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Investigation On Iraq Prewar Intelligence

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Here are more timeline excerpts on PNAC's position on the justification for the war with Iraq.


On October 31, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM.64 The same day President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which declared that “t should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.” In signing the act, Clinton stated that the U.S. “looks forward to a democratically supported regime that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life.”


On December 16, 1998, President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a four-day missile and bombing attack on Iraq. “I acted quickly because, as my military advisors stressed, the longer we waited, the more time Saddam would have to disburse his forces and protect his arsenal,” Clinton explained in his December 19 radio address to the nation. “Our mission is clear: to degrade Saddam’s capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction.”


On December 19, 1998 Saddam Hussein declared that inspectors would never be allowed back in Iraq. Inspectors would not return to Iraq for five years.


On January 25, 1999, UNSCOM expressed “no confidence” that Iraq’s biological warfare program had been dismantled. UNMOVIC’s March 6, 2003 report stated that there appears to be no “choke points” to prevent Iraq from producing anthrax at the same level it did before 1991, and large-scale Iraqi production of botulinum toxin “could be rapidly commenced.” The March 6 report also declared that

Iraq’s nearly 8500 liters of unaccounted for anthrax could still be viable 15 years after production. Moreover, Iraq may have been more successful drying anthrax into inhalation form than had been declared. Dried anthrax could be stored “indefinitely.” Finally, Iraq had not accounted for growth media that could produce up to 16,000 more liters of anthrax.


Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300 km (probably No Dong) and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300 km. The document quotes the North

Koreans as understanding the limitations imposed by the UN, but being prepared “to cooperate with Iraq on the items it specified....”


The CIA’s January-June 2000 WMD report stated:

We believe that Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.


The CIA’s July-December 2000 WMD report stated:

We believe that Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear

weapons program, our concerns were increased last September when Saddam publicly exhorted his “Nuclear Mujahidin” to “defeat the enemy.”


Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi

Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to nuclear weapons development.” Moreover, “According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military Industrial Commission

(MIC).” Furthermore, “Several scientists—at the direction of senior Iraqi government officials—preserved documents and equipment from their pre-1991 nuclear weaponrelated research and did not reveal this to the UN/IAEA.”


Furthermore, the CIA report for July-December 2001 cited specific evidence of a resurgent missile program. Two new solid-propellant ‘mixing’ buildings at the al-Mamoun plant...appear especially suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers of the type acquired for the Badr-2000 program. In fact, we can find no logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings other than an Iraqi intention to develop longer range, prohibited missiles (that is, to mix solid propellant exclusively geared for such missiles). In addition, Iraq has begun reconstructing the ‘cast and cure’ building at al-Mamoun, which contains large and deep casting pits that were specifically designed to produce now-proscribed missile motors.


On November 8, 2002, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441 chronicling Iraq’s

history of non-compliance with U.N. resolutions.


Finally, one connection of particular note was senior al Qaeda terrorist planner Abu Musab Zarqawi and Iraqi intelligence. According to the Senate intelligence committee report, a captured senior al Qaeda trainer and recruiter “indicated he had heard” that Zarqawi “and others had good relationships with Iraqi intelligence.” It is not surprising then that after the fighting in Afghanistan, Zarqawi found safe haven in Baghdad over the summer of 2002, and, according to General Tommy Franks, was

subsequently “given safe passage into northern Iraq by Iraqi security forces.” According to the Senate report, there was little doubt that Iraqi officials knew Zarqawi was in Baghdad.


Finally, the administration never argued that Saddam Hussein was behind 9-11. Senior administration officials consistently stated that there was no specific evidence to connect Saddam Hussein to the attacks. As NSC Advisor Condoleeza Rice remarked one year after the attacks in a “NewsHour” interview, “No one is trying to make an argument at this point that Saddam Hussein somehow had operational control of what happened on September 11.” Similarly, only two moths before the Iraq war, President Bush, in response to a reporter’s question as to whether Iraq was involved with the attacks, stated simply: “I cannot make that claim.”

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Luke you might want to read this. Former Defense Policy Board chairman and prominent neoconservative Richard Perle, one of the principle advocates of invading Iraq, blasts the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq in a new interview with Vanity Fair. Vanity Fair published excerpts of Perle's remarks in a press release on Friday. "[bush] did not make decisions, in part because the machinery of government that he nominally ran was actually running him," said Perle. "Huge mistakes were made," he said, though Perle accepted "no responsibility" for designing the campaign to invade Iraq and the mishandling of the aftermath. Neoconservatives now falsely claim they had "almost no voice in what happened." But now, Perle is calling foul, saying he only agreed to tell the truth if it was published after the election. "Vanity Fair has rushed to publish a few sound bites from a lengthy discussion with David Rose…I had been promised that my remarks would not be published before the election." Another prominent conservative quoted in the article, Eliot Cohen, has a different view. “[T]hinking the government’s conduct of the Iraq war an entirely appropriate subject of political debate, I do not think anyone should have kept mum in an interview of this kind until an election had passed.”



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Guest Silent Activist

On January 7th, 2007, Washington Stakeout asked Brent Scrowcroft, the NSA advisor for first Bush administration, 'where are the weapons of mass destruction?' and why the sanctions against Iraq continued if Saddam did comply with disarmament and had no weapons of mass destruction?


Here's Brent's answers: Video




Sam Husseini: You, of course, were National Security Advisor under the first Bush Administration–


Brent Scowcroft: Yes.


SH: and one of the policies after the Gulf War was to maintain the sanctions regardless of what the Iraqi regime did? Was that a mistake?


BS: No, I don’t think it was a mistake because it accomplished what we were trying to accomplish and that is to make sure that Saddam was not a threat, and as it turned out, he was not a threat. The sanctions kept the army incredibly weak. We wiped it out in three weeks. So, Saddam was not a threat to the region under the sanctions. Did they hurt the Iraqi people? Yes, they did.


SH: And do you think that was worth it?


BS: In the overall results–yes.


SH: What estimates would have as to what the negative results were of the sanctions? How many people died because the sanctions remained in place?


BS: I don’t know how many people died. But nobody had to die, they died because of the way Saddam administered the sanctions. The oil, the Food for Oil Program was quite adequate had he done it right to feed any people hurt by the sanctions.


SH: The U.N. resolution said the sanctions would be removed once he complied with his obligations under the disarmament resolution.


BS: Yeah.


SH: –your policy was to say, even if he does comply–


BS: No, no, no, no, no, no.


SH: That’s what Jim Baker said and that’s what George Bush said in May of two thousand — of 1991.


BS: Well, I don’t recall the details of that.


