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  2. Actual reality?????

    Hijrah from Mecca to Madinah order from allah to the Prophet Muhammad Peace be upon him because Quraish hurt the Prophet and the Muslims Hijrah, in essence, is a process of transfer to a better situation. It is not meant to find a comfortable place where one would relax and stop endeavor (attempt). Rather, it is a search for an environment more favorable to continuous and constructive effort. Immediately after reaching Madinah, the Prophet undertook an all-embracing process to establish a faithful and strong society. This is a significant aspect and important lesson to learn from Hijrah. In the Glorious Qur'an, Allah, Most High, says, "Those who believe, and migrate and strive in Allah’s cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of Allah: they are indeed the successful people. Their Lord does give them glad tidings of a Mercy from Himself, of His good pleasure, and of Gardens where enduring pleasure will be theirs: They will dwell therein forever. Verily in Allah’s presence is a reward, the greatest (of all)." (Al-Tawbah 9: 20-22) The calendar year of Islam begins not with the birthday of our prophet (peace be on him), not from the time that the revelation came to him (Bethat) nor from the time of his ascension to heaven, but with the migration (Hijra) from an undesirable environment into a desirable place to fulfill Allah's command. It was migration from a plot that was set by the leaders of the Quraysh who were plotting to kill prophet Muhammad, and to destroy the truth that today is being conveyed to mankind everywhere against tyranny and injustice. Their purpose was to destroy the foundation of the Islamic state, the Sunnah of the tradition of the prophet, and to prevent the revelation being delivered by Allah's messenger to mankind. The Islamic calendar is reckoned from the time of migration (Hijra) of Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him) from Mecca to Madina. The Prophet's decision to migrate from Mecca came after several years of inhuman treatment of the faithful by the powerful tribes who were united despite all their feuds to stop the spread of Islam. Prophet Mohammad's decision to leave Mecca coincided with the infidel's plan to assassinate him. In 622 AD, the Quresh tribesmen held a meeting and decided that a band of young men, one from each tribe, should assassinate Prophet Mohammad collectively so that their responsibility for the murder could not be placed on any particular tribe. On the eventful night, the Prophet asked his cousin Ali Ben Abutalib to take his place in bed to make the Meccans think that he was asleep. The Prophet himself slipped out unobserved alongwith his loyal follower Abu Bakr (who was chosen as the first C aliph after the death of the prophet). They secretly made their way to a cave named Thawr, not far from Mecca and lay in hiding there for a day or two until Abu Bakr's son reported that the search for him had been given up. Then the two set out from Madina on camel back. They reached Quba, on the edge of the Madina oasis, on 12th Rabiul Awwal. With Mohammad's arrival in Quba a new phase of his career and glory of Islam started. This migration has a special significance in the history of Islam. It ended the Meccan period of humiliation and torture and began the era of success. His own people to whom he preached Islam for 13 years neglected the Prophet of Islam. But he was cordially received in Madina as an honored chief. In Madina his power enhanced day by day. Here he was not only the religious leader but took the role of a politician and statesman too. Prophet Mohammad expired ten years after his migration to Madina but only in one decade he changed the course of human history. Our religious calendar is the Hijri calendar. It is important for us to keep in mind the meaning and significance of Hijrah. Islamic months begin at sunset of the first day, the day when the lunar crescent is visually sighted. The lunar year is approximately 354 days long, so the months rotate backward through the seasons and are not fixed to the Gregorian calendar. The months of the Islamic year are: 1. Muharram ("Forbidden" - it is one of the four months during which it is forbidden to wage war or fight) 2. Safar ("Empty" or "Yellow") 3. Rabia Awal ("First spring") 4. Rabia Thani ("Second spring") 5. Jumaada Awal ("First freeze") 6. Jumaada Thani ("Second freeze") 7. Rajab ("To respect" - this is another holy month when fighting is prohibited) 8. Sha'ban ("To spread and distribute") 9. Ramadan ("Parched thirst" - this is the month of daytime fasting) 10. Shawwal ("To be light and vigorous") 11. Dhul-Qi'dah ("The month of rest" - another month when no warfare or fighting is allowed) 12. Dhul-Hijjah ("The month of Hajj" - this is the month of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, again when no warfare or fighting is allowed) Hijrah was one of the most important events in the history of Islam. It is for this reason `Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) adopted Hijrah date to calculate years. Muslims chose Hijrah as the focal point to reckon their chronology. In physical terms, Hijrah was a journey between two cities about 200 miles apart, but in its grand significance it marked the beginning of an era, a civilization, a culture and a history for the whole mankind. Islam progressed not only from the physical Hijrah, but because Muslims took Hijrah seriously in all its aspects and dimensions. DR. ZAKIR NAIK, TV AL HIJRAH, MALAYSIA - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GrEybmhapFg Hijra of the Prophet Muhammad SAWS By Sheikh Shady Alsuleiman https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TebwAAyMfh8
