Henry Hugh Shelton (born January 2, 1942) is a retired American career military officer. He served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997 to 2001.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton ordered Special Operations (SOCOM) commander Peter Jan Schoomaker (born February 12, 1946) to start a project code named "Able Danger" to track likely al Qaeda operatives worldwide.
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Special Operations Command - premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, properly equipped, and highly motivated: at the right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on Terrorism, accomplishing the strategic objectives of the United States - SOCOM Vision Statement
In order to accomplish this tasking General Schoomaker turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, was the 10 member Able Danger team leader.
The elite unit used computer programs, such as Spire, Parentage and Starlight, to track threats to U.S national security. Much of this data crunching was facilitated by private contractors, including Raytheon Company, of Waltham, MA, and Orion Scientific (now part of SRA International, Inc., based in Fairfax, VA) which helped execute the sophisticated data mining software packages, said Shaffer. When queried by GSN, a Raytheon spokesperson would neither confirm nor deny the company’s involvement with Able Danger.
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"What they were doing was determining who had associational links to certain people or entities or places," Zaid says.
In September 1999 U.S. Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer became a liason of the Able Danger team.
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I need you on a special project that we’re working on.” He looked over at the Special Technical Operations Office Chief, who was in the briefing, and said, “Read him into Able Danger.” So that was when I was first made aware that something was being done, and General Schoomaker turned to me and said, “I want you as part of the team doing this. - Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer
Schaffer defined the Able Danger program primary focus was tracking al Queda.
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Simply, to target Al Qaeda globally. All of Al Qaeda. It’s mission, functions and capabilities, so that on call -- one directed by national command leadership – the U.S. could do something to attack them. [To develop] an offensive capability so once we define what Al Qaeda is, we can find a way to stop them, to counter them overseas. - Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, Government Security News
According to Philpott, that Able Danger chart was produced in January or February 2000. The Able Danger Chart bore the name and likeness of Mohamed Atta, and linked him to a mosque in Brooklyn which has been a center of Islamic extremism for more than 20 years.
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In September 2000, the unit recommended that its information on the hijackers be given to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists - Rep. Curt Weldon in an interview with the Associated Press.
According to German police records, Atta was nowhere near the U.S. then. He was in Hamburg. And it wasn't until March 22, 2000, that Atta, an Egyptian national, began contacting flight schools here to see about taking lessons. He emailed 31 different schools. In one email, he wrote: "We are a small group of young man [sic] (2-3 persons) from several different Arab countries. We would like to start a course for professional airplane-pilots."
Then on March 31, Atta also emailed an old friend from Cairo who was studying in Florida to ask if he needed to apply for a student visa before coming to the U.S. He then applied for his visa, got it May 18, and arrived here June 3—several months after the Able Danger team allegedly placed the future hijacker in Brooklyn. By July, Atta had settled in Florida, far from his alleged Brooklyn base.
Shaffer set up meetings with FBI officials in 2000, but they were canceled because lawyers for the Special Forces unit -- of which Able Danger was a member -- allegedly were concerned military authorities could not legally share information with domestic law enforcement about potential terror suspects in the United States. An FBI agent, who, according to Representative Curt Weldon, will testify under oath that she organized the meetings between the FBI and Able Danger analysts to discuss Atta.
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Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, chairman and vice chairman of the now-defunct 9/11 commission, said that Able Danger "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts that involved [Osama] bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Separately, Kean and Hamilton said a senior 9/11 commission staffer met with a "U.S. Navy officer employed at DOD [Department of Defense] who was seeking to be interviewed by commission staff in connection with a data mining project on which he had worked."
But they said the officer's "account was not sufficiently reliable" to include in the final report.
That meeting, they said, took place on July 12, 2004, when the commission's final report already was well into its last stages -- the report was released July 22. The meeting included the senior commission staff member, another staffer, the Navy officer and a Defense Department representative.
According to the official record of the meeting, the officer "recalled seeing the name and photo of Mohamed Atta on an 'analyst notebook chart' assembled by another officer," Kean and Hamilton said in their statement. - CNN August 17, 2005
Jamie S. Gorelick, former Deputy Attorney General under Janet Reno and the Clinton administration. Gorelick was at the center of controversy as a result of her March 4, 1995 controversial memo to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White and others, erecting “a wall of separation” disallowing the sharing of intelligence between law-enforcement agencies about terrorists in the United States. Gorelick may be more intimately involved than previously thought with hampering communications between U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies fighting terrorism. Supposedly, Gorelick stopped Able Danger from passing leads to the FBI.
Although the National Security Council had the means through the U.S. Defense Support Program to bring all the CIA-FBI-DIA information [that they can't talk to eachother about], into a single picture.