SH: Regardless of your compliance–


BS: But he never did comply with the sanctions–


SH: He never complied with the disarmament obligation?


BS: No.


SH: So where are the weapons of mass destruction?


BS: No.


SH: Where are the weapons of mass destruction if he didn’t comply?


BS: He didn’t comply in the sense that we didn’t know that there weren’t weapons of mass destruction because he did not open for the inspectors until 2001–two.


SH: Hussein Kamel, are you familiar with the testimony of Hussein Kamel? When were you aware Hussein Kamel–


BS: Yes.


SH: –said that everything was destroyed.


BS: We were not in office at that time.


SH: When did you become aware of it, though?


BS: I don’t know that we became aware of it until after the Second Gulf War. Virtually, everyone thought there were weapons of mass destruction. We did. The Europeans did. Virtually everybody did. Hussein Kamel said they were destroyed and we didn’t believe him.

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Guest Silent Activist

Hussein Kamel, the highest-ranking Iraqi official ever to defect from Saddam Hussein’s inner circle, told CIA and British intelligence officers and U.N. inspectors in the summer of 1995 that after the gulf war, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them.


KAMEL WAS SADDAM Hussein’s son-in-law and had direct knowledge of what he claimed: for 10 years he had run Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. Kamel told his Western interrogators that he hoped his revelations would trigger Saddam’s overthrow. But after six months in exile in Jordan, Kamel realized the United States would not support his dream of becoming Iraq’s ruler after Saddam’s demise. He chose to return to Iraq—where he was promptly killed.


In the build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Bush administration figures--including George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell--repeatedly cited Kamel's testimony as evidence that Iraq had produced unconventional weapons, without mentioning that, according to Kamel, all such weapons had been destroyed.



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Levin Releases Newly Declassified Pentagon Inspector General Report on Intelligence Assessment Activities of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith


Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, released the newly declassified report [PDF] of the Department of Defense Inspector General on its Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The report was declassified at Levin's request.


In releasing the report, Levin said: "It is important for the public to see why the Pentagon's Inspector General concluded that Secretary Feith's office developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship, which included conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, and why the Inspector General concluded that these actions were inappropriate. Until today, those details were classified and outside the public's view.


The Feith office alternative intelligence assessments concluded that Iraq and al Qaeda were cooperating and had a mature, symbiotic relationship, a view that was not supported by the available intelligence, and was contrary to the consensus view of the Intelligence Community. These alternative assessments were used by the Administration to support its public arguments in its case for war. As the DOD IG report confirms, the Intelligence Community never found an operational relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda; the report specifically states that, the CIA and DIA disavowed any mature, symbiotic’ relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida."


Here are some excerpts of this report:


Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), Office of International Security Affairs (ISA). The Office of International Security Affairs formulates and coordinates international security strategy and policy for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) on issues of Department of Defense (DoD) interest that relate to foreign regions and nations, their governments, and the defense establishments. The ASD/ISA was instrumental early in 2002 in responding to the inquiries of the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding links between Iraq and al-Qaida.


The Policy Support Office assisted the OUSDP in developing national security and defense policy by providing infrastructure support, personnel, and information technology and security until June 2002, when it transferred to the newly created Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Policy Support Office requested details from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) because of "the voluminous amounts of intelligence the office was receiving but was unable to assess." From January 2002 through November 2003 DIA detailed an intelligence specialist to the Policy Support Office within the OUSDP.


According to an Action Memo dated November 26, 2001, for the Deputy Secretary of Defense from the ASD (ISA), the purpose was to "Obtain approval of creation of a Team B, called the Policy Counter Terror Evaluation Group (PCTEG). Through independent analysis and evaluation, the PCTEG would determine what is known about al-Qaid's worldwide terror network, its suppliers, and relationship to states and other international terrorist organizations..."


As envisioned the PCTEG would function under the joint chairmanship of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Affairs. The ASD/ISA, with permission from the USDP, tasked the PCTEG with studying al-Qaida's worldwide organization, including its suppliers, its relations with States and with other terrorist organizations (and their suppliers), identifying "chokepoints" of cooperation, coordination, and vulnerabilities, and recommending strategies to render the terrorist networks ineffective. The PCTEG, however, never included more than two analysts so the Chairmanship issue never attained a level of operational formality. In letters to Senator Warner and Representative Harman on Jun 21, 2003, Mr. Feith, then USDP, describe the purpose of the PCTEG as to "help me develop proposals for Defense Department strategies for the war on terrorism, which is a policy excercise not an intelligence activity."


Following a USDP request to the Director, DIA for support from the Intelligence Community, DIA detailed two junior Naval Reservist Intelligence Analysts to OUSDP in February 2002 to replace the two existing OUSDP members. The PCTEG produced a briefing in support of policy development in June 2002, "Understanding the Strategic Threat of Terror Networks and their Sponsors."


During the summer of 2002, following the deactivation of one of the two Naval Reservists, the one remaining detailed intelligence analyst reviewed intelligence data to determine whether there were links between Iraq and al-Qaida. At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, a member of the OUSDP Policy Support Office and the remaining PCTEG detailee collaborated to create a briefing, marked "Draft," "Assessing the Relationship Between Iraq and al-Qaida," which they briefed to the Secretary of Defense on August 8, 2002. On August 15, 2002, they provided a simular briefing, marked "Draft." with the same title to Mr. George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and VADM Lowell "Jake" Jacoby, then Director, DIA. On September 16, 2002 the OUSDP provided a similar version of the briefing, marked "Draft," to Mr. Stephen Hadley, then Deputy National Security Advisor, as requested, and Mr. I Lewis Libby, thn Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice President. The PCTEG as an organization ceased to exist shorly thereafter.


The OUSDP created the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in October 2002 by renaming and expanding the OUSDP Near East and South Asia office's Northern Gulf Directorate to concentrate on plicies for Iran, Iraq, and the Global War on Terror. In his June 21, 2003 letters to Senator Warner and Representative Harman, Mr. Feith described the OSP as a plicy planning group and a consumer, rather than a producer of intelligence. In a February 3, 2004, letter to Senator Levin, Mr. Feith described the purpose of the OSP as having been, "...created to serve as the regional office for Northern (Persian) Gulf affairs and as the lead office within the Policy organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for developing U.S. strategy and plicy for the global war on terrorism." The OSP was renamed as the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs, remaining in Near East/South Asia as before, and its personnel continued to perform their policy functions for that region.


The review objective was to determine whether personnel assigned to the OSP, the PCTEG, and OUDP conducted unauthorized, unlawful, or inappropriate intelligence activities from September 2001 through June 2003. If so, the OIG was to provide recommendations for remedial action.


