

do not assault 27  his home.

24:16 Although 28  a righteous person may fall seven times, he gets up again,

but the wicked will be brought down 29  by calamity.

24:17 Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, 30 

and when he stumbles do not let your heart rejoice,

24:18 lest the Lord see it, and be displeased, 31 

and turn his wrath away from him. 32 

24:19 Do not fret because of evil people

or be envious of wicked people,

24:20 for the evil person has no future, 33 

and the lamp of the wicked will be extinguished. 34 

24:21 Fear the Lord, my child, 35  as well as the king,

and do not associate 36  with rebels, 37 

24:22 for suddenly their destruction will overtake them, 38 

and who knows the ruinous judgment both the Lord and the king can bring?

JOB 28

28:20 “But wisdom – where does it come from? 34 

Where is the place of understanding?

28:21 For 35  it has been hidden

from the eyes of every living creature,

and from the birds of the sky it has been concealed.

28:22 Destruction 36  and Death say,

‘With our ears we have heard a rumor about where it can be found.’ 37 

28:23 God understands the way to it,

and he alone knows its place.

28:24 For he looks to the ends of the earth

and observes everything under the heavens.

28:25 When he made 38  the force of the wind

and measured 39  the waters with a gauge.

28:26 When he imposed a limit 40  for the rain,

and a path for the thunderstorm, 41 

28:27 then he looked at wisdom 42  and assessed its value; 43 

he established 44  it and examined it closely. 45 

28:28 And he said to mankind,

‘The fear of the Lord 46  – that is wisdom,

and to turn away from evil is understanding.’” 47 

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The 153rd Article

Wherein generosity consists.
So, I believe true generosity, which causes a man to set himself at the highest rate he justly may, consists only partly in knowing there is nothing which truly he can call his own, unless this free disposition of his wills, nor wherefore he ought to be praised or blamed, unless for using that well or ill; and partly in feeling a constant, and firm resolution in himself to use it well, that is, his will shall never be wanting to undertake and execute such things as he shall judge to be best, which is to follow virtue absolutely.

The 154th Article

That it restrains a man from condemning others.
Those who have this knowledge and
resentment of themselves are easily persuaded that every other man has such of himself too, because there is nothing in it that depends of anything else. Wherefore they never condemn anybody. And though they oft-times see other men commit errors that make their weakness appear, yet they are evermore inclined to excuse than blame them, and to believe that they do it rather for want of knowledge than good will. And as they do not think themselves much inferior to those who have greater estates, honors, nor yet more wit, knowledge, beauty, or generally that surpass them in any other perfections, so they do not esteem themselves much above those whom they surpass because all these things seem very little considerable to them in comparison of their good will for which only they esteem themselves and which they suppose, is, or at least may be, in every other man.

The 155th Article

Wherein virtuous humility consists.
So the most generous use to be most humble, and virtuous humility consists only in this that the reflection we make on
the infirmity of our own nature, and the faults we may have formerly committed, or those we are like[ly] to commit which are no whit less than those committed by others, is the reason why we do not prefer ourselves before anybody but think that others, who have their free disposition as well as we, may use it as well.


2:6 Now we do speak wisdom among the mature, but not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are perishing.

2:7 Instead we speak the wisdom of God, hidden in a mystery, that God determined before the ages for our glory.

2:8 None of the rulers of this age understood it. If they had known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

2:9 But just as it is written, “Things that no eye has seen, or ear heard, or mind imagined, are the things God has prepared for those who love him.”

2:10 God has revealed these to us by the Spirit. For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.

2:11 For who among men knows the things of a man except the man’s spirit within him? So too, no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God.

2:12 Now we have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, so that we may know the things that are freely given to us by God.

2:13 And we speak about these things, not with words taught us by human wisdom, but with those taught by the Spirit, explaining spiritual things to spiritual people.

2:14 The unbeliever does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him. And he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned.

2:15 The one who is spiritual discerns all things, yet he himself is understood by no one.


63:7 I will tell of the faithful acts of the Lord,

of the Lord’s praiseworthy deeds.

I will tell about all the Lord did for us,

the many good things he did for the family of Israel, 16 

because of his compassion and great faithfulness.

63:8 He said, “Certainly they will be my people,

children who are not disloyal.” 

He became their deliverer.

63:9 Through all that they suffered, he suffered too. 

The messenger sent from his very presence delivered them.

In his love and mercy he protected them;

he lifted them up and carried them throughout ancient times. 

63:10 But they rebelled and offended his holy Spirit,  

so he turned into an enemy

and fought against them.

63:11 His people remembered the ancient times. 

Where is the one who brought them up out of the sea,

along with the shepherd of his flock?