In addition, there is a 1979 document called the Delimitations Agreement, between the DOJ and SECDEF which outlines investigatory authorities for counterintelligence (and by extension counterterrorism) cases between the Bureau and military CI agencies. The bottom line is that DOD does not have jurisdiction to investigate civilians in the United States without FBI coordination. They can investigate civilians overseas who may post a threat to DOD personnel/installations, but once bad guys pass over into the States, FBI retains investigatory jurisdiction.
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In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation. - Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence), September 1, 2005
Ms. Pat Downs statement is completely inaccurate. Here is the military regulation.
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TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE COLLECTED ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
Information that identifies a United States person may be collected by a DoD intelligence component only if it is necessary to the conduct of a function assigned the collecting component, and only if it falls within one of the following categories: Note: Terms used in this part are defined in appendix A and may differ substantially from traditional Army usage.
1. Information obtained with consent. In may be collected about a United States person who consents to such collection.
2. Publicly available information. Information may be collected about a United States person if it is publicly available.
3. Foreign intelligence. Subject to the special limitations contained in section E., below, information may be collected about a United States person if the in constitutes foreign intelligence, provided the intentional collection of foreign intelligence about United States persons shall be limited to persons who are:
(a) Individuals reasonably believed to be officers or employees, or otherwise acting for or on behalf, of a foreign power;
(
An organization reasonably believed to be owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a foreign power;
© Persons or organizations reasonably believed to be engaged or about to engage, in international terrorist or international narcotics
activities. (See AR 190–52.); (d) Persons who are reasonably believed to be prisoners of war; missing in action; or art the targets, the hostages, or victims of international terrorist organizations; or
(e) Corporations or other commercial organizations believed to have some relationship with foreign powers,organizations or persons.
4. Counterintelligence. Information may be collected about a United States person if the information constitutes counterintelligence, provided the international collection of counterintelligence about United States persons must be limited to:
(a) Person who are reasonably believed to be engaged in, or about to engage in, intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, or international terrorist activities. (See AR 190–52, AR 381–12, and AR 381–20.)
(
Persons in contact with persons described in paragraph C.4.a., above, for the purpose of identifying such persons and assessing their relationship with persons described in paragraph C.4.a., above.
5. Potential sources of assistant to intelligence activities. Information may be collected about United States person reasonably believed to be potential sources of intelligence, or potential sources of assistant to intelligence activities, for the purpose of assessing their suitability and credibility. This category does not include investigations undertaken for personnel security purposes. (See subsection 8.)
6. Protection of intelligence sources and methods. Information may be collected about a United States person who has access to, had access to, or is otherwise in possession of, information which reveals foreign intelligence and counterintelligence sources or methods, when collection is reasonably believed necessary to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information; provided that within the United States, intentional collection of such information shall be limited to persons who are:
(a) Present and former DoD employees;
(
Present or former employees of a present or former DoD contractor; and
© Applicants for employment at DoD or at a contractor of DoD.
7. Physical security. Information may be collected about the United States person who is reasonably believed to threaten the physical security of DoD employees, installations, operations or official visitors. Information may also be collected in the course of a lawful physical security investigation. (See AR 381–12, AR 381–20, AR 190–1, and AR 190–52.)
8. Personnel security. Information may be collected on a United States person that arises out of a lawful personnel security investigation. This includes information concerning relatives and associates of the subject of the investigation, if required by the scope of the investigation and the information has a bearing on the matter being investigated or the security determination being made. (See AR 604–5, AR 381–12, AR 381–20, and AR 190–52.)
9. Communications security. Information may be collected about a United States person that arises out of a lawful communications security investigation. (See AR 380–53.)
10. Narcotics. Information may be collected about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activities.
11. Threats to safety. Information may be collected about a United States person when the information is needed to protect the safety of any person or organization, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations. (See AR 190–52.)
12. Overhead reconnaissance. Information may be collected for overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons.
13. Administrative purposes. Information may be collected about a United States person that is necessary for administrative purposes.
Furthermore, someone here on a visa does not seem to be a US person:
27. United States person. a. The term “United States person” means:
(1) A United States citizen;
(2) An alien known by the DoD intelligence component concerned to be a permanent resident alien;
(3) An unincoporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens;
(4) A corporation incorporated intelligence the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. A corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated intelligence the United States, is not a United States person.
b. A person or organization outside the United States shall be presumed not to be a us person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained. An alien in the United States shall be presumed not to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained.
c. A permanent resident alien is a foreign national lawfully admitted into the United States for permanent residence.