The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligense Community and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products. This condidtion occurred because the OUSDP expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative intelligence. As a result, the OUSDP did not provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence" to senior decision makers.


The USDP requested and received detailes from DIA who had asscess to intelligence databases. The DIA detailees were assigned to the Policy Support Office and PCTEG in 2002. In addition, other DIA Defense Intelligence Officers were assigned to support OUSDP. The detailees and the Defense Intelligence Officers had access to intelligence databases such as the DIA Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. Interviews that DIA detailees and DIA Defense Intelligence Officers pulled both raw intelligence and finished intelligence production from Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System and provided it to OUSDP personnel. The DIA Defense INtelligence Officers also provided daily intelligence read packets until their dissolution in the spring of 2003.


OUSDP personnel and the DIA detailees used the same intelligence assessments. In a July 25, 2002 memo, "Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the Case," one OUSDP detailee explained the basis for their alterative intelligence assessment, stating, "the following information clearly makes the case for an Intelligence Finding (emphasis added) - that Iraq has been complicit in supporting al-Qaida terrorist activities." Further, in translating that alternative intelligence assessment into a briefing, "Assessing the Relationship Between Iraq and al-Qaida," the OUSDP performed Intelligence Activity and, more specifically, Intelligence Production.


Some of the conclusions in the briefing, "Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida," produced by a collaborative team composed of two OUSD detailees and a former OUSDP member who was working in the capacity of Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, were not supported by the Intelligence Community. In fact, the briefing, assessed that, "Intelligence indicates cooperation [al-Qaida] in all categories; mature, symbiotic relationship," and as having a higher degreee of cooperation than those conclusions supported by the Intelligence Community. The briefing detailed a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida." Each version included a slide, "What Would Each Side Want From a Relationship?" According to the briefing, one of Iraq's objectives was a desire for an "Operational surrogate to continue war;" the slide listed al-Qaida as that surrogate. Further, OUSDP members briefed an alleged meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and al-Ani, an Iraqi Intelligence Service Officer on a slide, "Known Contacts" in all three versions of this brief. The Intelligence Community disagreed with the briefing's assessment that the alleged meeting constituted a "known contact."


The Intelligence Community was united in its assessment that the intelligence on the alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and al-Ani was at least contradictory, but by no means a "known contact." The SSCI Phase I Report noted that, "Although the CIA has not ruled out the meeting, its analysis characterized the meeting as highly unlikely."


On June 21, 2002, the CIA published a report, "Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship," which described the reporting on the alleged meeting of Atta with al-Ani as,"...contradictory, and we have not verified Atta's travel through other channels." The report also stated the CIA view on the Iraq-al-Qaida cooperation as, "Overall, the reporting provides no conclusive signs of cooperation (emphasis added) on specific terrorist operations, so discussion of the possible extent of cooperation between Iraq and al-Qa'ida is necessarily speculative."


Likewise, as draft August 20, 2002, CIA Report, "Iraqi Support for Terrorism" characterized the connection between Iraq and al-Qaida as follows: Saddam and Bin Ladin are not natural partners, but have maintained cautious contacts and some shared training. The two groups nevertheless remained suspicious of each other's motives, and to date we cannot document any joint operational activity.


A DIA Senior Intelligence Analyst working in the Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combatting Terrorism (JITFCT) countered point-by-point, each instance of an alleged tie between Iraq and al-Qaida mentioned in July 25, 2002 OUSDP memorandum, "Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the Case." The Intelligence Analyst disagreed with most of the OUSDP intelligence assessments.


Intelligence Analyst noted that the OUSDP memorandum was of "no intelligence value," in other words, the memorandum's assessments contradicted the Intelligence Community assessments on both the Iraq relationship with al-Qaida and, specifically, the veracity of the alleged meeting in Prague. He provided his assessment to the JOint Staff J2 for internal consumption. On August 14, 2002, in response to another internal J2 request, the JITF-CT Intelligence Analyst wrote a more detailed Memorandum, "DUSDPS Assessment on Iraq-al-Qaida Ties JITF-CT Response," specifically stating that far from being a "known contact," the "alleged 8 or 9 April 2001 meeting between Iraqi Intelligence Service officer Ibrahim al-Ani and al-Qaida operative Muhammad Atta is impossible to establish with available information."


On August 8, 2002, OUSDP members presented their briefing, "Assessing the Relationship Between Iraq and al-Qaida" to the Secretary of Defense. The briefing portrayed a "mature, symbiotic" relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida. The Secretary of Defense directed that OUSDP brief the DCI. The OUSDP eventually presented three different versions of this briefing to the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice President.


This briefing presented to DCI omitted the slide, "Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information" because, according to Mr. Feith, "it had a critical tone." The content of the excluded slide accuses the Intelligense Community of applying a standard requiring juridical evidence for reports, underestimating the importance for both Iraq and al-Qaida to keep their relationship hidden, and assuming that the two would not cooperate because of religious differences. Additionally, the details regarding the alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and al-Ani were discussed only on the slide, "Known Contacts," which portrayed the meeting as fact. The Intelligence Community previously disagreed with the assertions in this briefing on the veracity of the alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and al-Ani and the level of cooperation that OUSDP members ascribed to Iraq and al-Qaida in widely available intelligence products producted in the spring and summer of 2002.


The mission and role of the OUSDP expanded, based, in part, in response to inquiries from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. For example, instead of directing a January 22, 2002, memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence or the Director, DIA, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a memorandum to the USDP, requesting "input on the progress in pulling together intelligence links between Iraq and al-Qaida" It appears that the analysis was an on-going effort.


The ASD/ISA responded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 24, 2002. Part of the response stated, "So far we have discovered few direct links. However, we have uncovered evidence suggesting more robust indirect links." The cited direct links included the information that Muhammad Atta met twice in Praque with Iraqi Intelligence Service Praque staton chief, al-Ani.


Analysts are expected to marshal their facts, build coherent arguements, and defend those arguments while coordinating with other experts across the Intelligence Community. In the vast majority of cases, analytic judgments either stand or fall on the merits of their evidentiary base, intrinsic logic cannot achieve consensus support for their analysis, an alternative judgment is justified.


In 2003, Congress and the Administration asted to strengthen and consolidate the administration of the Defense Department's intelligence capabilities by crreating the statutory position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence that incorporated the intelligence component of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.


The "Intelligence Reform and Terrrorism Prevention Act of 2004" established both the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center. The DNI is now the principal advisor to the President of the United States and the National Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.