Where is the one who placed his holy Spirit among them,  

63:12 the one who made his majestic power available to Moses,

who divided the water before them,

gaining for himself a lasting reputation, 

63:13 who led them through the deep water?

Like a horse running on flat land they did not stumble.

63:14 Like an animal that goes down into a valley to graze,

so the Spirit of the Lord granted them rest.

In this way you guided your people,

gaining for yourself an honored reputation.

63:15 Look down from heaven and take notice,

from your holy, majestic palace!

Where are your zeal and power?

Do not hold back your tender compassion!

63:16 For you are our father,

though Abraham does not know us

and Israel does not recognize us.

You, Lord, are our father;

you have been called our protector from ancient times. 

63:17 Why, Lord, do you make us stray from your ways,  

and make our minds stubborn so that we do not obey you?  

Return for the sake of your servants,

the tribes of your inheritance!

63:18 For a short time your special nation possessed a land, 

but then our adversaries knocked down your holy sanctuary.

63:19 We existed from ancient times,  

but you did not rule over them,

they were not your subjects. 

64:1 1  If only you would tear apart the sky and come down!

The mountains would tremble before you!

64:2 As when fire ignites dry wood,

or fire makes water boil,

let your adversaries know who you are, 

and may the nations shake at your presence!

64:3 When you performed awesome deeds that took us by surprise,  

you came down, and the mountains trembled before you.

64:4 Since ancient times no one has heard or perceived,  

no eye has seen any God besides you,

who intervenes for those who wait for him.

64:5 You assist those who delight in doing what is right,

who observe your commandments.

Look, you were angry because we violated them continually.

How then can we be saved?

64:6 We are all like one who is unclean,

all our so-called righteous acts are like a menstrual rag in your sight. 

We all wither like a leaf;

our sins carry us away like the wind.

64:7 No one invokes your name,

or makes an effort to take hold of you.

For you have rejected us

and handed us over to our own sins. 

64:8 Yet, Lord, you are our father.

We are the clay, and you are our potter;

we are all the product of your labor.

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The 156th Article

What the properties of generosity are and how it serves for a remedy against all unruliness of the passions.
They who thus are generous are naturally addicted to do great things, and yet to undertake nothing they are not capable of. And because they esteem nothing greater than to do good to other men, and to condemn
their own interest on such an occasion, they are exquisitely courteous, affable, and officious to everyone. Withal, they are absolutely masters of their passions, especially of their desires, jealousy and envy, because there is nothing, the acquisition whereof depends not on them, whose worth they suppose can countervail a hearty desire of them, and of hatred against men, because they esteem them all; and of fear, because the confidence of their own virtue secures them; and lastly of wrath, because little valuing all things without themselves they never give their enemies so much advantage as to acknowledge that they are angry with them.

The 157th Article

Of pride.
All such as have a good
conceit of themselves for anything else whatsoever, have not a real generosity but only pride, which is always very vicious, though it be so much the more as the cause for which a man esteems himself, is more unjust. And the most unjust of all, is, when he is proud for no reason, that is, though no man can see (for all this) any desert in him for which he should be prized, but only because worth is trampled on, and he imagines renown is nothing but mere usurpation, he believes that they who attribute most to themselves have most. This vice is so unreasonable and absurd that I should scarce believe there were any such men who gave themselves up thereunto, if nobody had ever been praised unjustly. But flattery is so common everywhere that there is no man so deficient, but he oft sees himself esteemed for things which merit not any praise, yea, that even deserve blame, which gives occasion to the more ignorant and stupid to fall into this sort of pride.

The 158th Article
That the effects thereof are contrary to those of generosity.
whatsoever be the cause for which a man esteems himself, if it be ought else but the will he perceives in himself always to use well his free disposition, from whence I said generosity came,
it ever produces a pride exceeding blame-worthy, and so different from this true generosity, that the effects whereof are absolutely contrary. For all other goods, as wit, beauty, riches, honors, &c. using to be the more esteemed, for being found in fewer persons, and being for the most part of such a nature, that they cannot be communicated to many, therefore proud men endeavor to abase all other men, and being slaves to their desire, their souls are incessantly agitated with hatred, envy, jealousy, or wrath.


13:16 do not neglect to do good and to share what you have, for God is pleased with such sacrifices.


8:1 There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. 8:2 For the law of the life-giving Spirit in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and death. 8:3 For God achieved what the law could not do because it was weakened through the flesh. By sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and concerning sin, He condemned sin in the flesh, 8:4 so that the righteous requirement of the law may be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit.