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They were stopped because the lawyers at that time in 2000 told them Mohamed Atta had a green card" -- he didn't -- "and they could not go after someone with a green card," said Rep. Curt Weldon
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The "Wall." The "wall" metaphor is shorthand for the recognition that separate authorities govern law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations targeted against Americans. These authorities, designed to prevent a recurrence of domestic spying by the FBI and CIA, always recognized that international terrorism was both a law enforcement and intelligence matter. Contrary to the repeated mischaracterization by the Attorney General and others, the law never prohibited sharing information between law enforcement and intelligence communities; to the contrary, it expressly provided for such sharing. While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was interpreted to mean that prosecutors could not direct foreign intelligence wiretaps, as opposed to criminal wiretaps, the 9/11 failures had nothing whatsoever to do with the inability of prosecutors to direct such surveillance. - JusticeWatch
There was no legal basis for the provisions of Executive Order 12333 to have been interfered with or blatantly ignored by Department of Justice or Department of Defense lawyers pursuant to the exchange of intelligence data between SOCOM project Able danger and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal. - The provisions of Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981
As George W. Bush was sworn in January 2001, Special Operations Command submitted the final plan to the joint staff, and Able Danger ended.
e I.G. (inspector general) came in and shut down the operation because of a claim that we were collecting information on U.S citizens," says Smith.
Sometime after all Able Danger data was destroyed.
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa described the documents as "2.5 terabytes" _ as much as one-fourth of all the printed materials in the Library of Congress, he added.
On Sept. 25, 2001 Weldon stated that he handed over an Able Danger chart to Stephen John Hadley (born February 13, 1947), the current U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (commonly referred as National Security Advisor) for President George W. Bush.
"Steve Hadley looked at the chart and said, Congressman, where did you get that chart from?" Weldon said in a June 27 floor speech in congress.
"Steve Hadley said, Congressman, I am going to take this chart, and I am going to show it to the man. The man that he meant, Mr. Speaker, was the President of the United States. - Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa
National security adviser Stephen J. Hadley yesterday denied receiving a Defense Department chart that allegedly identified lead terrorist Mohamed Atta before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, dealing a blow to claims by a Republican congressman that have caused a political uproar in recent weeks.
Hadley does recall seeing a chart used as an example of "link analysis" -- the technique used by the Able Danger program -- as a counterterrorism tool, but is not sure whether it happened during a Sept. 25, 2001, meeting with Weldon or at another session, Jones said. - Washington Post, Saturday, September 24, 2005; Page A06
Attorney General, John Ashcroft reflected back to Gorelick when questioned at a 911 Commission hearing.
"In 1995, the Justice Department embraced flawed legal reasoning, imposing a series of restrictions on the FBI that went beyond what the law required," he said. "The 1995 Guidelines and the procedures developed around them imposed draconian barriers to communications between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The wall left intelligence agents afraid to talk with criminal prosecutors or agents. In 1995, the Justice Department designed a system destined to fail."
Continuing his testimony, Ashcroft stated:
"Somebody built this wall.” Ashcroft added: "The basic architecture for the wall . . . was contained in a classified memorandum entitled 'Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations. Full disclosure compels me to inform you that its author is a member of this Commission."
General Schoomaker became the 35th Chief of Staff of the United States Army, on August 1, 2003.
In October 2003, Executive Director (now Rice aide) Philip Zelikow of the 9/11 commission, two of his staffers, and a "attorney from the administration" were briefed in Afghanistan by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (DIA liason for Able Danger) on what the program had accomplished and why he felt it should be reestablished. Zelikow urged Shaffer to contact him personally upon his return to the US after his time in Afghanistan.
When the story broke, former Rep. Lee Hamilton, a Democrat from Indiana, co-chairman of the 9/11 commission, at first denied the commission had ever been informed of what Able Danger had found, and took a swipe at Weldon's credibility:
"The Sept. 11th commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of the surveillance of Mohamed Atta or his cell," Hamilton said. "Had we learned of it obviously it would have been a major focus of our investigation."
Hamilton changed his tune after The New York Times reported Thursday, and The Associated Press confirmed, that commission staff had been briefed on Able Danger in October 2003 and again in July 2004.
Shaffer and defense contractor James D. Smith, have stated that they had copies of a pre-Sept. 11 chart that included Atta, but that they were destroyed in 2004 under unclear circumstances.
"I was on the front end of specific tasks to feed something the Army was doing," says Pentagon contractor J.D. Smith, who discovered Atta's link to al Qaida
recollections of the intelligence officers cannot be verified by any document. -
9-11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean
“Bluntly, it just didn’t happen and that’s the conclusion of all 10 of us. - Republican commissioner Slade Gorton
O'Reilly August 25, 2005
ZAID: There are up to a dozen people, who, if they are contacted, who will support what Tony has asserted. His members of his team.
[Fade out music starts playing in the background.]
The Army ordered the documents destroyed. That's why they didn't get the right documents.
O'REILLY: I got it. Thank you gentlemen. We appreciate it. Plenty more ahead as The Factor moves along this evening.
The commission's refusal to investigate Able Danger after being notified of its existence, and its recent efforts to feign ignorance of the project while blaming others for supposedly withholding information on it, brings shame on the commissioners, and is evocative of the worst tendencies in the federal government that the commission worked to expose - Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa, August 10, 2005
C-SPAN Sunday Morning, 8/21. Shaffer's interview is 34:25 into the 3 hour show.
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