November 23, 2005, established the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as Principal Staff Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. It further stated that the Under Secretary shall serve as the Secretary of Defense's primary representative to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as well as provide policy and oversight on the training and career development of personnel in DoD counterterrorism, intelligence, and security components.


The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senor decision-makers.


The assessments produced evolved from policy to intelligence products, were disseminated. The Deputy Secretary of Defense direction made the action authorized; however, we believe the actions were inappropriate because a policy office was producing intelliegence products and was not clearly conveying to senior decision-makers the variance with consensus of the Intellgence Community.





January 24, 2002


FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs


Indirect Links:


Abu Nidhal Organization (ANO) headquartered in Baghdad.


ANO has following known links to al-Qaida: Bin Laden met in January 1998 with the General Secretary of ANO. Agreed to provide financial assistance in return for unspecified assistance to al-Qaida.


Bin-Laden sent his deputy to Lebannon in 1998 to meet with ANO operatives to explore areas of cooperation.


The al-Qaida cell in Lebannon has received weapons and ammunition from ANO


Vehicle Muhammad Atta used to visit Prague registered to ANO agent.


ANO has links with Hizollah, which in turn has significant links to al-Qaida


ANO responds expeditiously and fully to Iraqi government directives (October 2001)


Iraqi government expressed concern (October 2001) to ANO leaders that Baghdad's alliance with ANO would lead the US to hold Iraq accountable for al-Qaida terrorism


Suggests ANO funtions to serve Iraqi objectives and that Iraq is aware of ANO ties to al-Qaida.




The JITF-CT Intelligence Analyst specifically cited that, "the alleged April 8 or 9, 2001, meeting between al-Ani and Muhammad Atta is impossible to establish with available information. Czech officials retracted some of their evidence after determining that Muhammad Atta did not enter the country on March 31, 2001; they had confused him with a Pakistani national with a similar name.


The OSD Policy briefing to the Deputy National Security Advisor and Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice President did draw conclusions that were not fully supported by available intelligence. The briefing contained two slides, "What Would Each Side Want From a Relationship?", and "Findings." These two slides claimed "cooperation in all categories," and listed the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida as being "mature and symbiotic" with shared interest and pursuit of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and"some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al-Qaida specifically related to 9/11. These claims were not supported by the available intelligence.


In contrast, the CIA characterized the information about the relationship as contradictory. In a June 2002 assessment of al-Qaida ties to Iraq the CIA stated that the pattern of contacts and cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaida over the years found few substantiated contacts between al-Qaida over the years found few substantiated contacts between al-Qaida operatives and Iraqi regime officials. In the report, "Iraqi Support for Terrorism," the CIA also stated, "As in other areas of the Iraq al-Qaida relationship, unresolved questions and knowledge gaps limit our ability to confidently gauge the existence or extent of cooperation through training and especially through the sharing of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) capabilities.


The CIA described reporting on CBRN as "episodic, sketchy or not corroborated in other channels," which was far from the "shared interest and pursuit of WMD" that OUSPD assessed. As for operational planning, the CIA stated, "we have uncovered no solid indication of Iraqi complicity in or foreknowledge of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks."


Analysts within the Intelligence Community agreed that possible ties could exist between Iraq and al-Qaida for training, but without conclusive reporting, the Intelligence Community believed that most contacts between the two were insignificant. In contrast OUSDP believed that the CIA affirmed the relationship between the two many times, only to discount them. A Senior Intelligence Analyst at DIA stated that the OUSDP papers lacked the background that normally separates a policy paper from an intelligence paper.

Only the OUSDP assessed that Iraq and al-Qaida had "mature, symbiotic relationship, with cooperation in all areas."


A DIA detailee working for the OUSDP prepared a critique of the report, "Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship" which was sent to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.


The Principal Deputy of International Security Affairs sent the DIA detailee a copy of the CIA report, "Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship," requesting opinion of the document. The detailee response, "Comment on CIA's "Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship," contained the sentence, "Therefore, the CIA report should be read for content only - and CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored." The DIA analyst who authored the comment cited a belief that the CIA had intitially published, "strong, convincing information on Iraq and al-Qaida ties," but was very cautious in verifying the information. The comments were eventually sent to Under Secretary Feith, who forwarded them to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.


Key Definitions


Intelligence Activities. The collection, production, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.


Intelligence Production. The validation, correlation, analysis, and intrepretation of information on foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.


The USDP stated, "The work reviewed was not an "OUSDP" activity, assessment, view, position, or initiative, despite the Draft Report's repeated assertions to the contrary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) never approved, adopted, or advocated the draft briefing or any of the work leading to it as an "OUSDP' view or assessment. Each version of the briefing was marked "draft" or "draft working papers" and was never presented as anything other than that.

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Long read, but informative. I overlooked this one on the wire.


You might think this press conversation on April 10 with Dana Perino quite funny.


Q But why? Do you mean Iraqis are going to come and attack us?


MS. PERINO: The terrorists that are seeking a safe haven in Iraq, if we were to leave, would find one, just like they had one in Afghanistan, and they could --


Q How do you know that?


MS. PERINO: -- hurt us and -- well, based on experience from September 11th. That's how we know it.


Q September 11th had nothing to do with Iraq.


Of course she did not answer. Now the question is asked about Iran.


Q The President has talked about weapons of mass destruction, of course, for a number of years. Has the Iranian threat reached the level of the Iraqi threat of a few years ago?


MS. PERINO: I don't know what you're trying to drive at there. I can reiterate for you that we are working diplomatically with our partners and our allies, and making sure that Iran does not achieve what its stated aim is, is to have a -- well, they haven't said that they -- they want a peaceful nuclear program, but we do believe that they are working towards a nuclear weapon and we are not going to allow that to happen.

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Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet has released his memoir, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA.


The book outlines Tenet's version of 9/11, the War on Terrorism, the 2001 War in Afghanistan, the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, rough interrogation and other events.


Tenet spoke about his memoir on 60 Minutes yesterday, outlining the contents of his book including allegations that are contrary to the George W. Bush administration positions.


It's the most despicable think I've ever heard in my life. I'll never believe what happened that day informed the president's view or belief of the legitimacy or timing of this war. The discussions are how you might do this, not whether you should do this.


Tenet faced accusations of hypocrisy from former espionage officials on the book's release date, for not speaking out earlier against the White House's push to invade Iraq.


An error was found in the book where a key conversation with then Pentagon advisor Richard Perle on September 12, 2001, in which Tenet claims Perle told him that "Iraq had to pay for the attack" could not have occurred as Perle was stranded in Paris and didn't return to Washington, D.C. until three days later.