  3. Descartes' Meditations MEDITATION I. OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY DOUBT. I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt...I sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing certain...it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect ) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause... if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false. But it is not sufficient to have made these observations; care must be taken likewise to keep them in remembrance. For those old and customary opinions perpetually recur-- long and familiar usage giving them the right of occupying my mind, even almost against my will, and subduing my belief; nor will I lose the habit of deferring to them and confiding in them so long as I shall consider them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions to some extent doubtful, as I have already shown, but still highly probable, and such as it is much more reasonable to believe than deny. It is for this reason I am persuaded that I shall not be doing wrong, if, taking an opposite judgment of deliberate design, I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for a time, that all those opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at length, having thus balanced my old by my new prejudices, my judgment shall no longer be turned aside by perverted usage from the path that may conduct to the perception of truth. For I am assured that, meanwhile, there will arise neither peril nor error from this course, and that I cannot for the present yield too much to distrust, since the end I now seek is not action but knowledge. I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me
  4. Descartes' Meditations MEDITATION IIII OF TRUTH AND ERROR. For, in the first place, I discover that it is impossible for him ever to deceive me, for in all fraud and deceit there is a certain imperfection: and although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without doubt of malice and weakness; and such, accordingly, cannot be found in God. I am conscious that I possess a certain faculty of judging [or discerning truth from error], which I doubtless received from God, along with whatever else is mine; and since it is impossible that he should will to deceive me, it is likewise certain that he has not given me a faculty that will ever lead me into error, provided I use it aright. knowing already that my nature is extremely weak and limited, and that the nature of God, on the other hand, is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no longer any difficulty in discerning that there is an infinity of things in his power whose causes transcend the grasp of my mind. Whereupon, regarding myself more closely, and considering what my errors are (which alone testify to the existence of imperfection in me), I observe that these depend on the concurrence of two causes, viz, the faculty of cognition, which I possess, and that of election or the power of free choice,--in other words, the understanding and the will. For by the understanding alone, I [neither affirm nor deny anything but] merely apprehend (percipio) the ideas regarding which I may form a judgment; nor is any error, properly so called, found in it thus accurately taken. for the power of will consists only in this, that we are able to do or not to do the same thing (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or shun it), or rather in this alone, that in affirming or denying, pursuing or shunning, what is proposed to us by the understanding, we so act that we are not conscious of being determined to a particular action by any external force. For, to the possession of freedom, it is not necessary that I be alike indifferent toward each of two contraries; but, on the contrary, the more I am inclined toward the one, whether because I clearly know that in it there is the reason of truth and goodness, or because God thus internally disposes my thought, the more freely do I choose and embrace it; and assuredly divine grace and natural knowledge, very far from diminishing liberty, rather augment and fortify it. For, to the possession of freedom, it is not necessary that I be alike indifferent toward each of two contraries; but, on the contrary, the more I am inclined toward the one, whether because I clearly know that in it there is the reason of truth and goodness, or because God thus internally disposes my thought, the more freely do I choose and embrace it; and assuredly divine grace and natural knowledge, very far from diminishing liberty, rather augment and fortify it. But the indifference of which I am conscious when I am not impelled to one side rather than to another for want of a reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and manifests defect or negation of knowledge rather than perfection of will; for if I always clearly knew what was true and good, I should never have any difficulty in determining what judgment I ought to come to, and what choice I ought to make, and I should thus be entirely free without ever being indifferent. I not only know that I exist, in so far as I am a thinking being, but there is likewise presented to my mind a certain idea of corporeal nature; hence I am in doubt as to whether the thinking nature which is in me, or rather which I myself am, is different from that corporeal nature, or whether both are merely one and the same thing, and I here suppose that I am as yet ignorant of any reason that would determine me to adopt the one belief in preference to the other; whence it happens that it is a matter of perfect indifference to me which of the two suppositions I affirm or deny, or whether I form any judgment at all in the matter. If I abstain from judging of a thing when I do not conceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly, and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm, I then do not make a right use of my free will; and if I affirm what is false, it is evident that I am deceived; moreover, even although I judge according to truth, I stumble upon it by chance, and do not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of my freedom; for it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will. And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him... acts are wholly true and good, in so far as they depend on God; and the ability to form them is a higher degree of perfection in my nature than the want of it would be. With regard to privation, in which alone consists the formal reason of error and sin, this does not require the concurrence of Deity, because it is not a thing [or existence], and if it be referred to God as to its cause, it ought not to be called privation, but negation [according to the signification of these words in the schools]. For in truth it is no imperfection in Deity that he has accorded to me the power of giving or withholding my assent from certain things of which he has not put a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is doubtless an imperfection in me that I do not use my freedom aright, and readily give my judgment on matters which I only obscurely and confusedly conceive. have even good reason to remain satisfied on the ground that, if he has not given me the perfection of being superior to error by the first means I have pointed out above, which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the matters regarding which I can deliberate, he has at least left in my power the other means, which is, firmly to retain the resolution never to judge where the truth is not clearly known to me: for, although I am conscious of the weakness of not being able to keep my mind continually fixed on the same thought, I can nevertheless, by attentive and oft-repeated meditation, impress it so strongly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it as often as I require it, and I can acquire in this way the habitude of not erring. I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge, that it forms no judgment except regarding objects which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived; because every clear and distinct conception is doubtless something, and as such cannot owe its origin to nothing, but must of necessity have God for its author-- God, I say, who, as supremely perfect, cannot, without a contradiction, be the cause of any error; and consequently it is necessary to conclude that every such conception [or judgment] is true. Nor have I merely learned to-day what I must avoid to escape error, but also what I must do to arrive at the knowledge of truth; for I will assuredly reach truth if I only fix my attention sufficiently on all the things I conceive perfectly, and separate these from others which I conceive more confusedly and obscurely; to which for the future I shall give diligent heed.
  5. Actual reality?????

    8-b CAMEL'S CALF Hazrat Anas (rz) says: Once a man begged Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) for a camel for conveyance purpose. Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) was in jolly mood, so He said, "Yes i will give you, but a calf (baby camel). That person could not understand and got surprised and said, "O messenger of Allah! what I will do with a calf of a camel?" (means how can i ride a calf). Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) said "Every camel is the calf of a camel (means even after getting matured for riding, it remains a child of camel) (Tirmizi, Abo Dawood) .................................. NO HEAVEN FOR OLD PEOPLE Hazrat Anas (rz) says: Once an old lady asked Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) to pray for her, so that Allah may bless her with heaven. Prophet said, "No old lady will enter heaven." She was shocked, begin crying and asked, "Why old women will not enter heaven?" Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) said, "Did not you read the verse of Qur'an which says. Women of heaven will be of young age." (Mean all people who died old will be made young first, then will enter heaven.) ................................. COME ALONG WITH YOUR FULL BODY Hazrat Auf bin Maalik Ashari (rz) says: During the journey of Tabook, I went to meet Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) when He(Peace be upon Him) was relaxing in a leather tent. I greeted Him(peace be upon Him) (said Salam), He(peace be upon Him) replied. Then I asked permission to meet him. He gave me permission. then I asked, Shall i come inside tent along with my full body? Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) said, "Yes, come along with your full body." So i entered the tent. Hazrat Usman bin Abo Ataka says, the leather tent in which Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) was relaxing was too small. Hence Hazrat Auf Said, Shall I come along with full body?" Hazrat Auf(rz) only by leaning inside tent, could have talked to Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him), but both were in jolly mood, hence talked in terms of full and half body. (Abo Dawood) ............................. لماذا الجنة محرمة على اليهود والنصارى؟ ترجمة حصرية - احمد ديدات 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XKu5EOi9kM لماذا لا تتحدث عن الاسلام يا ديدات؟ - احمد ديدات https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJsrugMLNak جديد - تخيل انك ممرضة لحظة ولادة يسوع المسيح! - احمد ديدات Ahmed Deedat https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18FoM6pFnvU
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  8. Actual reality?????