8:5 For those who live according to the flesh have their outlook shaped by the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit have their outlook shaped by the things of the Spirit. 8:6 For the outlook of the flesh is death, but the outlook of the Spirit is life and peace, 8:7 because the outlook of the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to the law of God, nor is it able to do so. 8:8 Those who are in the flesh cannot please God. 8:9 You, however, are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God lives in you. Now if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, this person does not belong to him. 8:10 But if Christ is in you, your body is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is your life because of righteousness. 8:11 Moreover if the Spirit of the one who raised Jesus from the dead lives in you, the One who raised Christ from the dead will also make your mortal bodies alive through His Spirit who lives in you.

8:12 So then, brothers and sisters, we are under obligation, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh 8:13 (for if you live according to the flesh, you will die),  but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body you will live. 8:14 For all who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God. 8:15 For you did not receive the spirit of slavery leading again to fear, but you received the Spirit of adoption, by whom we cry, “Abba, Father.” 8:16 The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are God’s children. 8:17 And if children, then heirs (namely, heirs of God and also fellow heirs with Christ)  – if indeed we suffer with him so we may also be glorified with him.

8:18 For I consider that our present sufferings cannot even be compared 23  to the glory that will be revealed to us. 8:19 For the creation eagerly waits for the revelation of the sons of God. 8:20 For the creation was subjected to futility – not willingly but because of God 24  who subjected it – in hope 8:21 that the creation itself will also be set free from the bondage of decay into the glorious freedom of God’s children. 8:22 For we know that the whole creation groans and suffers together until now. 8:23 Not only this, but we ourselves also, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we eagerly await our adoption, the redemption of our bodies. 8:24 For in hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope, because who hopes for what he sees? 8:25 But if we hope for what we do not see, we eagerly wait for it with endurance. 

8:26 In the same way, the Spirit helps us in our weakness, for we do not know how we should pray, 29  but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings. 8:27 And he who searches our hearts knows the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes on behalf of the saints according to God’s will. 8:28 And we know that all things work together for good for those who love God, who are called according to his purpose, 8:29 because those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that his Son would be the firstborn among many brothers and sisters. 8:30 And those he predestined, he also called; and those he called, he also justified; and those he justified, he also glorified.

8:31 What then shall we say about these things? If God is for us, who can be against us? 8:32 Indeed, he who 35  did not spare his own Son, but gave him up for us all – how will he not also, along with him, freely give us all things? 8:33 Who will bring any charge against God’s elect? 36  It is God who justifies. 8:34 Who is the one who will condemn? Christ is the one who died (and more than that, he was raised), who is at the right hand of God, and who also is interceding for us. 8:35 Who will separate us from the love of Christ? Will trouble, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or danger, or sword? 38  8:36 As it is written, “For your sake we encounter death all day long; we were considered as sheep to be slaughtered.” 39  8:37 No, in all these things we have complete victory through him who loved us! 8:38 For I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor heavenly rulers, nor things that are present, nor things to come, nor powers, 8:39 nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in creation will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.


7:1 Now 1  the Pharisees 2  and some of the experts in the law 3  who came from Jerusalem 4  gathered around him. 7:2 And they saw that some of Jesus’ disciples ate their bread with unclean hands, that is, unwashed. 7:3 (For the Pharisees and all the Jews do not eat unless they perform a ritual washing, 5  holding fast to the tradition of the elders. 7:4 And when they come from the marketplace, they do not eat unless they wash. They hold fast to many other traditions: the washing of cups, pots, kettles, and dining couches. 6 ) 7  7:5 The Pharisees and the experts in the law asked him, “Why do your disciples not live according to the tradition of the elders, but eat 8  with unwashed hands?” 7:6 He said to them, “Isaiah prophesied correctly about you hypocrites, as it is written:

‘This people honors me with their lips,

but their heart 9  is far from me.

7:7 They worship me in vain,

teaching as doctrine the commandments of men.’ 10 

7:8 Having no regard 11  for the command of God, you hold fast to human tradition.” 12  7:9 He also said to them, “You neatly reject the commandment of God in order to set up 13  your tradition. 7:10 For Moses said, ‘Honor your father and your mother,’ 14  and, ‘Whoever insults his father or mother must be put to death.’ 15  7:11 But you say that if anyone tells his father or mother, ‘Whatever help you would have received from me is corban’ 16  (that is, a gift for God), 7:12 then you no longer permit him to do anything for his father or mother. 7:13 Thus you nullify 17  the word of God by your tradition that you have handed down. And you do many things like this.”

7:14 Then 18  he called the crowd again and said to them, “Listen to me, everyone, and understand. 7:15 There is nothing outside of a person that can defile him by going into him. Rather, it is what comes out of a person that defiles him.”


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