Read the book

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Senator Kerry’s Veterans Day Message


Veterans Day means different things to different people. This Veterans Day, my mind returns again and again to a flight I took home from Baghdad in August -- and an unforgettable reminder of the obligation we have to all who serve the country we love. As we boarded the C-130, I looked into the cargo hold and saw a simple, aluminum coffin with a small American flag draped over it. We were bringing another American soldier home to his family and final resting place.



read sun tzu the chapter on spys to get your answer

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Guest Dissident Voice

In October 30, 2002 Oil and Gas International revealed that the Bush administration wanted a working group of 12 to 20 people to (a) recommend ways to rehabilitate the Iraqi oil industry in order to increase oil exports to partially pay for a possible U.S. military occupation government.


Halliburton, the energy services company previously headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, had prepared a confidential 500-page document on how to handle Iraq's oil industry after an invasion and occupation of Iraq. This Halliburton document was written several months before the invasion of Iraq, and before it got a no-bid contract to implement the plan (and overbill the U.S.).

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n October 30, 2002 Oil and Gas International revealed that the Bush administration wanted a working group of 12 to 20 people to (a) recommend ways to rehabilitate the Iraqi oil industry “in order to increase oil exports to partially pay for a possible U.S. military occupation government.”


Halliburton, the energy services company previously headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, had prepared a confidential 500-page document on how to handle Iraq’s oil industry after an invasion and occupation of Iraq. This Halliburton document was written several months before the invasion of Iraq, and before it got a no-bid contract to implement the plan (and overbill the U.S.).


Please post your source on this.

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Guest Dissident Voice

It was recently reported by Mainstream media that George Bush had rejected a pre-Iraq War offer by Saddam Hussein to leave with a mere $1 billion.




The war has cost U.S. taxpayers $0.5 trillion so far




Authoritative estimates of violent and non-violent Iraqi excess deaths now show that the post-invasion excess deaths in Occupied Iraq total 2.0 million.


4,108 US Coalition deaths and 27,753 US soldiers wounded so far.



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Guest Dissident Voice
Please post your source on this.




The link is now broken


But, you can search these links






On October 30, White House mouthpiece Ari Fleischer declared that "the White House has no interest in controlling Iraq's oil reserves if the Bush administration decides to take military action to remove Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein."


http://asia.reuters.com/news_article.jhtml ?type=topnews&StoryID=1659024


(Reuters 10/30/02) "That's not the way America works," he said. On the very same day, Oil and Gas International (10/30/02) issued a report directly refuting Fleischer. The report


http://oilandgasinternational.com/departme...02_meeting.html documents the fact that the White House and the US State Department have scheduled meetings with Iraqi opposition leaders to carve out Iraq's oil and gas reserves : "The Bush administration wants to have a working group of 12 to 20 people focused on Iraqi oil and gas to be able to recommend to an interim government ways of restoring the petroleum sector following a military attack in order to increase oil exports to partially pay for a possible US military occupation government

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Guest Illuminati

September 11 offered the opportunity to finally embark upon the ultimate plan devised by Albert Pike, and articulated more recently by Samuel Huntington as a Clash of Civilization, a global war against Islam. As William Engdahl pointed out, “if the Bush administration had been unprepared for the shock of September 11, 2001, they certainly wasted no time in preparing their response, the war on terror.

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Guest human_*

I understand the scenario that you are trying to portray, but it's only a scenario.


And here is the main link to that SCENARIO which you are referring too.






In October 30, 2002 Oil and Gas International revealed that the Bush administration wanted a working group of 12 to 20 people to (a) recommend ways to rehabilitate the Iraqi oil industry in order to increase oil exports to partially pay for a possible U.S. military occupation government.


Halliburton, the energy services company previously headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, had prepared a confidential 500-page document on how to handle Iraq's oil industry after an invasion and occupation of Iraq. This Halliburton document was written several months before the invasion of Iraq, and before it got a no-bid contract to implement the plan (and overbill the U.S.).

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Guest LAW_*
I understand the scenario that you are trying to portray, but it's only a scenario.


And here is the main link to that SCENARIO which you are referring too.





From the article you posted it demonstrates that Bush's primary invasion objective was for U.S. companies to gain privileged access to Iraqi oil. The forecasts (or dreams) of American planners that oil production would jump to 6mbpd by 2010 and easily fund the occupation and reconstruction of the country were now seen for what they were -part of the hype disseminated privately by American neo-cons to sell the idea of invading Iraq to the public. I would like to embelish a little on this scenario.


In September 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III , signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order 39 that privatized nearly 200 Iraqi public-sector companies and opening them up to 100% foreign ownership. A foreign investor shall be entitled to make foreign investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor, unless otherwise provided herein. Foreign investment may take place in all parts of Iraq. A foreign investor may establish a wholly foreign-owned business entity in Iraq. The initial term of any license to use property shall not exceed 40 years, but may be renewed for further such periods. Licenses may be reviewed by the internationally recognized, representative government established by the people of Iraq.




The Bush White House had also realized by then that denationalizing the oil industry would be a blatant violation of the Geneva Conventions, which bar an occupying power from altering the fundamental structure of the occupied territory's economy.


The Iraqi constitution will play a significant role in structuring both production and revenue developments in the oil sector. For this reason, of all the articles in the constitution, those relating to oil have been the most contentious. The key provisions are outlined in Articles 109 and 110.


Article 109: First: The federal government with the producing governorates and regional governments shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields provided that it distributes oil and gas revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country with a set allotment for a set time for the damaged regions that were unjustly deprived by the former regime and the regions that were damaged later on, and in a way that assures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this will be regulated by law. Second: The federal government with the producing regional and governorate governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encourages investment. Amendment:(Antiquities and antiquity sites, traditional constructions, manuscripts and coins are considered part of the national wealth which are the responsibility of the federal authorities. They will be administered in cooperation with the regions and governorates, and this will be regulated by law.)


Article 110: The following competencies shall be shared between the federal authorities and regional authorities: First: To administer customs in coordination with the governments of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. This will be organized by law. Second: To regulate the main sources of electric energy and its distribution. Third: To formulate the environmental policy to ensure the protection of the environment from pollution and to preserve its cleanness in cooperation with the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. Fourth: To formulate the development and general planning policies. Fifth: To formulate the public health policy in cooperation with the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. Sixth: To formulate the public educational and instructional policy in consultation with the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. Seventh: To formulate and organize the main internal water sources policy in a way that guarantees fair distribution. This will be organized by law.


The wording of Article 109 does not exclude foreign ownership of upstream oil industry assets, though most senior oil officials are not in favor of this level of foreign investment. Presumably, the detail of hydrocarbon development policy will be left to national and regional legislatures.