    . هيبة المسلمين عند الغرب - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ImUWy1RLQM شاهد ماذا قال محلل سي ان ان عن سكن مسلمين بجوارك في امريكا م.mp4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9HTLPrVjC8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrT20oRf00M
  9. Actual reality?????

    27 – The pilgrim remembers that in doing these rituals he is the guest of the most Merciful. The gathering of Hajj is not at the invitation of any government or organization or king or president, rather it is the invitation of the Lord of the Worlds Who has made it an occasion on which the Muslims meet on a footing of equality in which no one is superior to anyone else. Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning): “And proclaim to mankind the Hajj (pilgrimage). They will come to you on foot and on every lean camel, they will come from every deep and distant (wide) mountain highway (to perform Hajj). That they may witness things that are of benefit to them (i.e. reward of Hajj in the Hereafter, and also some worldly gain from trade)” [al-Hajj 22:27-28] Al-Nasaa’i (2578) narrated that Abu Hurayrah said: The Messenger of Allaah (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “The guests of Allaah are three: the warrior for the sake of Allaah, the pilgrim performing Hajj and the pilgrim performing ‘Umrah.” Classed as saheeh by al-Albaani in Saheeh al-Nasaa’i, 2464. 28 – Strengthening bonds with the believers, as represented in the words of the Messenger of Allaah (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him): “Your blood, your honour and your wealth are sacred to you as this day of yours in this month of yours in this land of yours is sacred.” Narrated by al-Bukhaari, 65; Muslim, 3180. 29 – The season of Hajj is distinguished by complete separation from the people of shirk and kufr who are forbidden to attend any part of it. It is forbidden for them to enter the Haram at any time, no matter what their purpose. Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning): “O you who believe (in Allaah’s Oneness and in His Messenger Muhammad)! Verily, the Mushrikoon (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the Oneness of Allaah, and in the Message of Muhammad) are Najasun (impure). So let them not come near Al‑Masjid Al-Haraam (at Makkah) after this year; and if you fear poverty, Allaah will enrich you if He wills, out of His Bounty. Surely, Allaah is All-Knowing, All-Wise” [al-Tawbah 9:28] Al-Bukhaari narrated that Abu Hurayrah said: “Abu Bakr (may Allaah be pleased with him) sent me as an announcer on that Hajj [which the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) appointed Abu Bakr to lead in 9 AH], to announce on the Day of Sacrifice in Mina that after this year no mushrik might perform Hajj and no one might circumambulate the House unclothed.” Farewell Tawaf Farewell Tawaf is the final rite of Hajj. It is to make another Tawaf around the Ka'bah. Ibn Abbas said: "The people were ordered to perform the Tawaf around the Ka'bah as the last thing before leaving Makkah, except the menstruating women who were excused." Bukhari. Dr Zakir Naik speaking about Hajj - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/embed/Xn4v_9jWblw Do Muslims Worship the KA'BAH ? Dr. Zakir Naik (Urdu) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9MqYyFhpKM
  10. The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza, [1883], at sacred-texts.com PART V: Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation...we do not possess absolute dominion over them...Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them...Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland... He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27)... Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed? That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause; wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea. If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason; therefore, the emotion will cease to be a passion. there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body, and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception. everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary. The mind understands all things to be necessary and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore, it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and feels less emotion towards the things themselves. The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think; therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else... the mind's essence, in other words, its power, consists solely in thought, the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion, in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is, which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding. By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain. God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection; therefore he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain. The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect; wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active; consequently there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words, no one can hate God. This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason, it is common to all men, and we desire that all should rejoice therein Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge, founded on the actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions; at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body endures; and, consequently, it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything, or remember things past, except while the body endures God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence. This essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God, and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity; and this conception must necessarily exist in God The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal. the highest virtue of the mind, that is the power, or nature, or highest endeavor of the mind, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind. The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge: consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus, from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration. Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity, and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God. Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D. In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause. rom this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is, pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal. If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions. Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal. This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind; it is itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D. Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical. From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which ) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God, it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind, is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second kind... all things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death. The mind's essence consists in knowledge; therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures, and, consequently, the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil. Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c. death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence, it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil-that is, by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; therefore, he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that he will be affected with love towards God, which must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore, such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D. we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy. we primarily endeavor to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect. the eternal part of the mind is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act ; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them. If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts. Blessedness consists in love towards God, which love springs from the third kind of knowledge; therefore this love must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand; that is, so much the more power has it over the emotions, and so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. Proverbs 29:11 A fool lets fly with all his temper, but a wise person keeps it back.
  11. Actual reality?????

    18 – Increasing piety and making the heart fit to honour the Symbols of Allaah. Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning): “and whosoever honours the Symbols of Allaah, then it is truly, from the piety of the hearts” [al-Hajj 22:32] 19 – Training the rich to give up their distinct clothing and accommodation and making them equal with the poor in clothing and in the rituals of tawaaf, saa’i and stoning the jamaraat. This teaches them to be humble and to realise the insignificance of this worldly life. 20 – The pilgrim persists in worshipping and remembering Allaah during the days of Hajj, moving from one sacred place to the next, from one action to another. This is a kind of intensive training in worship and remembrance of Allaah. 21 – Training oneself to be kind to people – so the pilgrim guides those who are lost, teaches those who are ignorant, helps the poor, and supports the disabled and weak. 22 – Developing good characteristics such as forbearance and putting up with annoyance from people, because the pilgrim will inevitably be exposed to crowding and arguments, etc. Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning): “The Hajj (pilgrimage) is (in) the well-known (lunar year) months (i.e. the 10th month, the 11th month and the first ten days of the 12th month of the Islamic calendar, i.e. two months and ten days). So whosoever intends to perform Hajj therein (by assuming Ihraam), then he should not have sexual relations (with his wife), nor commit sin, nor dispute unjustly during the Hajj.” [al-Baqarah 2:197] 23 – Training oneself to be patient and to put up with difficulties such as heat, long distances, being apart from one’s family, going back and forth between the holy sites and crowded conditions therein. 24 – Learning to give up one's usual habits and the things that one is comfortable with, because the pilgrim has to uncover his head and give up his regular clothes, and leave behind the accommodation, food and drink that he is used to. 25 – When the pilgrim does saa’i between al-Safa and al-Marwah, he remembers that the one who obeys Allaah and puts his trust in Him and turns to Him, He will not let him down, rather He will raise high the esteem in which he is held. When Haajar the mother of Ismaa’eel (peace be upon them both) said to Ibraaheem, “Has Allaah commanded you to do this?” he said, “Yes.” She said, “Then He will not let us down.” So Allaah raised high the esteem in which she was held and the people, including the Prophets, started to run between the two hills as she had done. 26 – Teaching oneself not to despair of the mercy of Allaah, no matter how great one's worries and distress. For the way out is in Allaah’s hand. The mother of Ismaa’eel thought her son was about to die, and she started to run from one mountain to the other, looking for a solution, and it came to her from a source she could never imagine when the angel came down and struck the ground, and out came the water of Zamzam with its healing for diseases of the heart and body. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nuV8MUqsFng https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SAcR-apQc2Y شاهد...مديعة قناة CNN تعبر عن دهشتها من تنظيم مناسك الحج بالسعودية
  12. The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza, [1883], at sacred-texts.com PART IV: Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion. emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by virtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed. From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire, the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises. But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active, and must therefore be understood through our essence only; consequently its force and increase can be defined solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it; hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment. Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix. Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or quenched, Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present. I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet: 12— "The better path I gaze at and approve, The worse—I follow." Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increases knowledge increases sorrow." I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately. Desire is the essence of a man, that is, the endeavor whereby a man endeavors to persist in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger of the two. As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him-I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavor as far as he can to preserve his own being. Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly. The knowledge of good and evil is the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence. Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God. that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature. The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature, but it must be defined by the power, by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected ), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object, and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant. the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature. In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at variance one with another there is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are men most useful one to another. Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their fellow men The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also He who, guided by emotion only, endeavors to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavor, to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves. emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves. On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats. Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad. Pleasure is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked; therefore pleasure in itself is good Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest; the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body, and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such be good . But, as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own, we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion; we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavor to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for he seems unlike a man. As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed. Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions. If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire; therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men. Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly. Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive, and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil; hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil. The knowledge of evil is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature; therefore it is a passive state which depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof, namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils. A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another; therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil. I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above, none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason. But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavor to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect. the eternal part of the mind is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination, through which only we are said to be passive; therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them. If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand; that is, so much the more power has it over the emotions, and so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. 2 TIMOTHY 1 1:7 God did not give us a Spirit of fear but of power and love and self-control. ROMANS 4 4:13 For the promise 22 to Abraham or to his descendants that he would inherit the world was not fulfilled through the law, but through the righteousness that comes by faith. 4:14 For if they become heirs by the law, faith is empty and the promise is nullified. 23 4:15 For the law brings wrath, because where there is no law there is no transgression 24 either. 4:16 For this reason it is by faith so that it may be by grace, 25 with the result that the promise may be certain to all the descendants – not only to those who are under the law, but also to those who have the faith of Abraham, 26 who is the father of us all
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    9 – Pointing out the importance of Muslims coming together and establishing harmony. For we see usually each person travelling on his own, whereas in Hajj we see people coming in groups. 10 – Getting to know the situation of the Muslims from trustworthy sources, since the Muslim can hear directly from his brother about the situation of his Muslim brothers in the land from which he has come. 11 –Exchanging benefits and experience among the Muslims in general. 12 – Meeting scholars and decision makers from all countries and studying the situation and needs of the Muslims, and the importance of cooperating with them. 13 – Achieving true submission to Allaah by standing in the holy places when the pilgrim leaves al-Masjid al-Haraam which is the best of spots, and standing in ‘Arafah. 14 – Forgiveness of sins, because the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “Whoever does Hajj and does not speak any obscene words or commit any sin will go back cleansed of sin as on the day his mother bore him.” 15 – Opening the doors of hope to those who commit sin, and teaching them to give up their sin in these holy places, so that they will give up a lot of their bad habits during the period of Hajj and its rituals. 16 – Proclaiming that Islam is the religion of organization, because during Hajj the rituals and time are organized, with every action done in the place and at the time defined for it. 17 – Training oneself to spend in charitable ways and to avoid miserliness. The pilgrim spends a great deal of money for the sake of Hajj, on travel expenses, on the road and in the sacred places. https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=American+Christian+the+Hajj+pilgrimage
  15. “Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure." The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza PART III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, ... a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves. Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. This endeavor, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform. Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it. Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. if the body, and consequently the mind has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other. I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain, and desire. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire. the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, and consequently according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it, in other words, according as it may love or hate the same. Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus, when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be accidentally a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Pride,... is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain. In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of his self-approval, that is, of his pleasure; he will, therefore, endeavor, as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him: this endeavor or desire will be increased, if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire. But this endeavor or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore he will for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival, which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object. This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater. since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavor, appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love. If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it. For love is a pleasure which a man endeavors as far as he can to render permanent; he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavor is greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the endeavor to bring about that the beloved should return his affection . Now these endeavors are constrained by hatred towards the object of love; wherefore the lover will for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear. Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are the causes also of pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and endeavor either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed (attacked). However, I do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations (uncertainty) springing from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope. Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object. We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse, it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions, hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid (fearless), others timid (fearful), others by some other epithet (attribute). Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavors to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency. Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; Self-complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free. As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those others, and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many. For we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects. But when we suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only. This mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called Consternation (confusion), because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration; otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence (wisdom), industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater, and when joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature. To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c., we are, in consequence, determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity. A man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof. When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity. This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself; thus he is himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself. The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat. The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity. Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is checked in its endeavor—in other words, it feels pain. This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or self-complacency. For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure, in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly-that is, in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain he will endeavor to remove, by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can, embellishing his own. It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honor and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and venerate their possessors. Envy is a species of hatred or pain, that is, a modification whereby a man's power of activity, or endeavor towards activity, is checked. But a man does not endeavor or desire to do anything, which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature as himself. When, therefore, we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations (wavering) of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given modification of itself; therefore, according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice (greed), and ambition, being merely species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions. ... It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's nature or essence; therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavor to persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But by the endeavor to persist in its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we mean appetite and desire ; therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire. Now by pain we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked; therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is diminished or checked; therefore, no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which are attributable to the mind in that condition All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection. No one can deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain
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  18. The Quinisext Council (often called the Council in Trullo or the Penthekte Synod) was a church council held in 692 at Constantinople under Justinian II. It rejected most of the Constitutions of the Holy Apostles on account of the interpolations (redaction, editing) of heretics. Only the forty-seventh and last chapter of the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions contains the eighty-five Canons of the Apostles, of it to which has been given the name Canons of the Apostles was received in the Eastern Christianity. It is interesting to see what is viewed as cannon and what is not. The Book of Revelation and the Gospel of Barnabas are not mentioned. The Apostolic Canons Canon 85 The Statutes of the Fathers (Either the Didache, Didascalia, or most likely the Constitutions of the Apostles) was mentioned in Pope Gregory's I (papacy 590 - 604) response to Luminosus, abbot of the monastery of St. Andrew and St. Thomas, in the city of Ariminum (presently known as Rimini in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy) dispute with Castorius, Bishop of Ariminum. It was the city of Arinimum in 358, that Roman Emperor Constantius II requested western bishops at Ariminum to resolve the Arian controversy over the nature of the divinity of Jesus Christ, which divided the 4th-century church. Register of the Epistles of Saint Gregory the Great Book III Epistle XLII To Luminosus, Abbot Gregory to Luminosus, abbot of the monastery of Saint Thomas of Ariminum. Sergius I did not attend the Quinisext Council of 692, which was attended by 226 or 227 bishops, overwhelmingly from the patriarchate of Constantinople. The participation of Basil of Gortyna in Crete, belonging to the Roman patriarchate, has been seen in the East as representing Rome and even as signifying Roman approval, but he was in fact no papal legate. Sergius rejected the canons of the council as invalid and declared that he would "rather die than consent to erroneous novelties". Though a loyal subject of the Empire, he would not be "its captive in matters of religion" and refused to sign the canons. The Apostolic Constitutions were rejected as canonical by the Decretum Gelasianum. Writers such as Andrew J. Ekonomou have speculated on which canons in particular Sergius found objectionable. Ekonomou himself excludes the anathemizing of Pope Honorius I, the declaration of Constantinople as equal in privileges but second in honour to Rome. However, all popes since Leo I had adamantly rejected the 28th canon of the Council of Chalcedon, which on the basis of political considerations tried to raise the ecclesiastical status of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to equality with that of old Rome. Ekonomou mentions rather the approval by the Quinisext Council of all 85 Apostolic Canons, of which Sergius would have supported only the first 50. The Corpus Juris Canonici (lit. 