In February 2007, in line with the constitution, the draft hydrocarbon law the Iraqi government presented to Parliament kept oil and gas in the state sector. It also stipulated re-creating a single Iraqi National Oil Co that would be charged with doling out oil income to the provinces on a per capita basis.


The new law would authorise production share agreements (PSAs) which guarantees a profit for foreign oil companies. The industry had been completely nationalized by 1972.


The government in the 1990s, under the presidency of Saddam Hussein, gave PSAs to Russian and Chinese companies which gave a profit percentage of less than 10 percent.


The central government would distribute remaining oil revenues throughout the nation on a per capita basis. The draft law would allow Iraq's provinces freedom from the central government in giving exploration and production contracts. Iraq's constitution allows governorates to form a semi-independent regions, fully controlling their own natural resources.


The Iraq National Oil Company would have exclusive operational control of just 17 of Iraq’s 80 known oil fields. Normally countries do not have the type of exclusivity that would leave two-thirds of known and unknown fields open to foreign control. However, operational control of the fields does not mean control of the money made from them, and a percentage of the profits will be going into Iraqi tax revenue. Iraq’s oil reserves are believed to be the second largest in the world after Saudi Arabia.




The outcome of the Iraq oil law will determine America's position to withdraw from the Iraq war.

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Guest Dave Whyte

The suspension of the normal rule of law by the occupying powers, in turn, encouraged Coalition Provisional Authority tolerance of, and participation in, the theft of public funds in Iraq. State–corporate criminality in the case of occupied Iraq must therefore be understood as part of a wider strategy of political and economic domination. At least $12 billion of the revenue appropriated by the coalition regime has not been adequately accounted for.



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Guest human_*

Law, and it's still conjecture on your part, and every one else’s.


No one can accept the truth that bush went on the best information AT THE TIME, and that's it.


Law, in the area that I am an Expert in, I watch how the news media reports on what's going on, and the reporters

are at best re-posting information from the news releases.


<Maybe I should go back to lobbying? Find myself a nice gig, but with all of my luck it will be some thing that is considered a hot future political topic, and have my phones, computer, movements followed again.


When I use to lobby for another country I actually didn't mind the being followed part, because I knew that if some one mugged me or if I had an accident? I would have witnesses.>

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Guest Perseus Books Group

What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception


The most powerful leader in the world had called upon me to speak on his behalf and help restore credibility he lost amid the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. So I stood at the White house briefing room podium in front of the glare of the klieg lights for the better part of two weeks and publicly exonerated two of the senior-most aides in the White House: Karl Rove and Scooter Libby.


There was one problem. It was not true.


I had unknowingly passed along false information. And five of the highest ranking officials in the administration were involved in my doing so: Rove, Libby, the vice President, the President's chief of staff, and the President himself.


Scott McClellan was one of a few Bush loyalists from Texas who became part of his inner circle of trusted advisers, and remained so during one of the most challenging and contentious periods of recent history. Drawn to Bush by his commitment to compassionate conservatism and strong bipartisan leadership, McClellan served the president for more than seven years, and witnessed day-to-day exactly how the presidency veered off course.


Scott McClellan (born February 14, 1968) is a former White House Press Secretary (2003-2006) for President George W. Bush.


On April 19, 2006, McClellan announced that he would be leaving the Administration; he remained in the position until replacement Tony Snow was announced on April 26, 2006.


What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception book is scheduled to be released on June 2, 2008; however, excerpts have already been leaked. In the book, McClellan unexpectedly and harshly criticizes the Bush administration. He accuses Bush of "self-deception" and of maintaining a "permanent campaign approach" to governing rather than making the best choices. McClellan stops short of saying that Bush purposely lied about his reasons for invading Iraq, writing that the administration was not "employing out-and-out deception" to make the case for war in 2002, though he does write that the administration relied on an aggressive "political propaganda campaign" instead of the truth to sell the Iraq war. The book is also critical of the press corps for being too accepting of the administration's propaganda on the Iraq War and of Condoleeza Rice for being "too accommodating" and being very careful about protecting her own reputation.


McClellan unexpectedly and harshly criticizes the Bush administration in his memoir What Happened. He accuses Bush of "self-deception" and of maintaining a "permanent campaign approach" to governing rather than making the best choices. McClellan stops short of saying that Bush purposely lied about his reasons for invading Iraq, writing that the administration was not "employing out-and-out deception" to make the case for war in 2002, though he does write that the administration relied on an aggressive "political propaganda campaign" instead of the truth to sell the Iraq war. The book is also critical of the press corps for being too accepting of the administration's propaganda on the Iraq War and of Condoleeza Rice for being "too accommodating" and being very careful about protecting her own reputation.


The Bush administration responded through Press Secretary Dana Perino, who said, "Scott, we now know, is disgruntled about his experience at the White House. We are puzzled. It is sad. This is not the Scott we knew.



Washington, DC/Politics & Prose, 7pm – 6/10


If you are affiliated with the media and wish to request a book for review, please visit www.publicaffairsbooks.com/reviewcopy.html, or you may send an e-mail to PublicAffairs@perseusbooks.com. Please include the author and title and your affiliation in your request.



c/o Perseus Distribution Services (PDS)

1094 Flex Dr.

Jackson, TN 38301


Telephone: 800-343-4499

Fax: 800-351-5073

International Customers Fax: 731-935-7731



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Guest White House Press Secretary Offi

Press Gaggle by Dana Perino

Aboard Air Force One

En route Salt Lake City, Utah

1:56 P.M. MDT

May 28, 2008



Q I know that you said you weren't going to be speaking anything more about McClellan, but could you give us a little sense of who told the President about it, when it occurred and any reaction he had?


MS. PERINO: Sure. Well, you will recall that it was last November, right before Thanksgiving when we first heard about the book, when the excerpt came out. I was with the President at the time and told him about it -- we were at Camp David, right after an interview he had just finished.


And at that time, was led to believe that the excerpt was a little bit over-written and not necessarily representative of what the book would be like. And so I believe the original publishing date was sometime earlier this spring, so I've been anticipating the book to come out for a while. I think the June 2nd publishing date has been a little bit more firm recently, and so we knew that it would come out maybe next Monday, with some pre-publicity right before then.


So the President has been aware that it was going to come out. I talked to him a little bit yesterday -- I can't exactly remember where, but on the plane here -- I guess it was on the plane; I don't remember where we were on our way to, since we had three stops yesterday. And his reaction was similar to what I said this morning, which is he is puzzled, and he doesn't recognize this as the Scott McClellan that he hired and confided in and worked with for so many years; and disappointed that if he had these concerns and these thoughts he never came to him or anyone else on the staff that we know of.


So I think it's just a sad situation.


Q So you briefed him?


MS. PERINO: Yes, but I think I may not be the only one; we've known it's been coming for a while, so I'm assuming that other members of senior staff had alerted him. But we didn't really know what was in the book until yesterday -- well, I shouldn't say that, there are some people in the White House who get -- they get on any book chances to review, like from the legal perspective, but it was not widely distributed at all.


Q Do you anticipate doing sort of a line-by-line denial of or go through --


MS. PERINO: I don't think it's necessary to do that for this situation. You know, you can go through that, look at it yourself. I don't think it's the White House's responsibility to do a fact check of someone's memoirs, where they're rewriting what we all thought was a very different history with him at the White House.


Q I'm sorry if you said this, but was the President surprised?


MS. PERINO: I think you can fairly characterize it is as surprised, as well as he thinks it's a sad situation and was disappointed, as I said just a moment ago.


Q And also, a lot of Americans are beginning to read news accounts or see footage of this. I'm wondering if you have any concerns that it might undermine the public's confidence in the White House or in the mission in Iraq.


MS. PERINO: I don't. I think that if you look at -- look, setting aside his comments about what he now thinks about the war in Iraq, people can argue back and forth as much as they want about the ultimate decision to go to war. I think that the questions about the intelligence being wrong have been answered by the White House. The intelligence was wrong, and we have taken measures to make sure that intelligence failures like that don't happen again. And one of the ways we've done that is by modernizing and improving coordination amongst the intelligence agencies. And by any measure, that coordination is better than it's ever been in the United States. That doesn't mean there was anyone purposefully misled.


So fast-forward to where we are today in Iraq. We have a government led by Prime Minister Maliki that is going after criminal elements on both sectarian sides. We have a government that is increasingly able to sustain itself as it's been able to raise revenue and start paying for its own reconstruction. And there also -- have already had two elections; they're about to have another, coming up this fall. And the surge, as you heard the President say in the Air Force Academy speech, has worked. And Americans, along with others, are winning in -- winning and being successful because of changing strategies. It's a different type of struggle, in terms of an ideological struggle, as well as a counterinsurgency one, where you're trying, as the President said today, [to] help rebuild a country so that it will have a democracy from which to govern, sustain and defend itself.


And so, no, I'm not concerned about that. I don't think that -- I think people will be a little bit more interested into questions about why, if somebody has these concerns now, they wouldn't have brought them up.


I mean, I know that I was very fortunate to be hired by Scott McClellan. He's given me a great opportunity. I then worked for Tony Snow. And I have been around the White House since mid-September 2002. I have always had the opportunity to have a seat at the table, to make my opinions known whenever and to whomever I wanted to or felt I needed to, and I have done. So it's just curious to me why all of a sudden it seems that these were his actual feelings. It's hard for us, especially for me, who has been a very good friend to him. And of course, I wish him well. We all wish him well. Nobody has any ill feelings. We just think it's a sad situation.


Q Dana, can you tell us how much contact he's had with the White House since he left?


MS. PERINO: Well, I couldn't quantify it for you.


Q I mean, is it a lot? A little?


MS. PERINO: I know on a social basis that I had a lot of contact with he and his wife, sure.


Q I'm just kind of curious, in terms of the general -- you've kind of portrayed this as a sad situation that you're -- you don't quite understand this. But do you think this is causing any scrutiny on the White House as part of its own handling of the pre-war intelligence? I mean, is it causing any --


MS. PERINO: I think that horse has been beaten enough. And --


Q So the substance of what Scott is saying is not something that is causing any rethinking on the part of the White House?


MS. PERINO: I don't see any reason for it to do so. As I said, the questions about the intelligence being wrong has been -- have been asked an answered multiple times. And I think that I have had a good experience working both for Scott, for Tony Snow, and now heading up the press office, that I have good relationships with you all in the press corps, ones that are based on honesty and integrity. And I don't think that it ever -- I think that's always been the case since I've been there. So I don't see any reason for us to have to rethink anything at this point.


Q Did Scott tell you personally about his concerns that he raised in the book? Because I know you said you're a friend of Scott's.


MS. PERINO: Never.


Q I'm sorry, what?


Q "Never" to have what? I didn't hear it all.


MS. PERINO: His question was, had I ever heard such concerns? And I said, "Never."


Q The President often talks about, you know, history being the judge. And this is somebody who had a position where they could see more than, certainly, the public does. After some years of reflection, perhaps, looking back, thinking out of the limelight in private and everything, and coming up with his first version of history, isn't it a concern that, for you, for the administration, that the conclusions he's come to are the ones of your critics, essentially, rather than the supporters of the administration?


MS. PERINO: I think this is a unique situation. I don't think that this is so much as writing history as rewriting history. And when the President talks about "it will take a while," I think that that is just based on historical fact. I mean, it takes a while for any type of administration to be understood, and I think this is an anomaly.


Q Even though you don't -- you don't think there are others out there who maybe also were once supporters of the war, looked at the facts as we knew them at the time, and then to have now come around, as he says in the book, that he doesn't think it was the right decision? That's not a question of intelligence.


MS. PERINO: I'm not saying that's not the case, and I don't know. I don't go around and take a survey. But your question was, do I think that other people are going to turn around 180 degrees and become this -- have these expressions of concerns that they did not voice when they were at the White House. And so the question is, what did you really believe? Did you believe what you said at the time, or do you believe what you believe -- say you believe now? And I'm not going to be a judge of that. You all have to figure that out, or he'll have to answer for it for himself. I mean, I'm not going to -- as Jeremy suggested, the question being, would we go line-by-line through the book -- absolutely not. We have a lot more important things to do than that.


Q One specific factual thing. Scott suggested in the book that it was very unusual for Karl and for Libby to talk together, and that he was suspicious about that when he saw them talk one time. Was it unusual for those two to talk?


MS. PERINO: I found that to be strange. People in the White House have to talk to one another on a variety of different subjects. Who knows what the -- if that conversation -- if a conversation took place. Would it be surprising to me if Karl Rove and Scooter Libby, as the Director of Political Affairs Operation and the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, of whom was very important in our reelection efforts and our political efforts, would it be a surprise that they would have a conversation? Absolutely not. What would be a surprise is if they didn't have conversations. So I don't put much stock in that, but I don't know the facts. And I think he admits in the book that he doesn't either.

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Guest LAW_*

The new Australian government is not only pulling its troops out of Iraq, but also citing false intelligence used by the Bush administration to justify the invasion.