'Body of Canon Law') is a collection of significant sources of the canon law of the Catholic Church that was applicable to the Latin Church. These canons were later approved by the Eastern Council in Trullo in 692 but rejected by Pope Sergius I. In the Western Church only fifty of these canons circulated, translated in Latin by Dionysius Exiguus in about 500 AD, and included in the Western collections and afterwards in the "Corpus Juris Canonici". Canon n. 85 is a list of canonical books:a 46-book Old Testament canon which essentially corresponds to that of the Septuagint, 26 books of what is now the New Testament (excludes Revelation), the Didache, two Epistles of Clement, and the Apostolic Constitutions themselves, also here attributed to Clement, at least as compiler. In the year 632 AD a similar life vs. death teaching was shared by Mohamed to his followers. Quran Al-Baqarah (The Cow) Watch "Oldest Bible found in Palestine." The title is incorrect. The narrator mistakes the Didache as a long lost gospel. That is incorrect. The Didache is a catechism of rules for reformed Jews that followed the Messiah is confirmed in the Torah, Gospels, and the philosophical teaching of Saint Paul's Epistles. It is similar to the Leviticus for the Jews. Like the Dead Sea Scrolls the Didache's impact on Christianity is not fully understood. The Didache has a message from the Apostles to share with us all, its community rules and prayers can still be applied to contemporary daily living. In my personal opinion the Didache is the Torah Law for Christians to follow. The Teaching of the Apostles is more than a list of do's and don'ts. The Didache is a window to early Jewish Christian community rules and prayers, By connecting the Apostles Teaching to actual scripture and historical catechisms, I hope Christians will see that we are truly brothers and sisters with those of the Jewish and Muslim faith. What is said in the Old Testament is echoed in the New Testament. I am so grateful for this enlightenment. The moral framework of Didache can be seen in the Talmud and Quran as well. In addition, the teaching helped me realize how imperfect I really am. Here is a Google link to where the Didache can viewed at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, also called the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre, or the Church of the Resurrection by Eastern Christians, within short walk from the Muristan (market area) in the Christian Quarter of the walled Old City of Jerusalem. https://maps.google.com/maps?q=31.7784444444,35.22975+(Church+of+the+Holy+Sepulchre)&ll=31.778104,35.229847&spn=0.002061,0.004729&t=h&z=19&layer=c&cbll=31.778103,35.229898&panoid=bnfkMksz1x5NRciFkHzXuw&cbp=12,350.02,,0,4.94 The site is venerated as Golgotha (the Hill of Calvary), where Jesus was crucified, and is said also to contain the place where Jesus was buried (the Sepulchre). The church has been a paramount – and for many Christians the most important – pilgrimage destination since at least the 4th century, as the purported site of the resurrection of Jesus. Today, the church is home to branches of Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy as well as to Roman Catholicism. Indeed the Didache is the most ancient Christian catechism and has been acknowledged by all the major Christian churches. Those who proclaim salvation should have a great understanding in the light of what Jesus taught about faith and the meaning of His crucifixion. When I was young I was honored to be considered a brother in a Jewish fraternity. Now, I consider myself humbly blessed to be an adopted brother to the great Israelite nation. I would be lost without their wisdom and guidance. Watch "Church History Literacy - Chapter 3: The Didache." The speaker explains the reasons why following the "Teaching" will make your life better for you. http://bishopmoore.org/cms/lib02/FL02000199/Centricity/Domain/312/The%20Didache%20-%20What%20Is%20It.pdf The moral laws of the Didache are a derivative of what St. Paul refers to as the natural law and the commands given by our Creator to the mankind. Martin Luther coined the term "antinomianism," to criticize those that believe they are saved without having to keep moral laws derived from scripture. Antinomainism derived from the teachings of Marcion of Sinope, a bishop of Asia Minor who was the first of record to propose that many of the teachings of Jesus were incompatible with the actions of Yahweh, the God of the Hebrew Bible. According to Marcion, the god of the Greek Old Testament, whom he called the Demiurge, the creator of the material universe, is a jealous tribal deity of the Jews, whose law represents legalistic reciprocal justice and who punishes mankind for its sins through suffering and death. Contrastingly, the god that Jesus professed is an altogether different being, a universal god of compassion and love who looks upon humanity with benevolence and mercy. Marcion also produced his Antitheses contrasting the Demiurge of the Old Testament with the Heavenly Father of the New Testament. The Apostle John and Marcion of Sinope (according to R. Eisler, The Enigma of the Fourth Apostle, Methuen & Co., 1938, p. 158, plate XIII). Source: J. Pierpoint Morgan Library Marcion's belief appear to have evolved from Zoroastrian and Jewish Qumran communities duelist belief. Zoroastrianism is a monotheistic religion that believes that Ahura Mazda is the eternal creator of all good things. Any violations of Ahura Mazda's order arise from druj, which is everything uncreated.
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    thank you \\ Hajj is the fifth pillar of Islam, Allah has imposed on the Muslims in the sixth year Hijri, one of the best works, was asked the Messenger of Allah (: Any business better? He said: (faith in Allah and His Messenger). It was said: Then what? He said: (Jihad in the way of Allah). It was said: Then what? He said: (accepted Hajj (the pilgrimage which was mixed with sin.) _ [Agreed] And Aisha - may Allah be pleased - said: O Messenger of Allah Jihad see the best work do you not strive? He said: (No, but the best Jihad accepted Hajj) _ [Agreed]. The Hajj is an expiation for sins, he said (: (of Hajj and does not and does not immoral act, he returned the day his mother bore him) _ [Agreed]. He also said: ('umrah to an expiation for them, and accepted Hajj brings no less a reward than Paradise) _ [Agreed] said (: (Amar delegation of pilgrims and God, who goes, and they asked him to them gave He) _ [bazaar]. Hajj and cleanses the soul and restores clarity and fidelity, and that it would be human to be patient and endure, and Hajj implanted in the soul the spirit of bondage full of God, and submission true to the law of God, and the pilgrimage leads a person to God grateful for the blessing of money and blessing of wellness. Hajj and lead to long relationship with the Muslims, including different colors, languages and home, and feel more strongly the Association of Islamic brotherhood, and helps to spread the call of Islam, as it is a popular conference to address the Muslims and to identify the conditions, and discuss their problems. The conditions of Hajj being obligatory: 1 - Islam, Hajj is not obligatory on the infidel. 2 - puberty, there must be a boy, even pilgrimage boy before puberty, is not acceptable for duty after puberty, but to perform Hajj once again, for saying (: (Any boy Ag then reached Perjury (age of reference), he should do Hajj again) _ [ Tabarani]. 3 - the mind, not on the pilgrimage crazy, but do not correct it. 4 - freedom, there must not be a slave. 5 - Being, so that it is able to withstand the hardship of travel, and that he has enough is enough of having to beg until he returns. And women, like men in the conditions of Hajj being obligatory but it is essential that accompanied a husband or a mahram, or be with her trustworthy women . HAJJ 2017 MAKKAH TAWAF LIVE
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