Of most concern to this government was the manner in which the decision to go to war was made: the abuse of intelligence information, a failure to disclose to the Australian people the qualified nature of that intelligence. For example, (the public was not told of) the prewar warning that an attack on Iraq would increase the terrorist threat, not decrease it. - Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd


Before the invasion of Iraq, Howard argued that then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had to be toppled to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. No weapons of mass destruction have been discovered in Iraq, and no definite links have been established between Saddam and al-Qaeda or other terror networks.

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Guest Wendy Morigi

The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, and a bipartisan majority of the Committee (10-5), today unveiled the final two sections of its Phase II report on prewar intelligence. The first report details Administration prewar statements that, on numerous occasions, misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq. The second report details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.


“Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence,” Rockefeller said. “In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.”


“It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa’ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa’ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses.


“There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate.


“These reports represent the final chapter in our oversight of prewar intelligence. They complete the story of mistakes and failures – both by the Intelligence Community and the Administration – in the lead up to the war. Fundamentally, these reports are about transparency and holding our government accountable, and making sure these mistakes never happen again,” Rockefeller added.


The Committee’s report cites several conclusions in which the Administration’s public statements were NOT supported by the intelligence. They include:


Ø Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.


Ø Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.


Ø Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products.


Ø Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.


Ø The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.


Ø The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 as the Vice President repeatedly claimed.



Additionally, the Committee issued a report on the Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The report found that the clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate. Potentially important information collected during the meetings was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.


Today’s reports are the culmination of efforts that began in March 2003, when, as Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller initially requested an investigation into the origin of the fraudulent Niger documents. In June 2003, he was joined by all Democrats on the Committee in pushing for a full investigation into prewar intelligence, which was eventually expanded by the Committee in February 2004 to include the five phase II tasks.


The Committee released its first report on July 9, 2004, which focused primarily on the Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism. Those findings helped lay the foundation for some of the intelligence reforms enacted into law in late 2004.


In September 2006, the Committee completed and publicly released two sections of Phase II: The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress; and Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments.


In May 2007, the Committee released the third section of Phase II: Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq.


Separately, in early 2007, the Pentagon Inspector General released its own report on the intelligence activities conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and also concluded that those activities were inappropriate.

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Guest Shana Marchio

U.S. Senator Kit Bond, Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, today admonished Democrats for playing politics with the final reports on prewar Iraq intelligence to score election-year points.


“It is ironic that the Democrats would knowingly distort and misrepresent the Committee’s findings and the intelligence in an effort to prove that the Administration distorted and mischaracterized the intelligence,” said Bond.


Today, the final sections of the Phase II report on prewar intelligence were released by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Bond pointed out that the partisan report not only violates the Committee’s nonpartisan principles but also rejects the conclusions unanimously reached in previous reports.


In July 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Iraq report, adopted by a unanimous vote, makes clear that flawed intelligence – not Administration deception – was the basis for policy maker’s statements and decisions. The report released today completely ignores this key finding.


Bond also called attention to the Democrats’ hypocrisy in excluding any of their own statements in this final report. Democrats in the Senate examined the same intelligence as the Bush Administration, and they too characterized Iraq as a growing and dangerous threat to the United States. Bond pointed to the public record, which is replete with examples of statements by Democrat Senators making the same characterizations regarding Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and links to terrorism.


Key problems with the report include:


The minority was entirely cut out of the process and that the report was written solely by Democratic staffers – For example, Republican amendments, including those of the Vice Chairman, were not even given a vote;

The Democratic staff who authored the report twisted policy makers’ statements and cherry picked intelligence in order to reach their misleading conclusions, often leaving out pertinent intelligence;

The report does not review any statements of Democrats, only Republican administration officials;

The Democratic staff did not seek to interview those whom they accuse;

The Rome report violates the Democrats’ own criteria for the Phase II report and should have been excluded.

Bond stressed that this type of partisan gamesmanship is beneath the Senate Intelligence Committee and takes away from the important national security issues the Committee should be focused on. Congress has failed to pass a terrorist surveillance bill, or intelligence authorization act, both of which are critical to improving the intelligence community. These failures are a result of injecting partisan politics into the Committee’s oversight responsibilities, emphasized Bond. With this final Phase II report now complete, Bond concluded that it is critical the Senate Intelligence attempts to move forward in a nonpartisan manner.

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Guest Specter

Administration officials must be held accountable for their misdeeds.


Q Mr. President, on the way to Europe, you gave a very interesting interview for The Times newspaper in which you basically said that you regret your war rhetoric. Now I'm wondering, do you actually just regret your war rhetoric, or do you regret having gone to war with Iraq?


PRESIDENT BUSH: I don't regret it at all. Removing Saddam Hussein made the world a safer place. And yes, I told the guy -- the guy said, now what could you do over? First of all, you don't get to do things over in my line of work. But I could have used better rhetoric to indicate that one, we tried to exhaust the diplomacy in Iraq; two, that I don't like war. But, no, the decision to remove Saddam Hussein was the right decision.




Bad intelligence cannot be used wholly as the excuse for the decision to go to war. To do so would be to not only blur, but to eliminate, the line between policy-making and intelligence. To eliminate that line is to do no less than corrode a fundamental pillar of a democratic society.




Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and Al-Qa'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq emphasize the verb "suggesting," noting officials never "asserted" such a partnership.




Secretary of Defense's statement on underground WMD facilities' vulnerbility to airstrikes was not supported by intelligence.




During the period of the "Rome meetings," which refers to several days in December 2001 when two Department of Defense officials met with two Iranian former officials (one a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and other associated with the "intelligence establishment of Iran," although the Committee's report provides no further clarity on his association) to gather information on developments in Iran." The meeting was initiated by an American scholar from a conservative think tank, operating independently, and the Iranian expatriate and Iran-Contra figure Manucher Ghorbanifar. The meeting was facilitated by ?




The publication of these two reports - Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information (hereafter referred to as "The Rome Meetings" and "Statements," respectively) - came following repeated failures by the Majority to coordinate the work effort with the Minority. The decision to publish the reports was a premptory decision by the Chairman of the Committee to terminate Minority participation in an amendment process that, while some might consider delaying by cavillation, had been well-established and productive in all previous stages of the investigation. As partianship corrodes the value of intelligence, partisanship poisons intelligence oversight.




Secretary Powell's entire UN speech was checked by the intelligence community, and some areas were actually drafted by the CIA.




The al-Libi reporting on CBW training was never questioned by the CIA and the information was approved by the CIA for use in both the President's Cincinnati speech and Powell's UN speech.




Dispite these issues, when the White House submitted the speech for CIA and we have this handwritten comment which shows that the CIA approved the language in the terrorism section.



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